Medium-Term Review: 2005-2012, No. 10 December 2005 by Fitz Gerald, John et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEDIUM-TERM 
REVIEW 
 
2005-2012 
 
 
JOHN FITZ GERALD 
ADELE BERGIN 
IDE KEARNEY 
ALAN BARRETT 
DAVID DUFFY 
SHANE GARRETT 
YVONNE MCCARTHY 
 
 
DECEMBER 2005             NUMBER 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copies of this paper may be obtained from The Economic and Social Research Institute 
(Limited Company No. 18269). Registered Office: 4 Burlington Road, Dublin 4. 
www.esri.ie 
 
 
Price €100 
 
 
 
  
Authors 
John Fitz Gerald is a Research Professor, Ide Kearney is a Research Associate, Alan Barrett is a Senior 
Research Officer, David Duffy and Adele Bergin are Research Analysts, Shane Garrett and Yvonne 
McCarthy are Research Assistants with The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEDIUM-TERM 
REVIEW 
 
2005-2012 
 
 
JOHN FITZ GERALD 
ADELE BERGIN 
IDE KEARNEY 
ALAN BARRETT 
DAVID DUFFY 
SHANE GARRETT 
YVONNE MCCARTHY 
 
 
 
 
© THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
DUBLIN, 2005 
 
 ISBN 0 7070 0243 5 
 ISSN 0790-9470 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Work on this year’s Medium-Term Review has been a lengthy process, which involved many experts both 
from within and outside of The Economic and Social Research Institute. In preparing the Review for 
publication the authors have drawn heavily on the expertise of the Director and staff of the ESRI.  
Over the last six months, the authors have been in contact with several leading institutions and 
experts from various fields of the economy. Such meetings, as always, proved to be more than useful. In 
particular we would like to thank the Department of Finance, Teagasc, Forfás, the CSO, the ESB, IBEC, 
EIRGRID, and the other individuals who offered us useful advice. 
Once again the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, proved to be invaluable 
in offering advice and in allowing us access to their global econometric model, NiGEM which enabled us 
to formulate the External Environment section of this year’s Review, as well as allowing us to carry out 
various shocks in the model. 
Without Laura Weymes’s dedication this Review would not have appeared on time. The last word of 
thanks goes to Regina Moore, Mary Cleary and Deirdre Whitaker all of the ESRI, because without their 
professionalism, expertise and attention to detail, publication would simply not have been possible.  
Finally, the authors themselves are solely responsible for the analysis, views and conclusions reached 
throughout the Review. 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
Page 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IV 
 
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII 
 
 
Chapter 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 WHAT DRIVES THE ECONOMY? 5 
3 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 28 
4 OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 40 
5 THE HIGH GROWTH FORECAST 50 
6 THE OUTLOOK TO 2020 84 
7 CONCLUSIONS 95 
 REFERENCES 106 
Appendices 
 
1 FORECASTING RECORD OF THE MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 109 
2 DETAILED TABLES – HIGH GROWTH FORECAST 115 
3 DETAILED TABLES – LOW GROWTH FORECAST 123 
 
  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
After a decade of generally high growth and low unemployment there is a 
growing aura of invincibility about the Irish economy. Even the short 
slowdown of 2001-03 did not lead to an appreciable rise in unemployment. 
Today investment in housing is running at an unprecedented rate fuelling 
growth elsewhere in the economy. The unemployment rate is close to the full-
employment level, the lowest in the EU, and Ireland is seen to be the most 
attractive labour market in Europe for many of its young mobile population. 
Introduction 
The pattern of behaviour by households reflects a high degree of certainty 
about the future. The level of gross (and net) household debt is rising rapidly 
as households have confidence that they will be able to service this in the 
future. While some firms, especially in the manufacturing sector, are facing 
difficulties, their woes are masked by the feeling of bonhomie elsewhere in the 
business sector, especially in all those businesses that depend on building and 
construction for their success. 
The fundamental factors driving the Irish economy, which are considered 
in Chapter 2, remain quite favourable. In particular, the economy faces a very 
fortunate set of demographic circumstances over the next fifteen years. 
However, there are considerable dangers in the current situation: in particular 
the very high level of dependence on the building industry. This is 
compounded by apparent insouciance about the future manifested by many 
borrowers in the household sector.  
These internal risks to future prosperity must be seen against the 
background of the global economic imbalances that, if anything, are growing in 
magnitude. A key part of the story of this Review is the future evolution of 
these global imbalances.  
When Odysseus undertook his long voyage home from Troy he 
encountered many dangers. Not least were the distractions that the Lotus-
eaters provided for his crew. The lure of good times with the Lotus-eaters 
nearly derailed the voyage and tough measures had to be taken by Odysseus to 
get the crew back on board. Today, one of the key issues for policy-makers is 
how to tackle the dangerous imbalances that are building up in the economy at 
a time when euphoria in the household sector is possibly clouding the 
judgement of individual households. However, the nature and dimensions of 
the risks that the economy is likely to face over the coming decade suggest the 
need for public policy to take action to promote a soft landing. 
  
 While fears of a painful adjustment by the US economy to restore it to a 
sustainable growth path have been frequently expressed there is, as yet, no sign 
of it happening. In the light of this uncertainty we have developed two fully 
worked out scenarios for the US and the world economy: one where the US 
continues on its current unsustainable growth path with an ever rising balance 
of payments deficit and a second where the US undergoes an adjustment 
process bringing the external deficit under control.  
Background 
Assumptions 
In the more favourable, High Growth scenario, teased out in detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5, we assume that the US economy can go on growing at a 
rapid pace until 2015, with a gradual worsening in its external and government 
VII 
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deficits. If realised, this scenario would provide a very favourable backdrop for 
the Irish economy for the next decade. However, it is not possible for the US 
to continue forever on this path and we do not pursue the details of this 
scenario beyond 2015.  
When looking out to 2020 we feel that an alternative Low Growth world 
scenario is more realistic. This scenario, discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 6, 
assumes that the US economy begins a gradual adjustment to a more 
sustainable growth path from 2007 onwards. The transition to the Low Growth 
trajectory could occur at any point from 2007 onwards. Initially this 
adjustment process would be painful for the US and for the rest of the world. 
With the global imbalances continually increasing the adjustment process could 
be more painful the longer it is delayed.  
 
 Like a clockwork mouse that was fully wound up in the late 1990s, the Irish 
economy is gradually running down. Its potential to grow is less today than 
five years ago and it will be lower still in the next decade. The changing 
demographics play a key role in this slowdown. The unutilised resources 
available in the economy, not least the skilled labour, are being used up and, 
while there has been a major improvement in the quality of the infrastructure 
of the economy over the last decade, this development has been partially 
matched by the growth in pressures on that same infrastructure. As a result, 
the economy remains constrained by the limited stock of dwellings and 
infrastructure and consequent high prices and congestion. However, it still has 
the potential to grow at between 4 and 5 per cent a year out to the end of the 
decade. If realised, this would represent an unusually robust prospect 
compared to most of our EU neighbours. 
Forecast 
Figure 1: Alternative Growth Paths for Real GNP 
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Given the uncertainty about the development of the US and other major 
world economies over the period to 2020 we have developed two separate 
scenarios for the Irish economy – a High Growth and a Low Growth scenario. 
Possible paths for real GNP implied by these two scenarios are shown in 
Figure 1. Our conclusion is that by 2020 Ireland will end up closer to the lower 
growth path for GNP. However, when the economy will switch from the high 
growth path to the lower will depend on how long the necessary adjustment is 
delayed in the US. Two alternative adjustment paths are illustrated in Figure 1, 
one starting in 2010 and the other in 2015. 
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The High Growth scenario provides a forecast for the economy assuming that 
the current pattern of growth in the world economy continues. On this basis it 
seems likely that the economy will show quite robust growth out to the end of 
the decade (Table 1). This should see living standards, measured in terms of 
the more appropriate indicator of GNP per head, also rising quite rapidly by 
around 3.4 per cent a year. The growth in output per worker (productivity), 
which has been particularly slow over the first half of the decade, is expected 
to grow at 2.5 per cent a year out to 2010, more in line with the pre-1995 
experience. The growth in wage rates is expected to be between 4 and 4.5 per 
cent a year for the rest of the decade. Given that the rate of inflation is 
expected to remain close to 2 per cent a year, this should see continuing 
significant rises in real wage rates.  
High Growth 
Forecast 
The government is assumed to maintain a small surplus over the forecast 
horizon. As a result, the net indebtedness of the government sector will fall. 
The external balance should remain close to balance in spite of the continuing 
high level of investment in housing. 
Table 1:  Forecast Summary, High Growth 
 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15
 Average Annual Growth, % 
GNP 4.4 8.8 4.0 4.9 3.3 
GNP per head 3.9 7.7 2.2 3.4 1.6 
GNP per worker 2.5 3.7 0.9 2.5 1.5 
Non-Agricultural Wage Rates 4.4 6.0 5.5 4.3 6.9 
Consumption Deflator 2.7 3.2 3.4 2.1 4.1 
Employment, April 1.9 5.0 3.1 2.4 1.7 
Labour Force, April 1.9 3.4 2.9 2.3 1.5 
For end Year: 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Net Immigration, thousands -2 26 53 31 44 
Unemployment rate, ILO Basis % 12.2 4.3 4.2 3.6 2.7 
Balance of Payments, % of GNP 3.2 -0.3 -1.8 0.1 2.1 
General Government Balance, % of GNP -2.3 5.1 -0.6 0.3 0.1 
Debt/GNP Ratio1 83.6 34.3 22.4 17.2 12.5 
Housing Completions 31 50 79 70 80 
 
After the spectacular employment performance of the recent past, growth 
is expected to revert to a more normal rate of around 2.4 per cent a year out to 
2010. This growth should be accompanied by a small fall in the unemployment 
rate. With the supply of labour domestically slowing this will require a 
substantial continuing net inflow of skilled labour from abroad. However, the 
fact that GNP per head is expected to rise quite rapidly would suggest that the 
additional growth which is made possible by the immigration of skilled labour 
will enhance the living standards of the population as a whole. 
After 2010, under this scenario, increasing pressures build up within the 
economy resulting in accelerating inflation in prices and wages and a serious 
loss of competitiveness. The tightness of the labour market is reflected in the 
continuing fall in the unemployment rate. The housing market also shows 
pressures with a continuing very high level of output and corresponding 
improbably high prices. All this would suggest that even if the US growth were 
to continue unchecked, the Irish economy could begin to encounter serious 
problems early in the next decade as a result of a prolonged period of 
exceptional growth. 
 
1 The National Pension Reserve Fund has been netted off the debt. 
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The Low Growth scenario assumes that market forces will produce an 
adjustment in the US and the world economies beginning in 2007, moving the 
US back onto a sustainable growth path. The result of this adjustment process 
is that US and world growth would be significantly lower in the five years 
2007-11 than in the high growth scenario. Because of the openness of the Irish 
economy it would result in significantly lower growth in Ireland than in the 
alternative scenario where the US does not adjust. 
Low Growth 
Forecast 
Table 2: Forecast Summary, Low Growth 
  1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20
  Average Annual Growth Rates 
GNP 4.4 8.8 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.3 
GNP per head 3.9 7.7 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.2 
GNP per worker 2.5 3.7 0.9 2.0 1.8 1.9 
Non-Agricultural Wage Rates 4.4 6.0 5.5 4.1 2.8 3.2 
Consumption Deflator 2.7 3.2 3.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 
Employment, April 1.9 5.0 3.1 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Labour Force, April 1.9 3.4 2.9 2.1 1.1 0.7 
For end Year: 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Net Immigration, thousands -2 26 53 23 18 13 
Unemployment rate, ILO Basis % 12.2 4.3 4.2 7.1 6.4 4.0 
Balance of Payments, % of GNP 3.2 -0.3 -1.8 -0.4 3.0 6.0 
General Government Balance, % of GNP -2.3 5.1 -0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Debt/GNP Ratio 83.6 34.3 22.4 18.6 15.5 12.5 
Housing Completions, thousands 31 50 79 62 60 56 
 
In this scenario the Irish economy grows at less than its potential in the 
period to 2010 resulting in a significant rise in the unemployment rate to over 
7 per cent of the labour force in 2010. However, the growth in GNP per head 
would be rather similar to that of the last five years. There would be a much 
lower level of net immigration corresponding to the disimproved labour 
market circumstances. After 2010 the economy should grow at something over 
3 per cent a year giving rise to a growth in GNP per head averaging around 2 
per cent a year – comparable to the growth in the current decade. 
The rate of inflation in both consumer prices and wages would be much 
more moderate than in the high growth scenario reflecting the weaker labour 
market conditions. Also it is assumed in this scenario that there is a gradual 
slowdown in the building sector with house prices relatively stable in real 
terms.  
 
 The Irish economy is now exceptionally dependent on the building industry 
for growth and employment. The continued growth in prices, well above the 
rate of inflation in most of the other rich EU countries, looks increasingly 
threatening. While a soft landing remains a possibility, one can envisage a 
range of shocks that could cause a dramatic turnaround in the sector. For 
example, a more extreme or sudden US adjustment process, through its 
negative effects on world growth generally and on Ireland in particular, could 
cause a sudden loss of confidence bringing about a rapid and substantial fall in 
house prices of up to a third. In Chapter 6 we consider just such an outcome. 
Housing Market 
Risks 
The results of our analysis suggest that the impact could be very painful. 
The loss of confidence and the related fall in prices could bring about a fall in 
housing output of around 40 per cent. Superimposed on the low growth 
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scenario it could push growth in GNP down to near 1 per cent in the year that 
the collapse occurred and GNP per head could actually fall marginally that 
year. Over the first three years the unemployment rate could move temporarily 
above 10 per cent of the labour force.  
This Review is not suggesting that such a serious shock is inevitable. 
However, as the building and construction sector continues to grow it is 
becoming increasingly likely that some major shock will affect it and, as a 
result, the whole economy. Until the shock actually occurs it remains possible 
for wise economic policy to steadily reduce the economy’s exposure to such an 
unfavourable risk and to increase the chances of a genuinely soft landing over 
the coming decade. 
Given the size of the building and construction sector anything that causes 
a collapse in activity would immediately transmit itself to the rest of the 
economy. The aim of policy should be to try and reduce this danger. This 
could best be done by removing all incentives that are fuelling the boom and 
then by consideration of measures that can reduce demand for building and 
construction, either directly through moderating state spending, or indirectly 
through appropriate fiscal instruments. At the level of the economy a tight 
fiscal policy would help turn down the heat and it would also provide spare 
capacity for the state to intervene in the event that things go wrong in the 
future. 
 
 In spite of the dangers that exist, the Irish economy is basically robust and 
can look forward to an average growth rate in GNP per head of around 2 per 
cent a year out to the end of the next decade. If realised such a performance 
would be pretty remarkable.  
Medium-Term 
Challenges 
The demographic changes that are now inevitable are going to change 
society as well as the economy in many different ways. With the ageing of the 
very numerous cohort currently in their mid-20s, by 2015 it will be the care of 
infants rather than the lure of nightclubs that will have them up late at night! 
As a result, the demand for child-care outside the home will rise further and at 
the same time changes in the labour market are likely to reduce the supply of 
child-care workers with corresponding upward pressure on wages and prices. 
The continuing inflow of workers from abroad with a high level of 
education will add to the growth potential of the economy and will help raise 
GNP per head with consequential benefits for those already resident in 
Ireland. It should also see low skilled wage rates rising more rapidly than high 
skilled rates narrowing the existing wide dispersion of wage rates. Any 
tightness in the labour market for less skilled workers is a necessary 
consequence of Ireland moving up the value-added chain. It would not be 
appropriate to try and attract large numbers of low skilled workers from 
outside the EU to halt this process. 
The Irish economy’s future lies more in services that are produced using 
skilled labour rather than in the traditional manufacturing sector. Many of 
these services are tradable and they constitute an ever-increasing share of our 
exports. As with most other developed economies, it is quite possible to 
envisage the Irish economy continuing to grow in a sustainable manner 
supported by such exports, even if the manufacturing sector is no longer the 
motor of growth. The analysis reported in Chapter 2 examines how this 
process is already taking place.  
This shift in the factors driving growth does not mean that the 
manufacturing sector is no longer important. On the contrary, it will continue 
to be a key sector of the economy and its future success will remain very 
important. More than ever it will be the high technology part of manufacturing 
that will continue to thrive. However, it will no longer be a key generator of 
new employment opportunities. 
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Promoting a successful services based economy will require a change in 
policy focus. More than ever making Ireland an attractive place for skilled 
workers as much as for employers will help guarantee success. Research and 
Development (R&D) will of course be crucial. However, the priorities for 
support for R&D may need rethinking if it is to contribute to the success of 
business in the evolving services sectors. Finally, Ireland needs to wean itself 
away from excessive dependence on the low corporation tax regime. With 
increasing competition in this field we are no longer unique. In addition, we 
can not be certain that our neighbours’ frustration with the policy will not 
eventually provoke an unpleasant response. This does not mean that the 
regime should be abolished. Rather it means that we should cease to see it as a 
key policy instrument for promoting business in Ireland in the future. By 2020 
we need to have evolved an economy where the vast bulk of successful 
business activity is in Ireland because of all the other features that can confer 
competitive advantage. 
Finally, Ireland is ageing, albeit slowly by the standards of the rest of the 
EU. We have the time to prepare for the burdens that that will impose. 
 
 This Review has tried to tell a complex story, a story that reflects the reality of 
the Irish economy today. The next decade should see significant further 
progress in terms of rising living standards. However, the tone of this report is 
more ominous in the face of gathering clouds on the horizon. In particular, the 
very success of the building and construction sector holds the seeds of future 
potential problems. Economic policy needs to manage the exposure of the 
economy to any future crisis in the building sector: to reduce the possibility 
that a crisis may occur and to provide a buffer of resources to deal with the 
consequences of any future shocks. 
Conclusions 
 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
After a decade of generally high growth and low unemployment there is a 
growing feeling among households and companies that the Irish economy is 
invincible. Even the short slowdown of 2001-03 did not lead to an appreciable 
rise in unemployment and, as a consequence, it did not significantly dent 
confidence in the future. Today investment in housing is running at an 
unprecedented rate, fuelling growth elsewhere in the economy. The 
unemployment rate is bouncing around close to the full-employment level, and 
Ireland is seen to be the most attractive labour market in Europe for many of 
the mobile young population. 
1.1 
Background 
The pattern of behaviour by households reflects a high degree of certainty 
about the future. The level of gross (and net) household debt is rising rapidly; 
households have confidence that they will be able to service this in the future. 
Many companies also appear to be sanguine about the future. This is reflected 
in very substantial increases in employment. While some firms, especially in the 
tradable manufacturing sector, are facing difficulties, their woes are masked by 
the feeling of bonhomie elsewhere in the business sector, especially in all those 
businesses that depend on the building sector for their success. 
As discussed later in this Review, the fundamental factors driving the Irish 
economy remain favourable. The economy faces a very fortunate set of 
demographic circumstances over the next fifteen years. Together these 
circumstances will conspire to give Ireland one of the lowest rates of economic 
dependency in the OECD area. The benefits of past investment in education 
will also continue to produce a significant boost to productivity for some time 
to come. In addition, the economy, including the labour market, shows 
considerable flexibility. The limited impact of the recent economic slowdown 
on the unemployment rate was indicative of this flexibility. Also the very elastic 
labour supply through migration means that the labour market is fast to react 
to changes in demand. 
While the underlying structure of the economy is evolving in a manner that 
should be favourable to future growth, there are considerable dangers in the 
current situation. In particular, the extremely high level of dependence on the 
continuing success of the building industry is a serious cause for concern. This 
is compounded by the certainty with which many in the household sector view 
the future prospects for growth.  
These internal risks to future prosperity must be seen against the 
background of the global economic imbalances that, if anything, are growing in 
magnitude. A key part of the story of this Review is the future evolution of 
these global imbalances. In the more favourable, High Growth scenario, teased 
out in detail in Chapters 3 and 5, we assume that the US economy will 
continue growing at a rapid pace indefinitely in spite of a gradual worsening in 
its external and government deficits. We continue this scenario out for the next 
decade and, if realised, it would provide a very favourable backdrop for the 
Irish economy. However, it is not possible for the US to continue forever on 
this path and the results of this scenario suggest that other domestic factors, in 
particular the gradual loss of competitiveness, could in any event bring the 
period of high growth to an end. 
1 
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When looking beyond 2010 we feel that an alternative Low Growth scenario 
is more realistic. This scenario, discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 6, assumes 
that the US economy begins a gradual adjustment to a more sustainable growth 
path from 2007 onwards. This adjustment process would be painful for the US 
and for the rest of the world in the short term. We do not attempt to predict 
when this adjustment will actually occur. It could begin as early as 2007 or it 
could be postponed until well into the next decade. With the global imbalances 
increasing year by year the adjustment process is likely to be more painful the 
longer it is delayed. In addition, in the Low Growth scenario we assume that the 
adjustment process is fairly gradual and spread over a number of years. In 
practice, if it is to occur, the adjustment may be more of a short sharp shock. 
This could portend a much more unpleasant environment for the Irish 
economy in the year it happened, but the more rapid restoration of the world 
to a sustainable growth path could prove beneficial in the longer term. 
In this Review we have only considered two alternative scenarios for the 
world economy in detail. Obviously there is an infinite set of possibilities, 
some of which might produce a less painful resolution to the problem of 
international imbalances. However, it is equally true that things could be more 
difficult than we envisage in this Review and in Chapter 6 we consider how 
problems in the building and construction sector could interact with an 
unfavourable external environment to produce a serious domestic slowdown.  
While our forecasting record (see Appendix 1) has been acceptable, the one 
certainty is that the world will not turn out exactly as it is modelled in any of 
our scenarios. The purpose of this Review is primarily to provide an explanation 
of the factors driving the Irish economy and to explore a range of possible 
future economic outturns. This range of possibilities highlights the uncertain 
world in which policy-makers must operate. Their objective in forming 
economic policy should be to choose a strategy that will be robust in the face 
of a wide range of possibilities. It is also important to adopt policies that may 
reduce or eliminate the danger of some future shocks. To the extent that the 
range of forecasts in this Review helps policy-makers hone their policies to 
avoid future shocks, the actual economic outturn could be enhanced (and the 
forecasts rendered obsolete). 
When Odysseus undertook his long voyage home from Troy he 
encountered many dangers. Not least were the distractions that the Lotus-
eaters provided for his crew. The lure of good times with the Lotus-eaters 
nearly derailed the voyage and tough measures had to be taken by Odysseus to 
get the crew back on board. Today, one of the key issues for policy-makers is 
how to tackle the dangerous imbalances that are building up in the economy at 
a time when euphoria in the household sector is possibly clouding the 
judgement of individual households. Trying to get households and companies 
to focus on future dangers at a time when the economy is thriving is always 
difficult. However, the nature and dimensions of the risks that the economy is 
likely to face over the coming decade does underline the importance of 
commencing this task. 
 
 In Chapter 2, we bring together the results of recent work on the changing 
structure of the Irish economy, in an effort to develop our understanding of 
the mechanisms underpinning recent trends. As will be seen in that Chapter, 
services are playing an ever increasing role in the economy, both in terms of 
domestic consumption patterns and exports. Given the historic concentration 
on manufacturing in the policy arena and in discourse on the drivers of 
economic growth, this shift will be critical from a number of perspectives. In 
Chapter 2, we also return to some more traditional themes such as the role of 
human capital and immigration. While these themes have been discussed 
before, the work presented in Chapter 2 places developments in these areas in 
the broader context of Ireland’s recent economic experience. 
1.2 
 Outline of the 
Review 
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Turning next to the international context, a number of uncertainties exist 
which could have potentially large impacts on the Irish economy. Foremost 
among these are the on-going large imbalances in the US economy, in 
particular the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. The 
US balance of payments deficit has been growing in recent years and has now 
reached over 6 per cent of GDP. This situation is unsustainable in the long run 
and at some stage the US economy will have to adjust to return it to a 
sustainable path. As the adjustment could involve a large dollar depreciation 
and/or a dramatic cutback in US consumption, the implications for the Irish 
economy could be significant.  
In Chapter 3, using the NiGEM1 model of the world economy, we quantify 
by how much US private and public consumption might have to fall in order 
to bring the US economy to a point where the balance of payments deficit is 
sustainable. The results are used in the rest of this Review when we quantify the 
possible impact on the Irish economy of a US adjustment. As will be seen, the 
estimated impact is large and provides one of the key findings of this Review. 
We also look at the German economy to assess the prospects for recovery 
based on improved consumer sentiment as this, along with investment, 
appears to be the missing link in the potential German (and hence euro-zone) 
recovery. 
In Chapter 4, we provide a broad overview of our forecasts before going 
into greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 contains the High Growth 
forecast. In a sense, the crucial assumption that underlies this forecast is that 
no adjustment occurs in the US in response to its imbalances until after 2012. 
We have opted to present this as our detailed forecast to 2012 based on a 
belief that adjustment in the US is unlikely to occur in the immediate future. 
We are less certain as to whether or not an adjustment will occur after 2008/9. 
However, a working assumption is needed and so we have opted for the no-
adjustment story as the baseline. In the absence of a US adjustment, the 
picture that emerges of the Irish economy in the medium term is one of 
continued economic growth averaging over 4.5 per cent per annum out to 
2010.  
In Chapter 6, we alter the crucial “no-adjustment” assumption and estimate 
the impact on Ireland of an adjustment in US private and public consumption 
commencing in 2007. This Chapter presents details of our Low Growth 
scenario. This adjustment could begin in any year from 2007 onwards. The 
later it occurs the bigger the adjustment that is likely to be necessary. In 
modelling the adjustment in this way we do not imply that this is when and 
how we necessarily see adjustment occurring. Rather our goal is to quantify the 
impact of an adjustment and to examine the implications for Ireland. As noted 
already, the impact is large and so a core conclusion of this Review is that the 
on-going US imbalances pose a substantial threat to Ireland’s economy.  
Chapter 6 also includes an analysis of what would happen if the world 
slowdown, consequent on the US adjustment scenario, triggered a major fall in 
domestic housing prices. This scenario shows just how vulnerable the Irish 
economy now is to any downturn that has a major impact on the building 
industry. In this scenario where housing prices and output drop very 
substantially, the unemployment rate rises dramatically to over 10 per cent of 
the labour force towards the end of the decade. 
In Chapter 7, we discuss the implications of these scenarios for public 
policy over the coming decade. While there are dangers for future 
development, prudent policy could minimise these risks and help ensure that 
the Irish economy realises its considerable potential. 
 
1 The NiGEM world model has been developed and maintained by the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research in the United Kingdom. 
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In the discussion of the High Growth scenario in Chapters 4 and 5 we 
emphasise the annual average change in key variables for each five-year period. 
This is because we feel that much wider margins of error attach to the 
forecasts for individual years than to the forecast trend growth rates. While we 
still present year-by-year forecasts out to 2012, this could give a misleading 
impression of the degree of precision that can be expected from such an 
exercise. In addition to the detailed numbers for the years to 2012, we have 
also included some summary measures for average growth rates for the 
subsequent decade. Obviously, there can be even less precision about such 
numbers than for the current decade, but these numbers are useful in 
illustrating important structural changes that are likely to occur in the 
economy. We do not feel it sensible to include numbers for the period after 
2015 for the High Growth scenario.  
1.3  
Methodology 
As discussed in Appendix 1, our forecasting record, while better than 
average, is still not perfect. As a result, in preparing our forecasts we have 
examined a number of scenarios reflecting the range of uncertainty that 
surrounds our forecast of the potential output growth of the Irish economy. 
The forecast presented in this Review, and the analysis underlying the range 
of different scenarios, has been developed with the assistance of three different 
economic models. In developing our forecast for the world economy and the 
external environment for the Irish economy we have used the NiGEM world 
model of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in the 
United Kingdom. This model allows us to simulate different options on how 
the US economy is likely to cope with its internal imbalances and how these 
different options are likely to affect the rest of the world. It also allows us to 
examine how changes in exchange rates may affect the economic prospects for 
the major world economies. The benefit of such a model is that it allows “what 
if” experiments to see how sensitive forecasts are to changes in different 
assumptions. This model has proved an essential tool in preparing a consistent 
set of forecasts for the major world economies of relevance to Ireland. 
In analysing changes in the population structure that are taking place we 
have used a demographic model of the Irish economy. This model uses very 
detailed data from successive CSO Labour Force Surveys and Quarterly National 
Household Surveys on labour force status broken down by level of education, age 
and sex. The model is driven by the educational attainment of the population. 
In the model individuals, as they reach the age of 20 years, are assigned a level 
of education based on current trends. This level of education has a major 
impact on their labour force behaviour. The model is used to project births, 
deaths, the population, the labour force, the number of households, and the 
human capital of the work force. The level of migration is input into the 
demographic model, having itself been determined in the macroeconomic 
model. 
The HERMES2 macroeconomic model has been used for fifteen years in 
preparing successive Medium-Term Reviews. The latest version of HERMES has 
been re-estimated using data from National Income and Expenditure, 2003. A 
limited calibration to National Income and Expenditure, 2004, has been undertaken 
for the purpose of this Review. The forecasts for 2005 and 2006 are based on 
the Autumn Quarterly Economic Commentary. Appendix 1 of the last Review 
provided a description of the key mechanisms in that model.  
While any forecast involves many assumptions that rely on the authors’ 
judgement, this model is an essential tool in ensuring the coherence of the 
resulting forecast. In addition, the model is an indispensable tool for 
undertaking the kind of sensitivity testing we have used extensively in this 
Review, and in developing a range of scenarios that are internally consistent. 
 
2 Homer in the Odyssey referred to the god Hermes as “the green-eyed giant-slayer”. 
  
2. WHAT DRIVES THE 
ECONOMY? 
In recent years much has been written on the successful convergence since 
1990 of Irish living standards to those of the best performing EU member 
states. Previous Reviews have dealt with this topic, considering the driving 
forces behind this transition (in particular, ESRI, 1999 and ESRI, 2001). While 
there is a considerable degree of consensus on the factors underlying the 
apparent success, summarised in Honohan and Walsh (2002), there still remain 
significant areas of controversy. One element of this controversy is whether 
the story of the Irish economy over the last fifteen years is best seen as belated 
convergence due to the reform of policies that had previously prevented 
convergence (for example Ó Gráda, 2002) or, alternatively, whether the 
success derives from an especially efficacious policy stance adopted in Ireland 
(Barry, 2003). While there are elements of truth in both approaches, successive 
Reviews have leant more towards the former, “belated convergence”, approach.   
2.1 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine three areas of the economy 
where rapid changes have occurred over the last decade and where research 
suggests that the future behaviour of the economy may be rather different 
from the past. Understanding this changing economic environment is an 
essential first step in formulating scenarios for the likely future development of 
the Irish economy over the coming decade. The future will not be the same as 
the past! 
The first area of change, which we consider in Section 2.2, is the underlying 
sectoral structure of the economy. As the economy moved from being one of 
the most closed in Western Europe in 1960, to being one of the most open in 
1990 there was a major shift in its underlying structure. Whereas in 1960 the 
bulk of the goods that were consumed in Ireland were made in Ireland, by 
1990 most of the goods consumed were imported. Since 1990 that trend has 
slowed and even seen a small reversal. The counterpart to this increasing 
openness was the dramatic growth in exports as a share of output, substantially 
underpinned by the inflow of foreign direct investment into manufacturing.  
The characteristics of the goods exported also saw major changes. In 1970 
exports were dominated by agricultural products with a high share of domestic 
value added. By contrast, in the 1980s agricultural exports were diminishing 
rapidly in significance and the export of manufactured goods, which had a low 
share of domestic value added, had begun to grow rapidly. Since the late 1990s 
this pattern has begun to evolve so that today, services are the fastest growing 
category of exports.  
Recent changes in the structure of the economy suggest that the historically 
low domestic multiplier may be stabilising. The rising importance of services in 
total exports implies a slightly higher multiplier impact from exogenous 
changes in domestic activity. Furthermore, the pattern of personal 
consumption for goods and services has witnessed a big change in recent years, 
with services (which have a relatively high domestic value-added content) 
accounting for a growing share of total expenditure. In addition investment in 
Ireland now accounts for a very high share of national income and 
expenditure. Housing, which now accounts for almost half of the very high 
5 
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volume of investment, has a high domestic value added share. Thus 
investment in housing, with a low leakage through imported inputs, has a 
major impact on economic activity. 
The changing sectoral structure of output also has important implications 
for what will drive growth in the future. The prospects for the agricultural 
sector, which so dominated the Irish economic history of the 20th  century, are 
now of little significance for the future well being of the economy. 
Manufacturing, which played such an important role in fuelling growth in the 
last quarter of the 20th century, is now showing signs of “tiring”. Instead, as in 
many of the other most developed world economies of today, the services 
sector is taking up the “baton” driving growth. For any one who harks back to 
the mercantilist world of the past such a development would seem 
unsustainable. However, the dramatic growth in services exports, now 
accounting for almost a third of all exports, shows that such a model of 
economic development is potentially sustainable for the future. 
The second area where there have been major changes is in the labour 
market. Demographic change has played a key role in making Ireland a unique 
and exciting economic story. The legacy effects of past decisions by individuals 
in the fields of fertility and migration will continue to pattern demographic 
developments for at least the next half century. For the coming decade the 
demographic drivers are already fairly predictable (with the exception of 
migration). These drivers will be very different from what they were over the 
last twenty years, with a change in the age structure of the population, a further 
rise in female labour force participation and considerable immigration. These 
issues are considered in Section 2.3 
The Irish labour market has always been one of the most open in Europe 
with major flows of labour out of it in the past and, more recently, very large 
net inflows. This has meant that labour supply has been very elastic – 
responsive to real after tax wage rates and to unemployment rates. The full 
implications of this for public policy were not completely understood in the 
past and even today research is still throwing new light on how the labour 
market behaves. Section 2.4 examines the changing characteristics of the 
labour market. It argues that the behaviour of the market is likely to be rather 
different to what it was in the past, not least because of the success in 
maintaining the economy close to full employment since the end of the 1990s. 
Examining these three drivers of change in the economy provides an 
essential backdrop to the rest of the Review. Whether the changing structure of 
the economy will provide the basis for stable and sustainable growth will 
depend on how the economy adjusts to change. It will require an exceptionally 
flexible labour market to handle the eventual reallocation of resources away 
from building. Also, if the growth in the economy is to be sustainable the shift 
to exports of services will have to continue. The external competitiveness of 
the economy will be affected by new factors and a failure to adjust to this 
changing world could see the sustainability of growth called into question. 
 
 
2.2.1 BACKGROUND 2.2 
Living High on 
Services 
There is considerable uncertainty and even disbelief that the Irish economy 
could continue to expand through growth in the services sector, with the 
manufacturing sector playing a less significant role. To some extent this view 
stems from a mercantilist approach to economics – a feeling that services are 
not “true” output. However, some of the scepticism also stems from a more 
sophisticated understanding of how the economy works. There is a concern 
that, without a continued increase in manufactured exports to leverage growth 
elsewhere in the economy, the improvement in domestic living standards will 
eventually be constrained by the balance of payments: the increased flow of 
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goods which consumers will demand will not be affordable unless we can 
produce goods that foreigners, in turn, will demand. 
There are three areas where the change in the structure of the economy has 
altered the impact and role of manufacturing and services exports as drivers of 
economic growth in Ireland:  
• First, the import content (including profit repatriations) of exports of 
goods is high relative to the import content of traditional services exports. 
This means that euro for euro services exports provide a bigger injection 
into the domestic economy than do exports of goods.  
• Second, the terms of trade have moved continuously against the price of 
goods. This is reflected in the fact that merchandise export and import 
prices have risen much more slowly than the price of services trade, of 
domestically produced services, and also of domestic output. This means 
that the purchasing power of services output, measured in terms of 
internationally traded goods, has risen over time. 
• Finally, the import content of household expenditure, in terms of both 
consumption and investment, has fallen. The most significant change has 
been the huge increase in household resources devoted to investment in 
housing – a product with a very low import content. Rising incomes have, 
through an accelerator effect (Duffy, 2002 and Murphy, 1998), generated a 
big increase in housing investment. To a lesser extent demographic change 
and rising incomes has resulted in an increase in the share of consumption 
going on services, as the income elasticity of demand for services tends to 
be higher than for goods. As both services and housing investment tend to 
have relatively low import contents, this has increased the domestic 
multiplier effects of injections to the economy from the growth in net 
exports. 
As a result of these changes, which will be discussed further in Section 
2.2.2, the effect of external stimuli on the economy, such as a growth in net 
exports, has been substantially enhanced in recent years. 
2.2.2 THE IMPORT CONTENT OF EXPORTS 
The Irish economy is very open. Following the moves to liberalise trade that 
began in the 1960s, the Irish economy became more reliant on foreign markets 
both for the sale of its products and as a source for the purchase of foreign 
goods and services. Underlying this change in structure was a major rise in the 
propensity to import out of final demand, especially out of consumption.  
Table 2.1 shows how much of a unit of each component of final 
expenditure is derived from imports, either directly through the import of final 
products or indirectly through imports embodied in goods and services that 
are produced domestically.3 Following the initial phase of trade liberalisation 
that occurred in the 1960s, the composition of total consumption changed 
relatively rapidly, with the proportion of the total accounted for by imports 
increasing significantly from 27.7 per cent in 1964 to 34.5 per cent in 1975, 
before edging up further to 35.7 per cent by 1985. Since then, however, there 
has been a reversal of this trend, so that in 1998 the import content of 
consumption, at 33.8 per cent was lower than in 1975.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 These estimates are taken from Curtis and Fitz Gerald (1993) and McCarthy (2005). They use 
successive input-output tables for the Irish economy to calculate the direct and indirect import 
content of a unit of each component of final demand. These numbers represent the average 
import contents for the years in question.  
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Table 2.1: The Import Content, Direct and Indirect, of Final Demand 
 1964 1969  1975 1985 1998 
Consumption 27.7 29.5 34.5 35.7 33.8 
Food & Drink      NA 21.9 28.3 29.0 41.1 
Clothing & Footwear      NA 45.4 59.7 65.2 57.5 
Govt. Current Expenditure on 
Goods & Services 8.0 9.0 10.4 8.1 15.5 
Building Investment 25.5 23.9 26.3 23.4 26.4 
Machinery & Equipment 
Investment 73.2 73.6 70.9 69.0 62.6 
Agricultural Exports 18.6 22.0 19.0 31.1 42.0 
Industrial Exports 44.7 40.0 46.5 49.8 53.1 
Services Exports 24.0      NA      NA 28.7 41.9 
Final Demand      NA      NA 33.9 37.2 42.8 
 
 This reduction is primarily due to the change in the composition of 
consumption at the margin and it reflects the effects of differing income 
elasticities of demand for goods and services. The income elasticity of demand 
for services is on average higher than for goods, so that the strong growth in 
income in the Irish economy in recent times has led to a higher share of 
services in total consumption. Since goods are much more import intensive 
than services, this has led to a fall in the import content of a unit of 
consumption, as is evident in Table 2.1. 
The import content of government expenditure has risen over time; in 1985 
imported goods and services accounted for 8.1 per cent of government 
expenditure, much the same as it was in the 1960s. However, by 1998 the 
import content of government expenditure was 15.5 per cent, almost double 
the 1985 figure.   
In the case of other investment, largely machinery and equipment, the 
import content in 1998 was 62.6 per cent, significantly lower than in 1985. 
While this reflects some increase in domestic sourcing of capital goods the 
primary reason for the decline is the increase in the share of indirect taxes in 
the cost of a unit of non-building investment. Investment in building and 
construction has shown a different pattern with the total import content of 
building investment still only 26.4 per cent in 1998. This was very similar to 
what it was in the 1960s, and it is much lower than the import content for total 
consumption. Thus the allocation of a very large share of household income to 
investment in housing has substantially reduced the average import content of 
the combined outlays by the household sector on consumption and 
investment. Given the relatively low import content and the relatively high 
domestic value added content in the building and construction sector, this 
means that a unit of investment in building and construction has a much 
bigger multiplier effect on the domestic economy than a unit of investment in 
machinery and equipment. 
All components of exports have shown an increase in import content since 
1969 with the most significant increase occurring in agricultural exports 
between 1975 and 1998, when the total import content more than doubled 
from 19.0 per cent to 42.0 per cent. However, this change is somewhat 
misleading as a significant part of the increase in agricultural exports related to 
food processing, including the processing of cola concentrates. In addition, the 
statistics on agricultural exports are affected by the extent of the distortion in 
the value of these exports due to EU subsidies.   
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Figure 2.1: Leakage from a Unit of Industrial Exports 
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With regard to industrial exports, even in the 1960s over 40 per cent of a 
unit of industrial exports was accounted for by imports. This share rose 
steadily over the 1970s and the 1980s and by 1998 more than half of the value 
of industrial exports was sourced abroad. This figure still substantially 
overestimates the underlying domestic value added from a unit of industrial 
exports as it takes no account of profit repatriations. In 1998 profit 
repatriations from the manufacturing sector amounted to around 23 per cent 
of all exports, up from 17 per cent in 1985. When this factor is taken into 
account the combined leakage from a unit of industrial exports rose from 67 
per cent in 1985 to 76 per cent in 1998 (Figure 2.1). 
For services exports (excluding tourism) the import content has risen from 
29 per cent in 1985 to 42 per cent in 1998. At the same time the share of such 
exports in total exports rose from 11 per cent to around 15 per cent in 1998. 
Since then there has been a further dramatic increase in this share to over 33 
per cent by 2004 (Figure 2.2). As with industrial exports there is probably a 
significant share of the value added from this component of final demand 
which flows out of the economy as profit repatriations. Nonetheless, the 
domestic value added from this type of exports is significantly higher than for 
industrial exports. 
Figure 2.2: Composition of Exports 
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The very rapid growth in services exports is further illustrated in Table 2.2. 
The three big components of total services exports in 2004 were insurance, 
computer services and business services. These three were also among the 
fastest growing categories of services exports in the period 1998 to 2004, 
growing at an average annual rate of over 20 per cent a year. If services exports 
continue to grow much more rapidly than exports of goods in the future, they 
will play an ever-increasing role in driving the economy. While the import 
content of such exports was significantly lower than for industrial exports in 
1998, exports of both computer services and of insurance are likely to result in 
significant profit repatriations.4  
Table 2.2: Services Exports, 1998-2004 
 
Share of Total,  
2004 
Change in Value,  
1998-2004, % 
Transport 4.5 7.3 
Tourism and Travel 8.2 5.9 
Communications 1.8 18.2 
Insurance 19.4 23.3 
Financial Services 9.6 23.9 
Computer Services 35.5 22.0 
Royalties/Licences 0.4 -6.2 
Business Services 19.3 23.2 
Trade Related 7.7 85.4 
Operational Leasing 4.9 22.4 
Miscellaneous Business Services 6.7 11.2 
Other Services Not Elsewhere Stated 1.4 20.6 
Total 100.0 18.9 
 
In summary, the import content of final demand has increased steadily 
since the 1960s to an estimated 42.8 per cent by 1998. This increase was to a 
large extent driven by the changing composition of final demand over the 
period, and in particular by the rise in the exports share of GNP. The growing 
importance of services in total exports and total consumption, together with 
the very strong growth in building investment in recent years, all point to a 
compositional shift towards a relatively lower import content of final demand.  
TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS AND SERVICES 
Over the last twenty years there have been very different patterns observed in 
the movement of prices of goods and services. In the case of domestic value 
added, the price deflator for the industrial sector rose by an average of 2.6 per 
cent a year over the twenty years to 2002, whereas for GDP as a whole, the rise 
in the deflator was 4.3 per cent a year. In the case of market services the rise 
was 6.3 per cent a year. This meant that over time those working in the 
industrial sector had to produce an ever-increasing quantity of goods just to 
buy the same volume of services. By contrast, producers in the services sector 
generating the same volume of services as twenty years ago could enjoy a much 
higher standard of living in terms of goods purchasable with their enhanced 
incomes. 
 
 
 
4 In the case of the “computer and related activities sector” 85 per cent of the value added in 
2003 was accounted for by foreign owned firms while 63 per cent of value added was accounted 
for by profits (CSO: Census of Services, 2003).  
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Figure 2.3: Relative Price of Industrial to Service Exports 
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This pattern is also reflected in the case of exports. Figure 2.3 shows the 
movement in the deflator for industrial exports relative to that for exports of 
services over the last forty years. Since the late 1970s the services export 
deflator has risen significantly more rapidly than that for industrial exports; the 
services exports deflator rose by 3.6 per cent a year in the twenty years ended 
2001 whereas for industrial exports it rose by only 2.3 per cent a year. The 
terms of trade moved against goods and in favour of services over that period.5  
This trend is replicated throughout the developed world. The production of 
goods generally involves a lower share of educated labour than for much of the 
output of the services sector. This, together with the greater tradability of 
goods, has seen output of goods shift continuously to less developed 
economies where labour with limited education is cheapest. The developed 
economies have specialised into services production, including tradable 
services, and the production of goods involving skilled labour. This has 
allowed the price of goods (increasingly produced in less-developed 
economies) to fall relative to the price of services. In turn, the differential 
returns have encouraged firms in developed economies to specialise into the 
production of increasingly valuable services. 
For Ireland, the continuing fall in the real value of goods exported means 
that the economy has to steadily increase its sales abroad to keep purchasing 
power constant. Where services can be exported they are generally likely to 
hold their value to a much greater extent in the medium term. This means that 
while industrial exports continue to be much more important for the Irish 
economy than for many other developed economies, it would not be surprising 
to see a greater specialisation over time into production of services for export. 
Such exports will play an ever-increasing role in sustaining Irish growth. 
2.2.3 HOUSEHOLD SECTOR SAVINGS, INVESTMENT AND THE 
MULTIPLIER 
The household savings ratio is an important variable in understanding the 
behaviour of any economy. If aggregate domestic savings are inadequate to 
fund investment this will result in a balance of payments deficit. As discussed 
in the next chapter, the current low savings rate in the US will probably need 
to change if the US is to move onto a more sustainable growth path. The next 
Chapter also considers how a change in the savings behaviour by German 
 
5 Because of the difficulty in data collection the services exports deflator may not be a very 
reliable series. Originally it was deemed to be the deflator for consumption. 
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households would impact on the German economy in the short-term. In 
Ireland, the personal savings rate has been maintained at quite a high level over 
a sustained period. 
The personal savings rate plays a role in determining how an economy 
reacts to external shocks. Where, for example, exports rise, leading to higher 
employment and incomes, the extent to which households spend their income 
will determine the indirect effects of the shock on the economy. In the short 
run the higher the savings ratio, the lower the multiplier effects of an injection 
of money into an economy. 
The household savings ratio is calculated by subtracting household 
consumption from household disposable income and expressing the resulting 
savings as a percentage of disposable household income. Figure 2.4 shows the 
trend in household sector savings over the last twenty-five years. However, if 
private investment in housing (and agriculture) is treated as being an 
expenditure out of household personal disposable income, a rather different 
pattern emerges. As shown in Figure 2.4, today the household sector is 
spending more than it earns on consumption and housing, resulting in an 
increase in the sector’s net indebtedness (or a fall in its net asset position).  
Since 1980 the personal savings ratio has fluctuated around 10 per cent of 
disposable income, indicating a continuing relatively high savings rate. 
However, the massive growth in investment in housing since the mid-1990s 
has moved the household sector from a position as net saver, lending to the 
rest of the economy and abroad, to one where it is borrowing at a very high 
rate. While twenty-five years ago a unit increase in personal disposable income 
would have resulted in a less than unitary increase in household outlays, this is 
no longer the case. Today the outlays, when housing is included, may rise by 
more than the increase in income. While this is not sustainable indefinitely, it is 
clearly sustainable (if not desirable) for some time to come. 
Figure 2.4: Household Savings and Investment 
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The models developed of the Irish housing sector suggest that a major 
driver of such investment in the short term is the rise in personal disposable 
income (see Duffy, 2002 and Murphy, 1998). Generally, the income elasticity 
of demand for housing is estimated at greater than unity resulting in a 
substantial accelerator effect. Thus when using a simple model of the 
multiplier response of Irish demand to an external injection, it is probably 
appropriate to treat housing investment as being similar to consumption – 
responding to any rise in disposable income. 
What this means is that the leakage for savings assumed in the traditional 
multiplier model, which was 10 per cent or 15 per cent over much of the last 
thirty years is zero (or even temporarily negative) today. A unitary increase in 
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income will lead both to a rise in consumption of 0.8 to 0.9 units and an 
additional increase in investment. This has the effect of enhancing the leverage 
effect on output (GNP) of injections of demand into the economy from 
external forces, such as increasing exports. 
Table 2.3 contains a set of illustrative numbers for the propensity of the 
economy to import and to consume at the margin both in 1980 and in 2002. 
As argued above, the marginal propensity to consume, when defined to include 
investment in housing, has risen significantly in recent years so that today it 
could be considered to be temporarily close to unity. The result of this is to 
increase the multiplier effect of a unit increase in exports. Also, the marginal 
propensity to import out of consumption has fallen slightly in recent years. 
This has also served to increase the multiplier and hence the domestic impact 
of any increase in exports.  
Finally, the import content of services exports is lower than for 
merchandise exports. A crude allowance is made for profit repatriations from 
services output in 2002, which would have been close to zero in 1980. On the 
basis of these purely illustrative numbers, the impact of a unit increase in 
services exports on the economy may be substantially greater today than it is 
for a comparable increase in the export of goods, as evidenced by the 
multiplier. 
Table 2.3: Assumptions 
 1980 2002 
Marginal propensity to import out of consumption6 0.34 0.31 
Marginal propensity to import out of industrial exports .75 .75 
Marginal propensity to import out of services exports7 .29 .62 
Marginal propensity to consume 0.9 1.0 
Multiplier – industrial exports 0.6 0.8 
Multiplier – services exports 1.7 1.2 
 
On the basis of the assumptions shown in Table 2.3, a crude “multiplier” is 
calculated for 1980 and 2002 for injections from the two types of exports (see 
Appendix 2.1 for details on the calculation of the multiplier).8 These suggest 
that the move towards services exports will lead to a larger domestic value 
added injection per unit of exports. Of course in practice, the effects of any 
injection are likely to be more complex. For example, the higher the multiplier, 
the more likely it is to result in higher wage inflation and higher prices for non-
tradables. Under such circumstances the effects on real activity would be very 
much reduced. However, these multipliers are useful in suggesting an order of 
magnitude for the effects of a change in industrial exports relative to a change in 
services exports. 
2.2.4 IMPLICATIONS 
The Irish economy has become increasingly more open over the past forty 
years, with a pattern of steadily increasing import leakages from both domestic 
demand and exports. However, recent changes in the structure of the Irish 
economy mean that the multiplier effects of injections of demand from 
exports are now greater than they were for much of the last thirty years, while 
 
6 Including housing. 
7 For 2002 it is assumed that profit repatriations account for around 10 per cent of services 
exports. However, at the margin it is likely to be much higher. Here we assume a figure of 20 per 
cent. This number is used for illustrative purposes. There is, as yet, no information on the extent 
of such outflows.  
8 This is a very crude calculation as no attempt has been made to use the appropriate marginal 
variables – marginal propensities to import and to consume. These can be very different from 
the averages. 
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the changing composition of consumption towards services and the growing 
importance of housing investment mean that the continuous rise in the import 
content of domestic demand may finally have reached a plateau. 
The changing pattern of relative prices and the changing comparative 
advantage of the Irish economy mean that there are increasing incentives to 
specialise into services production, including production of tradable services. 
The much greater domestic input content of many types of services output 
means that, euro for euro, they are more valuable to the economy than exports 
of manufactured goods. While services exports with a higher domestic input 
content may still account for only a third of Irish exports, they are nonetheless 
very valuable. The significant increase in their share in future years envisaged 
in the forecasts in subsequent chapters could help sustain continuing growth in 
the economy. 
These changes in economic structure help explain why it is realistic to 
expect that the Irish economy has the ability to continue growing over the 
coming decade, facilitated by increasing dependence on the production of 
tradable services. The model of the last twenty years, where the economy 
experienced exceptionally rapid growth in manufacturing output, was the 
exception to the experience of most other developed economies. In that model 
a very rapid growth in exports of manufactured goods was needed to leverage 
a significant growth in the domestic economy.  
This changing structure of the economy does not mean that new 
investment in high-tech manufacturing is not needed. In order to simply 
maintain employment at its current level a constant inflow of projects is 
needed to replace those that close. However, it does suggest a need to refocus 
development policy more towards the services sector.  
An increasing feature of all Ireland’s exports, goods and services, is the key 
role played in the production process by skilled labour. In addition, investment 
in research and development (R&D) is likely to be a feature of firms that are 
successful in the future in the tradable sector. It is, therefore, of importance to 
develop an effective policy to promote R&D that enhances the capacity of the 
economy to grow. This theme is taken up again in Chapter 7. 
Looking forward it is likely that the Irish economy will grow to look much 
more like other highly developed economies in the world. It will see the 
manufacturing sector accounting for a falling share of domestic value added 
and a falling share of domestic employment. This should not be seen as a 
failure. Rather it is part of the normal process in a mature developed economy. 
 
 The Irish demographic profile is unique. It is characterised by a relatively 
young population with approximately one-fifth of the adult inhabitants in the 
15-24 year age cohort. Such a favourable position means that the problems 
caused by ageing populations in many other EU and OECD countries are not 
as prevalent in Ireland today. This benign situation is the result of the interplay 
of a number of factors in the latter half of the 20th century, among which high 
birth rates and substantial migratory flows were the most important.  However, 
the favourable structure of the population looks set to deteriorate in the long 
term, as the now relatively young population ages. As these structural changes 
occur they will have an important effect on the potential growth rate of the 
economy, mainly through their effect on labour supply and dependency ratios. 
It is thus pertinent for policy-makers to incorporate such effects into medium- 
and long-term plans (Barrett and Bergin, 2005). However, in the time horizon 
covered by this Review the population structure will remain broadly favourable. 
2.3 
Demographic 
Structure 
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Figure: 2.5: Population Structure 
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Figure 2.5 highlights the changes that have occurred and are set to occur in 
the population structure over the twenty year time frame, 1995 to 2015. The 
snapshot view of the population in 1995, 2005 and 2015 indicates the 
decreasing number of persons in the younger age cohorts over time. In 1995, 
over 40 per cent of the population were in the 0-24 year age category.  In 2005 
this percentage is forecast to fall to 36.2 per cent and in 2015 it will fall further 
to 33.1 per cent. At the same time, the numbers in older age cohorts are 
forecast to increase; in 1995, 11.4 per cent of the population were in the 65+ 
age cohort; in 2005 this percentage stabilised at 11.2 per cent but in 2015 it is 
forecast to rise to 13.0 per cent. While the rise in this statistic does not portend 
any significant increase in old-age dependency in the near future, Figure 2.5 
does show that there will be a serious rise in dependency in the decades after 
2020.  
BIRTH RATE 
The Irish birth rate has undergone significant change over the last half century, 
and this is one of the main factors accounting for the changing demographic 
profile in Ireland today. The path of change can be disaggregated into three 
distinct time periods, as evidenced in Figure 2.6; the first period, which was 
characterised by a very high rate, runs from 1960 to 1980. During this time the 
birth rate increased from 21 births per thousand in 1960, peaked at 23 births 
per thousand in 1971 and averaged 22 births per thousand over the whole 
period. These high birth rates account for the current large proportion of the 
population in the younger age cohorts. The second period ran from 1981 to 
1989, during which time the birth rate experienced a marked decline, falling to 
a low of 15 births per thousand in 1989. The final period saw the birth rate fall 
to a record low of 13 per thousand in 1994 before rising slowly over the 
remaining years. Over the next decade, our forecasts suggest that the birth rate 
will level off at approximately 15 births per thousand of population.  This 
means that in years to come, there will be relatively fewer persons in the 
younger age cohorts, provided there are no offsetting increases caused by 
migration.   
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Figure 2.6: The Birth Rate 
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The births are forecast on the basis of a fairly constant Total Fertility Rate 
(TFR) of around 1.9.9 In addition to the change in the birth rate itself, there 
have also been changes in the ages at which women are becoming mothers; 
research suggests that a large proportion of the female population are now 
becoming mothers later in life than in the 1970s and the 1980s.  Such changes 
have important implications for the supply of labour; when this phenomenon 
initially took effect, it would have resulted in a once off boost to the labour 
supply, as those women who traditionally would have become mothers in their 
twenties instead became mothers in their thirties. This pattern is reflected in 
the changing pattern of female labour force participation. 
The limited rise in the birth rate over the rest of the decade that we forecast 
reflects the rising number of women in their late twenties and thirties, the age 
at which women now typically become mothers; the population bulge of young 
people born in the 1970s is mirrored 30 years later as they themselves begin to 
have children. 
MIGRATION 
Migration flows have long played a crucial role in driving changes in both the 
population structure and the labour force. However, there have been wide 
fluctuations in flows over time, with some periods characterised by net 
emigration and others characterised by net immigration; economic research 
shows that these flows are sensitive to economic circumstances not only in 
Ireland but also in the main destinations where migrants traditionally go. 
However, this research was conducted at a time when most of the flows into 
and out of the country were Irish people. Generally it showed that people 
would work in Ireland for somewhat less (or at a higher unemployment rate) 
than in the UK. However, while the underlying processes will remain the same 
for non-Irish migrants, the sensitivity and speed of response to changes in the 
standard of living in Ireland relative to the source or destination countries may 
change. Thus, there is increased uncertainty about the migration figures 
generated by the model and included in the forecasts in the rest of this Review. 
Figure 2.7 highlights the volatile nature of net migration flows in the Irish 
economy over the last half century. Following the high emigration rates of the 
1980s, the improvement in Irish economic fortunes relative to its EU partners 
in the 1990s resulted in a reversal of this trend; the numbers immigrating 
 
9 This is an artificial measure that represents the potential number of children over her lifetime 
for a representative woman. 
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greatly outweighed the numbers leaving the country since 1996, resulting in 
positive net migration flows since then. Such flows have reached record highs 
in the year ended April 2005, when net migration was 53,000. These flows 
have acted to insulate the economy in a number of ways.  In the 1980s the high 
negative migration flows meant that the rapid rise in unemployment was lower 
than it otherwise would have been, these flows accounted for over 3.0 per cent 
of the labour force in 1989.   
Conversely, the positive net migration flows of the latter half of the 1990s 
acted to insulate the economy from a constraint on labour supply at a time 
when the economy was growing rapidly and the unemployment rate was falling 
to what are effectively full employment levels. As already mentioned, these 
flows, coupled with high birth rates, have also acted to postpone the problem 
of ageing now faced by many other countries. 
Figure 2.7: Net Immigration 
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Over the next decade, it is expected that net inward migration will continue. 
The magnitude of the inflows will depend on the likely growth trajectory of the 
economy, as discussed in subsequent chapters. The size and nature of these 
inflows will play an important role in the future growth of the economy and 
they will impact on the future demand for infrastructure, including housing. 
Figure 2.8: Alternative Projections for Net Immigration 
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Should the economy continue to grow along the High Growth trajectory, 
described in subsequent chapters, immigration would continue at a high level 
as shown in Figure 2.8. However, should reality turn out to be close to the Low 
Growth scenario, consequent on a major readjustment in the US, immigration 
would gradually slowdown to around 10,000 a year. These two alternative 
scenarios would have very different implications for the economy generally 
and for the housing market in particular. 
DEPENDENCY 
A major factor in the changing fortunes of the Irish economy has been the 
evolution of the dependency rate. The economic dependency rate is defined 
here as the ratio of those who are not working in the population, including 
children and pensioners, to those who are working. Obviously, the lower the 
dependency ratio the more money that is available to individuals to spend out 
of their own income. 
The combination of the fall in the birth rate since the 1980s and the high 
level of emigration in Ireland up to the 1960s, means that both young age and 
old age dependency has fallen over the last decade; the dependent population 
is set to decrease further from the currently low levels over the next decade, as 
shown in Figure 2.9.  For decades this ratio was much higher in Ireland than in 
its EU partners. This placed a serious additional burden on an economy that 
was already under-performing in the 1950s and 1960s. With rising 
unemployment aggravating the situation the ratio peaked in the late 1980s. 
Since that date it has fallen dramatically. 
Figure 2.9: Economic Dependency Ratio  
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Today the economic dependency ratio is at an all time low in Ireland and, 
under the High Growth scenario, it is set to fall even further, stabilising in the 
next decade at a rate of between 1.0 and 1.1. This means that every individual 
who is working will only have to support one other individual who is not. It is 
only after 2020 that the economic dependency rate will begin to rise. This 
turning point will be postponed a few years as a result of the considerable level 
of immigration envisaged as part of this scenario. However, the postponement 
will be very short and the ratio will rise continuously from 2020 onwards. What 
this means is that Ireland faces an unusual demographic window of 
opportunity over the next fifteen years when dependency will be at an 
exceptionally low level. It will be important that public policy uses this 
demographic dividend to prepare for the long-term problems of rising old-age 
dependency over the following fifty years. 
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LABOUR SUPPLY 
Labour supply is driven by three main factors: the natural increase in the 
population, participation rates and migration.  Over the last decade, these three 
factors have combined to produce an expansion in the supply of labour in the 
economy, causing it to increase from 1044 million in 1995 to an estimated 1.96 
million in 2005. Over the next decade, the rate of growth in the supply of 
labour is likely to decrease significantly, having important implications for the 
economy and for potential growth rates in particular. There is also likely to be 
a change in the relative weights of the different factors driving the growth in 
labour supply, with the role of the natural increase and rising participation rates 
decreasing over time and that of migration increasing.   
Figure 2.10: Decomposition of the Growth in Labour Supply 
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The changes that have occurred in the demographic structure of the Irish 
economy since 1960 have had, and will continue to have important 
implications for labour supply.10 The high birth rates up to 1980 have meant 
that there has been a rapid increase in the labour supply throughout the 1990s 
and into the current decade (Figure 2.10). This natural increase is estimated to 
have accounted for around a third of the expansion in the labour supply on 
average over the five year period 1995 to 2000.  While the natural increase will 
continue to account for a significant proportion of the increase in the labour 
supply over the next five years, it will play a diminishing role.  
The rise in female labour force participation played a very important role in 
the growth in labour supply in the 1990s. (About one half of the increase is 
attributable to the effect of the rising educational attainment of the female 
population.) In the second half of the decade, rising female participation 
contributed about 1.5 percentage points to the growth in labour supply. In the 
case of female participation rates, between 1995 and 2004, there were increases 
recorded in rates for all women between 25 and 64 years of age.  Participation 
rates of the age cohort 15 to 24 years have decreased, reflecting a rise in 
participation in education.  Labour force participation is high for women with 
high levels of education; the most substantial increases in participation over the 
last decade have occurred in women with a minimum education of Leaving 
Certificate level. The corollary is that labour force participation is low for 
women with low levels of education; females with only a primary level of 
 
10 For the last decade the large cohort of young people born in the 1970s has been replacing the 
much smaller cohort of people retiring who had remained in Ireland in the 1950s. However, 
after 2010 the smaller cohort of new entrants born in the late 1980s will be replacing the cohort 
that joined the labour market in the more favourable late 1960s and the 1970s when emigration 
had fallen from its 1957 peak. 
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education exhibit a particularly low participation rate and this trend has not 
shown much change since 1988.   
Looking ahead over the next decade, the effect of increasing female 
participation rates on labour supply growth will be limited.  This is because the 
increase already registered over the last ten years has meant that the pool of 
potential market entrants has become much smaller, with a large majority of 
the 25 to 64 year olds, particularly the younger members of this group, already 
in the labour force. Participation rates are now high by EU standards for 
women under 35 years, leaving little scope for further increase. It is thus likely 
that much of the increase will come from the older age cohorts, whose 
participation rates are relatively low by EU standards. In terms of the 
characteristics of participants who will account for the future, albeit relatively 
modest, expansion in the labour force, it is likely that the majority of these 
people will be relatively low skilled, as a good number of the skilled cohort are 
already working. Of course, any changes in future female participation rates 
will be affected by public policy; in particular, the participation rates of 
mothers will be affected by the availability and conditions of childcare; the 
participation of those with lower levels of educational attainment may depend 
on public policies related to up-skilling and further education as well as the 
interaction of the welfare system with the world of work.  
The story of male participation rates is different from that of female 
participation rates; while increases in the numbers of females participating in 
the labour market added substantially to the supply of labour over the last 
decade, on average the participation of males subtracted from it. Over the next 
five years, male participation is expected to continue to make a negative 
contribution to the labour force, before moving to a situation where its 
contribution will be zero. The main cause of the negative contribution will be a 
fall in the participation rates of the under twenty-fives, reflecting rising 
participation in education in the case of the younger cohort. 
It is anticipated that immigration will contribute around one percentage 
point a year to the growth in the labour force over the rest of this decade. In 
the next decade, if the High Growth scenario were realised, this might have to 
increase further. It must be remembered that net migration is extremely 
sensitive to changes in economic circumstances in Ireland relative to the rest of 
the world. This means that forecasting this element of labour force growth 
with any accuracy is very difficult. However, it is likely that because of the high 
educational attainment of both emigrants and immigrants, the process of 
migration will adjust to offset much of the long-term labour market effects of 
future shocks to the economy. 
 
 It is instructive to distinguish between different types of labour to help our 
understanding of how the labour market operates and what factors will drive 
labour supply in the future. One way of making this distinction is to look at the 
skills level of the population, how it has changed and how it is likely to change 
over time. The rising educational attainment of the labour force, through 
investment in human capital, can affect the economy through a number of 
different channels: it can increase the productivity of the workforce; it can 
increase labour force participation rates especially those of women; and it can 
reduce the chances of unemployment. As migration is crucial in explaining 
how the Irish labour market functions it is also important to look at the skill 
distribution of migrants. Since the mid 1990s immigration of highly educated 
non-nationals and the return migration of well-educated Irish people, has 
substantially supplemented the rapidly growing domestic supply of high skilled 
labour. At the same time, the demand for labour in the developed world has 
been shifting towards high-skilled occupations and away from low-skilled 
occupations. The coincidence of these factors was very beneficial to Irish 
economic growth. 
2.4  
Changing 
Characteristics 
of Labour 
Supply  
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Over the last twenty years there has been major investment in education in 
Ireland. While free second level education was first introduced in 1967, the 
substantial rise in participation only really began in the 1980s, especially in the 
participation rate at third level. One measure of the investment in education is 
the ratio of the human capital index for the 55-60 year cohort of the 
population relative to that of the 25-29 year old cohort.11 As can be seen from 
Figure 2.11 there was a 20 per cent increase in the average human capital index 
over the thirty year period from the 1960s to the 1990s. This represented a 
much bigger enhancement in educational attainment than was the case for the 
most developed EU member states. However, Ireland was beginning from a 
much lower base due to the relatively low participation rates a generation and a 
half ago. 
Figure 2.11: Investment in Human Capital-  
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As a result of this investment in human capital, the proportion of people in 
the labour force in Ireland with a minimum education of primary level only 
will decrease significantly over the next decade (Figure 2.12); in 1992, 22.5 per 
cent of the labour force had only a primary level of education, in 2002 this will 
have fallen to 14.9 per cent and in 2012, it is estimated that it will fall to 7.8 per 
cent. Similarly, in the case of those with only a Junior Certificate level of 
education, the numbers will fall from 26.3 per cent in 1992 to 18.1 per cent in 
2002, before falling further to 16.3 per cent in 2012. The proportion of the 
labour force with Leaving Certificate education and third level education will 
increase, with the most significant upgrading in education levels over the time 
frame occurring in the proportion of the labour force with a third level 
qualification, increasing from just under 22 per cent in 1992 to almost 40 per 
cent in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 For sources see Fitz Gerald, 2006, “Lessons from 20 Years of Cohesion” in S. Mundschenk, 
M. Stierle, U. Stierle-von Schütz and I. Traistaru (eds.), Competitiveness and Growth in Europe: 
Lessons and Policy Implications for the Lisbon Strategy, Edward Elgar. This index weights those with 
each of four levels of education by the estimated returns to the individual from having that level 
of education. Primary education has a weighting of one. The weights for Ireland are taken from 
Fitz Gerald, McCarthy, Morgenroth and O’Connell, 2003.  
  
 
22 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2005-2012 
Figure 2.12: Educational Attainment of the Labour Force 
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In assessing the effects of each of the factors affecting labour supply, it is 
important to look at them in the context of education and skills since increases 
in human capital (increased skills and education) raise the growth potential of 
the economy.12 The continuing enhancement of the educational attainment of 
the labour force which we forecast over the coming decade means that there 
will be a continuing contribution to productivity growth from this source. It 
will be only after 2020 that the growth in the average human capital of the 
labour force will fade out. As can be seen from Figure 2.13 the index of human 
capital grew at between 0.5 and 0.8 per cent a year over the period 1990-2005. 
While this does not necessarily translate into a similar increase in productivity, 
it does provide a useful guide to the potential long-term effects of the 
investment in education and training. While somewhat lower than in the last 
fifteen years, it is anticipated that as a result of investment already undertaken 
in education, the index will rise by around 0.4 per cent a year for the coming 
decade.  
Figure 2.13: Growth in the Index of Human Capital  
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12 See Romer (1986). 
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Recent research by Bergin and Kearney (2004) examines the impact of the 
increase in human capital that helped to transform Ireland in the space of two 
decades into a high productivity and low unemployment economy. This 
transformation takes place for a given profile of external demand, which 
changed dramatically over the period, captured in their model by an outward 
shift in the demand for Irish output and by skill-biased technical progress. This 
huge shift in demand is critical to understanding why the change in human 
capital actually mattered. Had demand remained unchanged then the 
consequences of the rise in human capital would have been a dramatic fall in 
the high-skilled wage, a negative effect on living standards and a rise in 
emigration. 
Their key findings suggest that the demand for Irish output is relatively 
sensitive to Ireland’s international competitive position. The openness of the 
labour market, through migration, has accommodated this in the face of rising 
demand. By international standards, this open labour market gave Ireland a 
unique advantage and facilitated the rapid convergence to EU living standards 
witnessed in recent years. Within this context, the rise in human capital played 
a pivotal role in increasing output and productivity, slowing the growth in wage 
dispersion between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and in boosting 
employment. They find that had Ireland failed to invest in human capital over 
the past 20 years, GNP per capita would be over 20 percentage points lower. 
In their numerical simulations the growth in output per head is decomposed 
into the contributions from employment, participation and productivity. The 
results suggest that, with unemployed resources, the biggest benefit to the Irish 
economy in the 1990s from human capital accumulation was in terms of 
employment rather than productivity. With the economy now at or close to 
full-employment the biggest benefit in the future is likely to come from rising 
labour force participation. 
The productivity enhancing effects of investment in education was felt 
much earlier in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. For Germany 
the major benefit of its post-war investment in education occurred in the 
1970s.13  As shown in Figure 2.11 there has been little additional upgrading of 
human capital over the last thirty years in such countries. This goes some way 
to explain the superior growth performance of Ireland, Spain and Portugal in 
recent years. 
The changing educational attainment of the labour force, together with its 
continuing rapid rise, has rather different implications for the supply of low 
skilled (Junior Certificate and less) and high skilled labour. As shown in Figure 
2.14 the supply of skilled labour will continue to rise rapidly over the coming 
decade. However, in spite of the rise in labour force numbers, the numbers of 
people available for work with limited education will continue to fall.  
 
13 Koman, R. and D. Marin, 1997. “Human Capital and Macroeconomic Growth: Austria and 
Germany, 1960-92”, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1551. 
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Figure 2.14 Supply of High Skilled and Low Skilled Labour  
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In producing this projection of the supply of high skilled and low skilled 
labour we are implicitly assuming that the skill distribution of migrants is 
identical to that of natives. However, recent research by Barrett, Bergin and 
Duffy (2005) shows that migrants have a higher level of educational attainment 
than Irish nationals so assuming they have the same skills mix as Irish nationals 
may be inappropriate. Their findings on the characteristics of immigrants are 
summarised in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Looking at immigrants who had arrived in 
the ten years up to 2003 and comparing them to Irish nationals (Table 2.4), it 
can be seen that immigrants into Ireland have notably high levels of education. 
While 16.7 percent of Irish nationals living in Ireland have degrees, 40 percent 
of immigrants have this level of educational attainment. This makes Ireland 
different to many other immigrant-receiving countries where immigration has 
been largely low skilled. Barrett et al do not explore the reasons underlying this 
“positive selection process”. However, the findings on the increasing skill-
intensity of labour demand in Ireland raises the possibility that the high-skill 
labour inflow is a response to this “pull factor”. 
Table 2.4: Distribution of Educational Attainment for Native and Immigrant 
Populations, %14 
 Irish UK 
Rest of 
EU-15 American Other 
Total 
Immigrants 
No formal/ primary 
education 13.7 6.7 1.3  6.8 5.5 
Lower secondary 19.2 19.6 2.5 4.3 5.8 9.6 
Upper secondary 27.5 18.8 24.9 14.9 23.3 22.0 
Post Leaving 12.3 10.5 8.1  8.3 8.8 
Third level – non-degree 10.6 15.8 14.5 6.4 12.9 14.0 
Third level - degree or 
above 16.7 28.4 48.6 74.5 42.8 40.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 41,612 626 393 47 878 1,944 
Source: Barrett et al. (2005). 
 
Although immigrants into Ireland have high levels of education, these skills 
were not being fully employed. In Table 2.5, it can be seen that the distribution 
of immigrants and natives across occupations is similar, in spite of the large 
difference in educational attainment seen in Table 2.4.  
 
 
14 As we are now restricting the sample to labour force participants, cell sizes are getting smaller. 
For this reason, we need to be cautious in interpreting the figures within immigrant categories, 
especially the US category. 
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Table 2.5: Occupational Distribution of Natives and Immigrants (%) 
 Irish UK 
Rest of 
EU-15 American Other 
Total 
Immigrants 
Managers and administrators 17.7 16.8 9.1 22.4 6.9 10.5 
Professional 10.5 14.5 15.2 22.4 10.7 12.9 
Associate professional and 
technical 8.7 10.9 10.7 18.4 11.6 11.4 
Clerical and secretarial 12.2 11.5 16.8 6.1 6.6 10.0 
Craft and related 13.6 13.5 5.6 0.0 10.4 10.1 
Personal and protective 
service 9.8 11.8 19.9 12.2 20.2 17.5 
Sales 8.2 5.9 9.3 8.2 6.4 6.9 
Plant and machine 
operatives 9.8 7.2 6.1 4.1 11.6 9.1 
Other (includes not stated) 9.6 7.9 7.2 6.1 15.6 11.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 41,831 643 428 49 1,108 2,228 
Source: Barrett et al. (2005). 
 
 The economy has undergone significant transformation since the 1960s. In 
particular, there have been considerable changes in the sectoral drivers of 
growth, in the labour market and in the demographic profile of the economy.  
There has been a shift in the role of different sectors, with the services sector 
now being the main driver of growth in the economy and the manufacturing 
sector playing a less significant role.  In the labour market, there has been a rise 
in participation rates and a reversal of the flow from a pattern of net 
emigration in the past to a period of sustained net immigration since 1996, 
having important implications for the supply of labour in the economy.  There 
have also been notable changes in the skill composition of the labour force, 
with the number of skilled persons increasing over time and the number of 
low skilled falling, accompanying a rise in the stock of human capital in the 
economy. With regard to the demographic profile, the analysis presented here 
points to a deterioration after 2020, in the currently favourable demographic 
trends, which will have important implications for policy formulation going 
forwards.   
2.5  
Conclusions 
Looking ahead, given the extreme openness of the Irish economy and its 
labour market, it is likely that further changes in structure will occur.  Whether 
these changes will affect the potential of the economy to generate stable and 
sustainable growth will depend on how adaptable the economy is. The external 
competitiveness of the economy will be affected by new factors and a failure to 
adjust to these could see the sustainability of growth called into question. 
The changes in demographics and the labour supply will continue to have a 
number of important implications for the Irish economy over the next decade.  
While the growth in the labour supply will be much less than it was in the 
1990s, it will, nonetheless, remain quite strong well into the next decade.  
The rising educational attainment of the population should increase the 
potential employability of the labour market participants, reducing the risk that 
future shocks could lead to a return to high levels of long-term unemployment.  
Past experience suggests that well educated labour market entrants will not 
remain unemployed in Ireland; they will either obtain employment in Ireland 
or in other parts of the EU. The increasing investment and participation in 
education will result in further improvements in the educational attainment of 
the labour force, which should positively affect productivity. 
Migration has played a crucial role in labour supply growth in recent years 
and is likely to continue to be one of the most important factors in 
determining changes in labour supply in years to come. This calls into question 
the choice of GNP growth as a policy objective. In the context of immigration, 
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an increase in the size of the economy (GNP) does not necessarily imply an 
increase in average living standards for existing residents (GNP per head). In 
the rest of this Review we pay particular attention to changes in GNP per head. 
For this reason, attention needs to be paid to the question of what precisely is 
the policy objective for immigration.  
While GNP per head is a better measure of welfare than GNP alone, there 
are other factors that affect the welfare of the population. One of these is the 
endowment of infrastructure, especially of housing. The limited endowment of 
infrastructure that Ireland currently possesses is affecting the standard of living 
in a manner that is not captured by GNP. For example, the poor endowment 
of public transport infrastructure leads to enhanced commuting times that 
impact negatively on welfare. To the extent that a higher population puts 
increasing pressure on the existing infrastructure this will reduce the welfare of 
the population in a manner not captured by the traditional measure of GNP. 
This additional “externality” from rapid growth must be considered in 
formulating policy for the future. Just because GNP rises, or even because 
GNP per head rises does not guarantee a welfare improvement of a similar 
magnitude. 
Arguably the Irish economy had too big an endowment of infrastructure in 
1960, reflecting a misallocation of resources over the previous decade.15 
However, today the economy shows all the signs of having “outgrown its 
clothes”. Both private infrastructure in the form of housing, and public 
infrastructure in the form of public transport, roads, sewerage and water 
supply, and electricity transmission are all constraining growth. This constraint 
is reflected in very high prices for housing and high indirect costs for 
individuals reflected in rising commuting times. In turn, these costs are passed 
on to the business sector through the labour market. Indirectly, through the 
adverse effect on competitiveness of the cost of maintaining an acceptable life 
style in Ireland, an infrastructure constraint is operating to reduce Ireland’s 
potential growth over the coming decade. 
However, at some point in the future the current very high rate of 
investment in infrastructure will see the endowment of infrastructure catch up 
with the economy’s needs. When this happens it will both free up major public 
and private resources for alternative uses, and it will also see a major shift in 
production within the economy, with a move away from the building sector to 
other sectors, especially services. Accomplishing such a transition in a limited 
time frame will require huge flexibility in the economy if the costs to 
individuals and to society generally are to be minimised. 
 
 
15 The over investment in railways over the previous century meant that Ireland had an 
excessive endowment of this form of infrastructure, the maintenance and operation of which 
was a major economic burden. This shows that merely providing such infrastructure is not 
necessarily an aide to future economic development. 
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APPENDIX 2.1:  
THE MULTIPLIER 
The changes that have occurred in the structure of the Irish economy, as 
outlined in this chapter, have a number of important implications.  Here we 
consider the issues discussed in terms of a very simplistic model of the 
economy, and the multiplier effects.16  
The traditional basic economics formulation of a macro-economy can be 
characterised in a series of simple equations: 
 
here: 
=  GNP     
tment) 
 
   
t f dome ic demand 
profit  
               
quation (1) is the traditional national income identity. Equation (2) 
 
Y = C + I + G + X – M      (1) 
C = bY        (2) 
M=m(C+I+G)+nX      (3) 
Y =  bY + I + G + X – mbY - mI - mG – nX   (4) 
Y(1-b+mb) = (I + G) (1-m) + X (1-n)    (5) 
)1(1
1
mb
n
dX
dY
−−
−=       (6) 
 
W
Y 
C = Consumption (here taken to include housing inves
I = Investment (here taken to exclude housing investment) 
G = Government consumption  
X = Exports 
M = Imports  
b = propensity to consume   
m = propensity to import ou o st
n = propensity to import out of exports (including 
              repatriations) 
 
E
determines consumption as a function of income. Equation (3) determines 
imports as a function of domestic demand and exports. Equations (4) and (5) 
substitute Equations (2) and (3) into Equation (1). Finally, Equation (6) 
determines the impact of a marginal change in exports on GNP (Y). That 
response is referred to as the multiplier. 
 
16 The much more sophisticated HERMES model is used in our analysis in subsequent chapters. 
  
 
3. THE EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
As a small open economy, Ireland’s expected performance is dependent on 
international economic events and the international economic outlook. Despite 
being a member of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the economy 
remains exposed to events outside the Euro Area due to the importance of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), particularly from the US, and the links of 
the traditional manufacturing sector to the UK. Since the publication of the 
last Medium-Term Review, world growth accelerated to its fastest pace in almost 
thirty years in 2004. Although the world economy has slowed significantly this 
year, the short-term outlook remains buoyant. Global growth remains 
unbalanced, with growth in both the US and Japan rising well above trend last 
year, while the UK performed moderately well but activity in the Euro Area 
has remained sluggish.  
3.1 
Introduction 
There is substantial uncertainty about the outlook for the world economy 
over the medium term. The primary reason for this uncertainty is the large 
macroeconomic imbalances that are evident in the US economy. The 
magnitude of the current account balance has focused attention on its 
sustainability and at some point in the future the US economy will adjust and 
experience a slow-down in growth. However, considerable uncertainty remains 
as to the timing of the adjustment, whether it will occur gradually or sharply 
and the mechanism(s) by which it will take place. As a result, we are presenting 
two sets of forecasts, one in which the US economy does not adjust and 
continues to experience robust growth (the High Growth scenario), although 
remaining on an unsustainable growth path, and the second in which the US 
current account deficit declines gradually to a long-run sustainable level (the 
Low Growth scenario). Although the more benign High Growth scenario is more 
likely for the next few years, when the adjustment eventually takes place the US 
economy will switch to a lower growth path having negative implications for 
that economy and also for the global economy, including Ireland. 
In this chapter we present medium-term forecasts for the three major 
economic blocks that impact on the Irish economy: the US, the Euro Area and 
the UK and then we draw out the major implications of this environment for 
the Irish economy.17 In preparing the forecasts we have utilised a number of 
different sources (especially the National Institute Economic Review, July 2005). 
We used the National Institute of Economic Research (NIESR) July 2005 
forecast as an input to the medium-term forecast for the major world 
economies. This forecast was modified to take account of additional 
information available to us from a range of different sources. In carrying out 
these modifications and in constructing the forecast where the US imbalances 
 
17 In this chapter, forecasts are presented on an annual basis out to 2010 and on a 5-year annual 
average basis to 2015. We assume unchanged international forecasts post-2015. 
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are redressed we have used the NIESR Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) 
to produce our own “adjustment” scenario.18 
 
 Since the early 1990s the US economy has played an important role as the 
main driver of world economic growth and the main source of world demand. 
Despite a temporary slowdown following the terrorist attacks in September 
2001, the US economy has experienced strong growth in recent years. 
However, considerable imbalances have arisen over the course of this 
expansion that give rise to concerns about the medium-term growth prospects 
for the economy. Most notably the US current account deficit has been 
widening and in 2004 the deficit stood at almost 6 per cent of GDP (see Figure 
3.1). The size of the deficit has focused attention on its sustainability and it is 
becoming more widely accepted that the US economy will have to adjust at 
some time in the future.19 Outgoing Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan 
Greenspan recently noted “Of course, deficits that cumulate to ever-increasing 
net external debt, with its attendant rise in servicing costs, cannot persist 
indefinitely. At some point investors will balk at further financing”.20 
3.2  
The United 
States 
Figure 3.1: US Current Account Deficit 
plications for long-run sustainability of the 
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In order to understand the im
the deficit. One way of characterising the current account balance is that it 
is the difference between national savings and national investment. During the 
second half of the 1990s savings sustained rising domestic investment (see 
Figure 3.2). However, since 2000 there has been a strong decline in the savings 
rate, largely attributable to a fall in public sector saving due to the growing 
fiscal deficit and a decline in household saving, albeit from a low base (see 
Figure 3.3). Two main factors explain the fall in the household savings rate. 
First, strongly expansionary monetary policy resulted in real interest rates 
falling by about 4 per cent between 2000 and 2004 making saving less 
attractive and facilitating borrowing for consumption purposes. Second, 
18 We are very grateful to Ray Barrell and Ian Hurst of NIESR for their assistance in using the 
NiGEM model. The forecast remains the sole responsibility of the authors. 
19 See Mann (2003), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) and IMF 
World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
20 Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, before the Banco de Mexico’s 
80th Anniversary Conference, Mexico City, November 14th, 2005. 
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between 1997 and 2004 house prices have risen by about 7 per cent per annum 
and the associated wealth effect for homeowners has encouraged higher 
consumer spending. 
Figure 3.2: US Savings and Investment as a Share of GDP 
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exports has been another importa
deficit. This is partly explained by 
and Japan in the late 1990s a
wdown in 2001.  Between 1995 and 2001, the real effective exchange rate 
appreciated by about 16 per cent supporting the increasing demand for 
imports by the US. However, between 2002 and 2004 the real effective 
exchange rate depreciated by around 13 per cent, so one would expect this to 
negate, at least to some extent, import demand. Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa 
(2005) argue that a change in preferences on the part of the US consumer 
towards foreign goods helps explain the persistent trade deficit. 
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A further driving force of the current account deficit has been the increase 
in the foreign demand for US assets.21 Capital inflows to the US continue as 
long as foreign investors are willing to purchase US assets at the prevailing 
price and expected returns. Prior to the stock market correction in 2000, the 
massive rise in US stock prices increased the foreign demand for US equities. 
More recently central banks’ demand for bonds, particularly from Asian central 
banks pursuing quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes, have maintained capital 
inflows into the US. The readiness of foreigners to invest in the US has helped 
to keep long-term interest rates low fuelling consumption in the US.  
Foreign demand for US assets has led to a massive increase in the net 
external liabilities of the US. The Net National Investment Position (NNIP) of 
a country is the difference between the value of its external assets and 
liabilities. Figure 3.4 shows the deterioration of this balance over time. The US 
currently stands as the world’s largest debtor nation and had a negative NNIP 
of around 22 per cent of GDP in 2004. Tille (2004) notes that only 35 per cent 
of US assets are denominated in dollars as compared to 95 per cent of its 
liabilities. This means that a depreciation in the US effective exchange rate 
increases the value of assets, while leaving the value of liabilities relatively 
unchanged. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) find that historically a depreciation in 
the dollar contributes about 30 per cent of the adjustment through the 
advantageous valuation effects on US assets. A substantial fall in the dollar is 
seen as one mechanism that will help restore balance to this situation. 
Figure 3.4: Net International Investment Position 
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The US cannot live beyond its means forever and at some point, either the 
negative NNIP and the costs of servicing that debt will become too great a 
burden on the US or else foreign investors may decide that they hold adequate 
US assets in their portfolios and stop purchasing them. A fall in the value of 
the dollar would temporarily improve the trade balance but may be insufficient 
to put the US current account back on a sustainable path. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2004) and others have argued that structural reform needs to take place in the 
US to counteract the causes of the deficit. Several leading academics have 
attempted to estimate the scale of the adjustment necessary to bring the US 
back on to a sustainable path. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) suggest that the real 
effective exchange rate needs to depreciate by about 30 per cent to bring the 
current account deficit back onto a sustainable path. They also argue that a 
change in domestic absorption is necessary for adjustment, not just a fall in the 
 
21 Blanchard, Giovazzi and Sa (2005). 
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dollar. Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) also find that a substantial dollar 
depreciation is likely to occur over the medium term. 
There are a variety of possible mechanisms that, separately or through 
some combination of them, could lead to an unwinding in the US 
imbalances:22 
• An increase in the household savings rate. This could be triggered by a 
slowdown in the housing market in the US. 
• A fall in US asset prices. 
• A substantial tightening of US fiscal policy which would increase 
domestic savings. 
• A major depreciation in the value of the dollar. 
• Strong growth in the rest of the world which would increase the 
demand for US exports. 
As there is no consensus about when the adjustment is likely to take place, 
the mechanism(s) by which it will take place and whether the adjustment will 
be gradual or rapid, it is difficult to take account of it in medium-term 
forecasts; yet it very much colours our view about the future prospects of the 
US economy. Due to this uncertainty, we present two alternative scenarios for 
the US going forward. In the High Growth forecast we assume that there is no 
adjustment to the US current account deficit.  
The key forecasts for the US economy are presented in Table 3.1. 
Following the slowdown in 2000-2001, growth in the US has gained 
momentum and short-term prospects remain favourable. Our baseline forecast 
is for annual average real GDP growth of 3.1 per cent between 2005 and 2010. 
In the short-term, consumption is expected to remain a significant driver of 
growth; with much of the consumption growth itself generated by wealth 
effects from sizeable house price rises, as well as robust equity prices. This 
leaves the household sector very exposed to house price changes or sharp 
interest rate increases.  
Our forecast for the dollar/euro exchange rate in the High Growth forecast 
incorporates a slight depreciation of the dollar; it is expected to average $1.29 
over second half of this decade. A depreciation of the dollar should lead to 
higher inflation but as the depreciation is quite moderate it will put limited 
upwards pressure on the rate of price growth. The inflation rate, as measured 
by the consumer expenditure deflator, is expected to average 3 per cent growth 
between 2005 and 2010. The main focus of Federal Reserve policy in recent 
years has been to foster price stability while maintaining sustainable growth in 
output. The Federal Reserve reacted aggressively in response to the slowdown 
in 2000-2001 by cutting interest rates to fifty-year historical lows. By 2004 
inflationary pressures started to build so the monetary authorities have 
responded by gradually increasing interest rates.  Short-term interest rates are 
expected to gradually increase over the course of the decade and are expected 
to average 4.4 per cent over the 2005 to 2010 period. 
Underlying this benign growth forecast is a continued deterioration in the 
current account balance, which as mentioned above, is unsustainable. Using 
the NiGEM model we simulated the impact of a gradual correction in the US. 
The scenario we examined is one in which the US government reduces its 
fiscal deficit and in which the household savings rate rises. The increase in 
personal savings could be triggered by a fall in asset prices, in particular house 
 
22 There has been much speculation that a major realignment of the Chinese renminbi, which is 
quasi-pegged to the dollar, could help redress the problems in the US. However, recent research 
shows that while an appreciation of the renminbi will lead to a fall in Chinese exports, Chinese 
domestic prices react very quickly and the real exchange rate moves back almost to where it was 
before such a change (EUROFRAME-EFN, Autumn 2005 Report). As a result, even if the 
Chinese authorities responded favourably to calls for them to aid the international adjustment 
process by adjusting their currency it would do little to solve the problem of the US balance of 
payments deficit. 
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prices. This is one of the many possible adjustments that could happen in the 
US. The effect of these changes is to produce a reallocation of resources 
within the US economy as envisaged by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005). There is 
considerable uncertainty as to when this adjustment is likely to happen. For the 
sake of simplicity we have started our simulation in 2007, though this should 
not in any way be seen as being a forecast of the timing of such an event; if 
adjustment starts later it is likely to have more severe consequences. It is also 
possible that the correction could happen quickly, meaning that the impact on 
the US and the wider world economy would be more concentrated in the 
immediate two to three years after the adjustment. 
Table 3.1: Forecasts for the US Economy 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
High Growth Forecast 
 Per Cent 
Annual Average % 
Change 
Real GDP Growth 3.2 4.4 3.9 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.5 
         Annual Average 
Inflation* 1.9 2.2 2.7 3.9 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.1 3.0 2.8 
Short-term interest rate 1.2 1.6 3.4 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.0 3.0 4.4 5.0 
Exchange Rate ($ per €) 1.13 1.24 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.30 1.32 1.34 1.06 1.29 1.39 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP) -4.6 -4.3 -3.5 -3.7 -3.4 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -2.5 -3.4 -3.3 
Current Account Balance (as % of 
GDP) -4.7 -5.7 -6.6 -5.8 -5.4 -5.3 -5.4 -5.6 -5.1 -5.7 -6.3 
 
US Current Account Adjusts – Low Growth Forecast 
 Per Cent 
Annual Average % 
Change 
Real GDP Growth     1.6 1.2 1.4 1.7   2.1 
  Annual Average 
Inflation*     4.2 3.0 2.1 1.4   0.7 
Short-term interest rate     6.2 5.7 5.2 4.6   3.9 
Exchange Rate ($ per €)     1.37 1.42 1.46 1.50   1.55 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)     -2.6 -1.9 -1.3 -0.7   0.2 
Current Account Balance (as % of 
GDP)     -5.0 -4.5 -4.3 -4.1   -3.9 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
 
The fall in the value of households’ assets reduces their perceived wealth. 
Many households will react to this change by reducing consumption and 
raising their savings to rebuild their wealth. This would have a negative impact 
on domestic demand. There is an element of circularity here because the 
expectation of such a decline could actually be the trigger for, say a fall in asset 
prices. In addition, we have assumed that part of the US imbalances will be 
corrected with a fiscal tightening over the medium term. This means that taxes 
will slowly rise and/or expenditure will grow at a lower rate over the medium 
term. This heightens the negative impact on households because we assume 
the government does not intervene to try and kick-start the economy by 
adopting expansionary fiscal policies. Overall, this shock would have a serious 
negative impact on US growth, knocking around 2 percentage points off the 
growth rate in the short term.  
As a consequence of the downturn in the US economy the dollar would fall 
by about 10 per cent compared to the High Growth forecast in the first four 
years after the shock leaving the exchange rate at $1.50 by 2010, $0.16 higher 
than in the High Growth forecast. The fall in the value of the dollar would lead 
to an upturn in US inflation in the short term. Measured by the consumer 
expenditure deflator, consumer prices could be around 1 percentage point 
higher in the first year of the shock as compared to the High Growth forecast. 
As a consequence of higher inflation the Federal Reserve would tighten 
  
 
34 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2005-2012 
monetary policy in the short term providing a further negative impulse to 
growth. This helps explain why the impact on growth is more negative in the 
short term. The rise in US inflation would be temporary so in the medium 
term the Federal Reserve would cut interest rates again. In the medium term 
the improved competitiveness of the US economy, as a result of the 
depreciation of the dollar, coupled with the easing in monetary policy would 
stimulate the US economy so that it could grow by an average of 2 per cent per 
annum between 2010 and 2015, half a percentage point lower than in the High 
Growth Forecast. Underlying this scenario is a gradual improvement in the 
current account balance.  
 
 Economic activity in the Euro Area has lagged behind the other major 
economies in the past number of years. Although growth is expected to remain 
subdued in the short term, the outlook for activity in the medium term is more 
positive, although we anticipate growth to remain slightly below potential. Real 
GDP growth is expected to average 1.8 per cent between 2005 and 2010 as 
compared to annual average growth of 1.3 per cent between 2000 and 2005. As 
a member of EMU, the outlook of the Euro Area economy is important to 
Ireland because monetary policy is determined at the Euro Area level. 
3.3  
The Euro Area 
Since the launch of EMU, monetary policy has been conducted by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The primary role of the ECB is to maintain 
price stability. Without endangering price stability, the ECB is required to 
support the general economic policies in the EU, including sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth. The ECB maintained a relatively tight monetary 
stance in its early years, although rates have come down from their peak of 
4.75 per cent in October 2001 in response to the sluggish pace of activity in 
the Euro Area. Official Euro Area interest rates are forecast to rise gradually 
over the remainder of this decade, although remaining relatively low, and are 
expected to average 2.7 per cent between 2005 and 2010. 
Figure 3.5: Short Term Interest Rates for the EU Area 
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Despite its current depreciation, which we anticipate to be short-lived, the 
strength of the euro since 2002 has hampered growth in the Euro Area with 
the real effective exchange rate rising by over 15 per cent in the past three 
years. While the appreciation of the currency has helped to contain price 
pressures in the Euro Area, it has restrained export growth, resulting in net 
trade making a negative contribution to Euro Area growth in 2003 and no 
contribution to growth in 2004. Within the four largest Euro Area countries, 
only Germany has been supported by the external sector in recent years. Figure 
3.6 shows how the Euro Area as a whole has been losing market share since 
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2001 yet Germany has managed to retain its external competitiveness despite 
the strong euro. However, the German economy has failed to translate robust 
growth in exports into growth led by domestic demand (see Box A.).  
Our High Growth forecast is based on the assumption that there is a gradual 
appreciation of the euro over the forecast period, with the dollar/euro 
exchange rate averaging $1.29 between 2005 and 2010. As a consequence of 
the appreciation of the euro and relatively modest growth, inflationary 
pressures will be very subdued in the Euro Area over the forecast period. The 
Euro Area consumer expenditure deflator is expected to average 1.6 per cent 
between 2005 and 2010. 
Figure 3.6: Export Market Shares 
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Fiscal policy remains a contentious issue in the Euro Area. The aggregate 
fiscal deficit stood at 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2004, a slight improvement on 
the 3 per cent deficit in the previous year. Looking at the average deficit masks 
the differing performance of various member states. Of particular concern for 
the Euro Area outlook are the fiscal balances of the larger member states with 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece all exceeding the 3 per cent 
deficit ceiling of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2004. This calls into 
account the credibility of the SGP and also if member states are to abide by its 
rules it effectively removes the option of using fiscal policy to tackle weak 
growth. On the basis of stronger growth our forecasts show some progress 
towards fiscal consolidation in the medium term and we anticipate the Euro 
Area fiscal deficit to average 2.4 per cent of GDP between 2005 and 2010.  
As mentioned previously in this chapter, a correction in the US current 
account deficit will have a negative impact on growth in the US. It is important 
to consider the results of the scenario on growth prospects for the Euro Area. 
The fall in the external value of the dollar would have a negative impact on 
European competitiveness. This would knock approximately 0.2 percentage 
points off the Euro Area growth rate in the short run. The impact of the shock 
would be to put downwards pressure on prices so inflation in the Euro Area 
would be slightly lower. The ECB would respond to this shock by cutting 
interest rates in an attempt to raise output growth. The prevailing low level of 
interest rates means that the scope for expansionary monetary policy is 
somewhat limited. 
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Table 3.2: Forecasts for the Euro Area Economy 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
High Growth Forecast 
 Per Cent 
Annual Average % 
Change 
Real GDP Growth 0.7 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9  1.3 1.8 2.2 
         Annual Average 
Inflation* 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7  2.0 1.6 1.8 
Short-term interest rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.4  3.1 2.7 3.7 
Exchange Rate ($ per €) 1.13 1.24 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.30 1.32 1.34 1.06 1.29 1.39 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP) -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.1 -1.8  -2.0 -2.4 -1.4 
Unemployment Rate 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.6  8.4 8.7 8.4 
 
US Current Account Adjusts – Low Growth Forecast 
 Per Cent 
Annual Average % 
Change 
Real GDP Growth     1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8    2.0 
  Annual Average 
Inflation*     1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5    1.6 
Short-term interest rate     2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6    2.7 
Exchange Rate ($ per €)     1.37 1.42 1.46 1.50   1.55 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)     -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.7    -1.5 
Unemployment Rate     8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6    8.6 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
Box A: Happy Germans  
The German economy, which accounts for approximately one-third of Euro 
Area GDP, has been the weakest performer in the Euro Area in recent years. 
Annual growth in Germany averaged 1.2 per cent for the five-period 1999 to 
2004, as compared to the Euro Area average of 2.1 per cent. The majority of 
the poor economic performance is attributable to slow growth in domestic 
demand growth. Wage moderation, the bleak outlook for the public finances 
and the pensions system have all weighed on private consumption. 
Consequently, the savings rate has been rising since 2001 and the German 
economy is now running a large current account surplus. This weakness in 
consumer demand is reflected in the deterioration in German consumer 
confidence (see Figure below).  
Figure: German Consumer Confidence 
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   THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 37 
Using the NiGEM model, we simulate the impact of the German consumer 
deciding to shift more of their resources to consumption away from saving, say 
as a result of a rise in consumer confidence. Specifically, we modelled the 
impact of a 3-percentage point rise in the level of consumption for the years 
2006 to 2008.  
Table: Impact of a Rise in German Consumption 
 2006 2007 2008 
 Percentage Difference from Base 
German GDP 0.8 0.8 0.8 
    
Euro Area GDP 0.3 0.3 0.3 
 Absolute Difference from Base 
German GGB (as % of GDP) 0.5 0.2 0.0 
German Current Account (% of GDP) -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
 
The effect of such a shock on the German economy and the wider Euro 
Area economy are substantial (see Table above). The level of German GDP 
would increase by around 0.8 percentage points for each year of the shock 
compared to what it otherwise would have been and this would add 0.3 
percentage points onto Euro Area output. The increase in consumption would 
have positive knock-on effects for employment and the unemployment rate 
could come down by 0.4 percentage points in the short term. The German 
General Government balance would also be improved and the deficit could 
fall by a half a percentage point of GDP in the first year of the shock. This 
could further enhance any boost to consumer confidence. The lower level of 
savings would see the current account surplus being reduced by just over 1 
percentage point. 
 
 The UK economy continues to be an important trading partner for Ireland 
despite its relative decline as a destination for exports. In 2004 Irish exports to 
the UK accounted for approximately 18 per cent of the value of total exports 
so Ireland is exposed to changes in the bilateral euro/sterling exchange rate 
and also to future growth prospects in the UK.23 Despite the slowdown in the 
international economy since 2000/2001 the UK economy has experienced 
robust growth, although growth has slowed this year. We anticipate that this 
slowdown is temporary and prospects for the medium term remain favourable. 
Real GDP growth is forecast to average 2.1 per cent on an annual basis 
between 2005 and 2010. Underlying our forecast for the UK economy is a 
gradual depreciation of sterling against the euro; which will enhance 
competitiveness in the UK and bolster growth. 
3.4  
The United 
Kingdom 
UK inflation, as measured by the consumer expenditure deflator, is 
expected to remain low over the forecast horizon with annual average inflation 
of 1.5 per cent forecast between 2005 and 2010. While the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England may cut interest rates in the short 
run, we expect that short-term rates will gradually rise towards the end of the 
decade.  
A feature of the UK economy in recent years has been the strong 
performance of the labour market. From an annual average of 10.3 per cent in 
1993, the number of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force declined 
to an annual average of 2.7 per cent in 2004 (see Figure 3.7) or 4.8 per cent on 
an ILO basis. We expect to see some increase in the unemployment rate over 
the forecast horizon, with the unemployment rate set to average 4.2 per cent 
between 2005 and 2010, half of the Euro Area average for the same period. 
 
23 A continuing issue facing the UK economy, and one that is of importance to Ireland, is the 
issue of EMU membership. It is assumed, for the purposes of this Review, that the UK does not 
join EMU. 
  
 
38 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2005-2012 
Figure 3.7: UK Unemployment Rate 
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The High Growth forecast for the UK economy, together with the implied 
forecast under the Low Growth scenario are presented in Table 3.3. The impact 
on sterling is more moderate than on the euro and would result in some 
further depreciation of sterling against the euro. This has a positive impact on 
UK competitiveness vis-à-vis the Euro Area, although the slowdown in the 
international environment would have a negative impact on growth. The 
depreciation of sterling against the euro would put upwards pressure on prices 
yet inflation would remain moderate; leaving scope for the MPC to react by 
cutting rates to help boost growth. 
Table 3.3: Forecasts for the UK Economy 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
High Growth Forecast 
 Per Cent 
Annual Average % 
Change 
Real GDP Growth 2.5 3.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2  2.4 2.1 2.7 
         Annual Average 
Inflation* 2.0 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2  1.9 1.5 1.0 
Short-term interest rate 3.7 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.6  4.7 4.4 4.9 
Exchange Rate (£ per €) 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72  0.65 0.70 0.74 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP) -3.2 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -2.5 -2.6 -2.5 -2.4  -1.4 -2.5 -2.3 
Unemployment Rate 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.3  3.1 4.2 5.4 
 
US Current Account Adjusts – Low Growth Forecast 
 Per Cent 
Annual Average % 
Change 
Real GDP Growth     2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1    2.3 
  Annual Average 
Inflation*     2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6    1.5 
Short-term interest rate     3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0    3.3 
Exchange Rate (£ per €)     0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72    0.73 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)     -3.0 -3.0 -2.6 -2.4    -2.3 
Unemployment Rate     3.7 4.2 4.5 4.8    5.2 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
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We have not outlined in any detail our forecast for developments in the rest 
of the world, most notably China and India. However, these economies are 
likely to continue growing rapidly, contributing an ever increasing share of the 
momentum in foreign trade. This represents an opportunity rather than a 
threat for the Irish economy. As argued in Chapter 7, these economies have 
limited supplies of skilled labour and their very success is raising demand for 
this scarce resource, and its cost, at an ever-increasing rate. The available skills 
are needed to manage their rapidly growing economies and it will be many 
years before their comparative advantage could come to lie in producing on a 
large scale products and services for export involving a high skilled input. As a 
result they represent very important markets for Irish firms in the future. 
3.5 
 Context for 
Ireland 
Since the last Medium-Term Review Ireland has continued to enjoy strong 
growth rates compared to other international economies. The bulk of this 
growth has been domestically driven, especially from the building and 
construction sector which is not self-sustaining. Although the structure of the 
economy is changing to a greater importance of services, this does not mean 
that Ireland is immune to events in the international economy. For example, 
services exports accounted for a third of the value of total exports in 2004 and 
total exports accounted for over 60 per cent of GDP in value terms. The 
relatively sluggish growth forecast for the international economy will have 
negative implications for the trading environment in which Ireland operates.  
The forecast continued appreciation of the euro will adversely affect 
Ireland's already eroded competitiveness base and reduce the scope of the 
possible contribution the external sector can make to growth. Ireland has a 
greater than average exposure to non-Euro Area trade and so is more likely to 
incur greater competitiveness pressures. 
The outlook for interest rates is externally determined by the ECB, and will 
therefore reflect conditions in the Euro Area rather than domestic conditions. 
This removes interest rate policy as a mechanism to stabilise the domestic 
economy, say in the area of housing, if the Irish business cycle is different 
from that of the larger Euro Area economies.  To date, the Irish economy has 
benefited from lower interest rates than might otherwise have been the case as 
a result of EMU membership. The forecast modest recovery in the Euro Area 
will see interest rates rise gradually over the course of the decade although 
remaining at relatively moderate levels.  
Overall, the international environment is more uncertain, with a less 
positive outlook than at the time of the last Medium-Term Review. The biggest 
risk to the international environment is that, at some point in the future, the 
imbalances present in the US economy will unwind. In the scenario described 
in this chapter, this would result in the US economy shifting to a lower growth 
path and output would grow below potential for several years after the shock. 
The likely realignment of the dollar would serve to further erode the 
competitiveness of the Euro Area. A sharp downturn in US economic 
performance would reduce Irish growth. There are a wide range of channels 
through which this would happen. Firstly, Ireland has a higher share of exports 
going to the US than is the case for many of its EU partners. Secondly, 
because the Euro would appreciate in the Low Growth scenario, the EU and 
Ireland would lose competitiveness. The resulting lower growth in the EU 
would also affect Ireland. Finally, the likely slowdown in FDI flows from the 
US and the slower growth in world trade would impact on Ireland. Therefore, 
such a scenario is likely to have a more negative impact on a country like 
Ireland. As mentioned previously, we have described one possible scenario in 
which the imbalances in the US economy are redressed. There is considerable 
uncertainty about the timing and speed of such an adjustment and it remains 
the biggest external risk to the medium-term growth prospects of the Irish 
economy. 
  
 
4. OVERVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
In this chapter we present an overview of our forecast for the Irish economy 
out to 2020. A major theme underlying this Medium-Term Review revolves 
around the fact that we expect that the growing external imbalances, that 
characterise the current growth performance of the US economy cannot 
continue indefinitely.  
4.1 
Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, we present two different scenarios in this Review. 
The external assumptions underpinning these two macro-economic scenarios 
have been described in detail in the previous chapter. We assume that the High 
Growth scenario is a reasonable basis for predicting the likely outturn in Ireland 
over the medium term out to around 2012. This scenario is outlined in detail in 
Chapter 5.  
However this scenario is not a reasonable basis for forecasting Irish growth 
over the longer term. Because of this we have developed a second Low Growth 
scenario which assumes that market forces will produce an adjustment in the 
US and the world economies. For illustrative purposes we have assumed that 
this Low Growth scenario begins in 2007. However, it is likely that if such an 
adjustment occurs, it will happen more suddenly than in the scenario 
considered here. Furthermore, the earlier an adjustment takes place the lower 
the likely cost of adjustment. Even though there is considerable doubt as to 
when this adjustment process will commence we consider that over the longer 
term this scenario best captures the external environment likely to face the 
Irish economy out to 2020. This scenario is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
The High Growth and the Low Growth scenarios prescribe two paths for the 
growth of GNP over the next fifteen years.24 Within the limits described by 
these two scenarios a range of possible adjustment paths exist. At some point, 
when and if the adjustment begins, the path of Irish GNP could switch from 
the High Growth to the Low Growth scenario. In Section 4.3 we present an 
overview of these alternative growth paths and their implications for the 
changing structure of the economy, the labour market, the housing market, the 
public finances and competitiveness.  
The detailed forecasts of the Irish economy, which we produce, are based 
on simulations of the ESRI HERMES medium-term macroeconomic model. 
In running these simulations we use the demographic assumptions discussed in 
Chapter 2, and assumptions on world economic conditions discussed in 
Chapter 3. To simplify the presentation we assume that the government sector 
runs a small surplus on the General Government Balance (GGB) over the 
course of both scenarios. This is achieved by varying the volume increase in 
public consumption and varying the average direct tax rate. The net effects is 
that the share of GNP accounted for by the public sector changes only slowly 
over time. Full details of the assumptions on the public finances are given in 
the next chapter. 
 
24 These two paths for GNP do not represent “confidence limits”. It is quite possible that GNP 
could perform better than in the High Growth scenario or worse than in the Low Growth scenario. 
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We begin however in Section 4.2 with our estimates of the potential growth 
rate of the Irish economy out to 2020. Assuming also a benign external 
environment moving forward, these growth rates should be achievable given 
accommodative domestic policies. However, while we believe that the external 
environment is currently the major source of uncertainty it is not the only one. 
The second major uncertainty we identify is the future performance of the 
housing market in particular, and the provision of sufficient infrastructure to 
tackle congestion problems in general, in the face of the immigration flows 
which would be necessary to achieve this potential growth rate over the next 
fifteen years.   
 
 The “potential output” of the economy attempts to measure what rate of 
growth the economy could achieve under favourable circumstances, given its 
endowment of labour and capital, and without causing inflationary pressures. 
The measure of potential output is important as it prescribes, in a sense, an 
upper limit on growth. Growth above potential is possible for a period. 
However, because it involves very high utilisation rates for the endowment of 
resources available to an economy, it results in an ever increasing rate of 
inflation. As such it is not possible to keep growing more rapidly than potential 
for too long. 
4.2 
Potential Growth 
Measuring the potential output of an economy is obviously not a simple 
exercise and there is a range of methods frequently used for the purpose. In 
addition, because the supply of factors of production is itself endogenous, it is 
not an easy concept to operationalise over a long time horizon. For example, 
while the labour force may be fixed in the short term, it can vary through 
migration in the longer term. Similarly, the capital stock can be increased 
through investment. 
In this Review we build up our estimate of the potential growth rate from 
estimates of the long-term rate of growth in productivity and the growth in the 
population who are available to work. We begin by assuming a growth path for 
productivity net of the effects of rising education or skill levels, where 
education levels are proxied by an index of human capital.25 This estimated rate 
of productivity growth should be a function of the capital stock. However, 
here we simply examine the long-term trend in this key item and use it to 
project forward. Table 4.1 shows both the actual growth rate of productivity, 
averaged over five year periods, and what we have assumed to be the long-
term trend growth. Assumed productivity growth net of human capital beyond 
2005 falls to 1.5 per cent from an average of 2 per cent per annum.  This 
reflects the declining role of high-productivity manufacturing and the 
increasing role of lower productivity services in total output. To this we add 
the expected growth in the human capital index – a measure of the additional 
growth in productivity arising from the increasing average educational 
attainment of the population. As can be seen from Table 4.1, this factor is still 
significant but its effect falls gradually out to the end of the next decade. 
The labour force is clearly endogenous – it adjusts depending on labour 
market conditions in Ireland relative to other countries in the EU. This 
contributes a certain “elasticity” to our measure of potential output.26 In 
practise we have estimated what labour force would be consistent with a given 
scenario.  
 
 
25 See Chapter 2, Section 2.4 for a fuller description of this human capital index. 
26 In reality, with a fixed capital stock, more labour (through immigration) would see a fall in 
productivity measured as output per person employed. While we have not been able to take this 
into account directly, as discussed in the next chapter we do see the limitations of the 
endowment of infrastructure as constraining the potential growth rate of the economy. 
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Table 4.1: Potential Growth Rate, Low Growth Scenario, Average Annual Growth, % 
 1970- 
1975 
1975- 
1980 
1980- 
1985 
1985- 
1990 
1990- 
1995 
1995- 
1900 
2000- 
2005 
2005- 
2010 
2010- 
2015 
2015- 
2020 
Actual output (GNP)* 4.0 4.1 0.3 3.2 4.4 8.8 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.3 
Actual Productivity 
 net of human capital* 3.0 2.1 1.2 1.9 1.8 3.1 0.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 
Potential Output (GNP) 3.6 4.8 5.2 4.7 6.8 7.9 5.2 4.4 3.5 2.6 
composed of:           
Assumed Productivity  
net of Human Capital 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Human Capital 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Labour Force* 0.9 1.5 0.9 0.1 1.9 3.4 2.9 2.1 1.1 0.7 
Unemployment rate at 4%* 0.2 0.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 
 * Low Growth scenario. 
 
In Table 4.1 we also show what would have been the effect on output if the 
unemployment rate at the beginning of a five year period fell to the assumed 
full-employment rate of 4 per cent by the end of the period.27 This treats the 
unemployed as a potential resource, adding to the labour supply. These 
numbers suggest that while the economy grew well ahead of potential in the 
1995 to 2000 period (by 8.8 per cent a year compared to 7.9 per cent), its 
performance in the 2000-2005 period is below potential, mainly because the 
actual growth in measured productivity net of human capital was very low. 
However, the fact that the unemployment rate still hovers close to de facto full 
employment level suggests that our figure for potential output has 
overestimated the growth potential for the current period.  
The estimates in Table 4.1 suggest that the economy has the potential to 
grow by about 4.5 per cent a year out to 2010, falling to 3.5 per cent a year to 
2015 and to around 2.5 per cent a year to 2020. Under the Low Growth scenario 
we anticipate that the economy will grow well below potential for the next ten 
years, mainly driven by lower levels of employment than those necessary to 
clear the labour market with rates of productivity growth mirroring potential. 
If the High Growth scenario proves correct beyond 2010, the economy would 
be growing above its long-term potential as measured here. However, these 
estimates are, necessarily, crude and a significant margin of error around the 
central estimate is possible. 
 
 
MEDIUM-TERM FORECASTS 4.3  
Overview of 
Alternative 
Growth Paths 
Table 4.2 shows the key economic aggregates under both scenarios over the 
medium term out to 2012. Under the High Growth scenario the economy 
performs significantly better in terms of growth, productivity and employment. 
This leads to a lower unemployment rate by 2010 that, despite substantially 
higher immigration, leads to much higher wage growth under this scenario. 
Coupled with the very high rate of house completions necessary to sustain the 
implied labour force growth, this leads to incipient inflationary pressures 
beyond 2010. In this Medium-Term Review we have opted to present the results 
of this High Growth scenario out to 2012 as achievable if the US economy does 
not adjust until after that time. However, domestic constraints on growth make 
it likely that even without any US adjustment, this High Growth trajectory would 
not be sustainable over the longer term. 
 
 
 
 
27 Here we are ignoring differences in the skills of the unemployed relative to the rest of the 
labour force. 
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Table 4.2: Forecast of Major Aggregates Under High Growth and Low Growth Scenarios 
Low Growth Forecast 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
          
GNP, % 4.0 5.6 4.8 3.8 3.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 
GNP per worker, % 0.4 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.0 
Investment, % 6.9 7.3 4.3 1.8 1.8 1.0 2.8 2.6 2.6 
Consumption deflator, % 1.2 2.1 2.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 
Non ag wage rates, % 5.7 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.1 2.8 
Employment (PES), % 3.5 4.5 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.3 
Labour Force (PES), %  2.9 4.0 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.1 
Unemployment rate – ILO 4.4 4.2 4.2 5.3 6.1 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.3 
Net Immigration, 000s 31.7 53.3 29.7 27.3 25.0 24.1 23.1 22.1 21.1 
Balance of payments,  
% of GNP 
-1.2 -1.8 -2.1 -1.6 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 1.0 
Exchequer saving,  
% of GNP 
0.1 -1.5 -1.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 
Debt/GNP ratio 24.4 22.4 20.9 20.3 19.7 19.2 18.6 17.9 17.3 
Housing Completions, 000s 77.7 78.9 78.1 73.0 67.9 62.8 62.3 61.8 61.4 
High Growth Forecast          
GNP, % 4.0 5.6 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.4 3.5 
GNP per worker, % 0.4 1.0 2.5 3.6 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.2 
Investment, % 6.9 7.3 4.3 2.5 3.1 2.9 4.9 4.3 3.8 
Consumption deflator, % 1.2 2.1 2.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.6 
Non ag wage rates, % 5.7 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.7 5.4 6.3 
Employment (PES), % 3.5 4.5 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.3 
Labour Force (PES), %  2.9 4.0 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.6 
Unemployment rate - ILO 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.4 3.6 3.2 2.6 
Net Immigration, 000s 31.7 53.3 29.7 27.3 27.0 29.0 31.5 34.2 36.7 
Balance of payments,  
% of GNP 
-1.2 -1.8 -2.1 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 
Exchequer saving,  
% of GNP 
0.1 -1.5 -1.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 
Debt/GNP ratio 24.4 22.4 20.9 19.9 19.1 18.2 17.2 16.1 15.2 
Housing Completions, 000s 77.7 78.9 78.1 73.5 70.1 67.5 70.5 73.5 76.2 
 
To understand more fully the productive capacity of the economy it is 
useful to decompose GNP per capita into a number of individual components, 
namely productivity, the employment rate, participation and dependency.28 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 plot the growth in each of the components of GNP per  
capita under the Low Growth and High Growth scenarios respectively. 
As shown in the figures, productivity growth is much greater and the 
unemployment rate is much lower under the High Growth scenario than under 
the Low Growth scenario between 2007 and 2011. As a result, by 2012, GNP 
per head is 6.9 percentage points higher under the High Growth scenario. 
Between 2011 and 2012, the growth rate in GNP per capita under both 
scenarios is similar, given that under the Low Growth scenario, the effects of the 
US adjustment are more or less completed during the period 2007  to 2011.   
 
28 In equation below LTOT is total employment, LF is the labour force, N1564 is the population of 
working age (15-64) and N is the total population. The first term on the right hand side of the 
equation measures productivity (output per employee), the second term measures employment 
as a proportion of the labour force (equal to one minus the unemployment rate), the third term 
measures the participation rate and the fourth term is the inverse of the dependency rate. 
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Figure 4.1: Decomposition of GNP Per Capita Growth Rate, Low Growth 
Scenario 
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Figure 4.2: Decomposition of GNP Per Capital Growth Rate, High Growth 
Scenario 
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 As already mentioned in the Introduction, in this Medium-Term Review we 
have opted to present our baseline forecast under two scenarios. These 
scenarios are stylised as “high” and “low” within which there are a whole host 
of different adjustment paths for the US and consequently for the Irish 
economy. We consider that if there were no adjustment in the US until 2012 
then the Irish economy could follow the High Growth path  as shown in Figure 
4.3. However beyond that point we argue that the Irish economy must adjust 
to the Lower Growth path, and that this path traces the ultimate end point which 
the economy is likely to arrive at by 2020. In addition Figure 4.3 illustrates a 
couple of possible adjustment paths between these two trajectories. 
4.4 
Longer Term 
Growth 
Prospects out to 
2020 
Figure 4.3: Alternative Adjustment Paths for GNP, Constant Prices 
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CHANGING STRUCTURE OF ECONOMY 
The Irish economy has for many years relied on industry as the main engine of 
growth. Structural change is currently underway in the economy and it is 
expected that manufacturing, while still very important, will make a declining 
contribution to growth in the long term. The counterpart to this is that market 
services will become more important in driving growth in the economy, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. There has been a dramatic increase in the share of 
services exports in total exports and this trend is forecast to continue in the 
coming years. 
This move to a greater share of services in total exports means that terms 
of trade movements are likely to be more favourable than in the past. The 
huge technical progress (and productivity) in the high technology sector means 
that prices have fallen pretty continuously. Output prices today for the high 
technology sector are below the level they were twenty years ago. Table 4.3 
and after adjustment for the 
or export, where the price 
s problems in this scenario could force adjustment to a lower 
gro
shows the average growth rate of GNP before 
terms of trade. The shift to production of services f
is expected to rise slowly rather than fall, means that a smaller volume increase 
in exports will be needed to sustain the same rate of growth in living standards, 
while also maintaining external balance. In the case of the High Growth scenario 
the positive terms of trade effect post-2010 looks unrealistically large. It arises 
from a high rate of increase in domestic wage rates, discussed later, consequent 
on a tight labour market. It seems improbable that the tradable services sector 
would be able to pass through such an increase and it suggests that the 
competitivenes
wth path, even if there were no adjustment in the US economy. 
Table 4.3: Effects of Terms of Trade on Average Growth in GNP, Percentage 
Points 
  GNP GNP Adjusted  
for Terms of Trade 
Difference 
1970-75 4.0 3.7 -0.3 
1975-80 4.1 3.8 -0.3 
1980-85 0.3 0.7 0.4 
1985-90 3.2 3.3 0.1 
1990-95 4.4 3.8 -0.6 
1995-00 8.8 8.6 -0.2 
2000-05 4.0 3.7 -0.3 
Low Growth:    
2005-10 3.5 3.2 -0.3 
2010-15 3.1 3.0 -0.1 
2015-20 3.3 3.5 0.2 
High Growth:    
2005-10 4.9 4.7 -0.2 
2010-15 3.3 4.5 1.2 
 
.4 shows the sectoral shares in GDP out to 2020. In both sc os 
th t services sector account around 55 per cent of output by 0. 
T terpart to this is a steady decline in the share of industry, although 
this decline is halted temporarily in  High Growth scen  out to 2010 due to 
st wth in the high-tech sec The non-market ices sector is likely 
to ts share in the total nomy under bo enarios, re ng 
increased demands for public services. 
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T Value-Added Shares in GDP at Factor Cost, Per Cent able 4.4: 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Low Growth      
Agriculture 3.9 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.2 
Industry 42.1 37.4 35.5 33.4 28.0 
Market Services 47.6 47.6 48.5 50.8 56.5 
Non-Market Services 11.2 13.3 14.2 14.0 13.8 
High Growth      
Agriculture 3.9 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.4 
Industry 42.1 37.4 38.7 35.6 29.2 
Market Services 47.6 47.6 45.8 48.4 54.9 
Non-Market Services 11.2 13.3 13.9 14.6 14.8 
LABOUR MARKET 
Under the High Growth scenario investment continues to grow strongly from a 
very high base in 2006. Ireland is currently devoting a dramatically larger share 
much of it in 
public and private infrastructure where er mari g the 
EU 15, investment as a share of GDP a d 20 per cent over the 
last decade whereas for Ireland it averaged lose to 3  per cent of GNP since 
2000. The strong growth in housing le to co ued st g dem  for 
labour in the 4 ws that by 2015 there are 40,000 
e oyed in th ustr tor, om ulk a  the 
building and construction sector nce in g employ nt 
is more modest since under b  scena  man turing employm  
o  term. 
F l Employm eve Thou s 
Figure 4.5 plots the total employment in levels under both scenarios. Under 
the Low Growth scenario employment is 150,000 lower by 2015 as a result of 
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the slower growth in output. In addition  the Low Growth scenario sees lower 
immigration, the difference in the growth in labour supply is more modest as
labour supply is also driven by rising participation rates under both scenarios.
This means that under the Low Growth scenario the unemployment rate is 4.6
percentage points higher by 2012 (Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.7: Housing Investment as Share of GNP, Per Cent 
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HOUSING MARKET 
W
investment in 2004 peaked at 14 per cent of the value of GNP, a truly 
exceptional share. This measure does not take account of th
manufacturing and distribution sector business in supplying materials and
services to housing. This is a much higher share than in any other EU 
economy. Because this sector sources so much of its material inputs in the 
domestic economy the multiplier effects of this injection are high. Figure 4.7 
plots the forecast path of housing investment’s share of GNP under the High 
and Low Growth scenarios. Under the Low Growth scenario the share of housing 
investment in GNP adjusts gradually downwards to a more sustainable long-
48 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2005-2012 
term path. These numbers imply a rate of housing completions of around 
62,000 per annum in the Low Growth scenario. Under the High Growth scenario 
 migrants pushes this share back to its 2004 peak by 
re of Value Added, Excluding Agriculture, Per Cent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ment, coupled with rising congestion costs, 
could see the emergence of a wage-price spiral which would eventually 
4.5 
the very strong inflows of
the end of the period. 
MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS 
Previous sub-sections have illustrated the loss to the economy in terms of 
employment, investment and public services from the Low Growth scenario 
relative to the High Growth scenario. However, Figure 4.8 highlights the longer 
term problems which would ensue if the economy followed such a High Growth 
trajectory for more than five years, in other words beyond our medium-term 
horizon as presented in Chapter 5. Figure 4.8 plots labour’s share of value 
added in the economy under the High Growth and Low Growth scenarios. Out to 
2009 under the High Growth scenario, the labour share falls as strong growth 
boosts profitability and employment. However, beyond that point wage 
 
Figure 4.8: Labour Sha
 
demands lead to a slow but inexorable elimination of this competitive
advantage so that by 2020 the economy is much less competitive under the 
High Growth scenario than the Low Growth scenario. This highlights the fact that 
the High Growth scenario is unlikely to be sustainable for more than a decade
whether or not the US undergoes a significant adjustment. Because of the
continuing tightness of the labour market in the High Growth scenario, from
early in the next decade the growth in nominal wage rates would rise above 6
per cent a year, more than double the rate envisaged for our EU competitors.
By contrast, in the Low Growth scenario wage rates in the next decade grow by 
around 3 per cent a year, maintaining competitiveness roughly unchanged
relative to the rest of the EU 15. 
 
 In this chapter we present an overview of the future prospects for the Irish 
economy over two horizons. In the first horizon, the five years 2007 to 2012, 
which we dub the “medium term”, we project that, if the US economy does 
not adjust over this period, the Irish economy could grow at a rate slightly 
above its long-term potential growth rate, averaging 4.6 per cent per annum. 
However, such a strong rate of growth, and the attendant high immigration 
flows it would require to maintain sufficient labour supply, would put strong 
pressure on the capacity of the economy to accommodate such growth, 
particularly in the housing market and the delivery of infrastructure more 
generally. In addition, the Irish labour market has been operating at or around 
full employment for a number of years now so that a further six years of 
stro owth and low unemploy
Conclusions 
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cha
the path of the Irish economy following this High Growth path beyond 2012. 
The choice of this end date is essentially arbitrary. This uncertainty 
centres around when the US economy is likely to adjust to correct imbalances. 
We have prepared a Low Growth scenario based on the assumption that the US 
economy begins to adjust in 2007. We believe that this scenario traces the 
future growth trajectory of the Irish economy over what we dub the “longer 
term”, and that at some point the economy will shift from the High Growth to 
the Low Growth path outlined in this chapter. If the US were to begin to adjust 
in 2007 then the Low Growth path would see the economy growing out to 2011 
below potential; beyond that point the economy gradually begins to recover 
and by 2020 it would have regained competitiveness. This scenario is ultimately 
more benign for the long-term prospects of the Irish economy, with migration 
flows and housing demands which can more easily be absorbed. 
 
 
llenge the competitiveness of the economy. Therefore, we do not envisage 
5. THE HIGH GROWTH 
FORECAST 
This chapter presents the High Growth forecast for the Irish economy to 
2012. It is based on the High Growth scenario in Chapter 3 where there is no 
adjustment in the US current account deficit in the short to medium term. 
While we do expect that the US will over the medium term adjust to correct its 
external imbalances, we feel that this is unlikely to begin in 2007 and is more 
likely to commence towards the end of the decade. For that reason we have 
chosen to forecast the medium term growth prospects for the Irish economy 
on the assumption that there are no sharp adjustments to the US economy 
within that time horizon. 
5.1  
Introduction 
In this High Growth forecast the economy performs well out to the end of 
the decade with GNP growth averaging just under 5 per cent per annum. This 
rate of growth is above an estimated potential growth rate of 4.5 per cent per 
annum in this period,29 driven by strong growth in the manufacturing sector. 
The attendant growth in employment leads to strong net immigration flows 
and a fall in the unemployment rate. Beyond 2009 this tightening of the labour 
market leads to the emergence of incipient inflationary pressures with rising 
wage and price inflation and a gradual slowing in the growth rate. Detailed 
forecast tables are given in Appendix 2. 
Table 5.1:  High Growth Forecast, Growth in Major Aggregates 
           1995- 2000- 2005- 2010-
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2000 2005 2010 2015 
  Per Cent Average Annual % Growth 
GDP 4.5 5.7 4.9 6.2 6.0 5.5 5.6 4.7 4.1 9.8 5.4 5.7 3.9
GNP 4.0 5.6 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.4 3.5 8.8 4.0 4.9 3.3
GNDI 3.3 4.5 4.6 5.2 4.4 4.0 4.5 4.7 4.2 8.2 3.5 4.5 4.4
Investment/ GNP ratio 29.6 29.9 29.7 28.9 28.7 28.6 29.0 29.2 29.4 25.6 28.6 29.0 29.2
Consumption Deflator 1.2 2.1 2.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.4 2.1 4.1
Employment(PES) - % 
change 3.5 4.5 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.3 5.0 3.1 2.4 1.7
Real after tax non ag. 
wages, % change 2.7 2.9 1.5 2.4 2.3 2.0 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.7
  Per Cent of GNP 
 For End Year 
  2000      2005      2010     2015
Balance of payments 
surplus -1.2 -1.8 -2.1 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 -0.3 -1.8 0.1 2.1
Debt/GNP ratio 24.4 22.4 20.9 19.9 19.1 18.2 17.2 16.1 15.2 34.3 22.4 17.2 12.5
General government 
balance as % of GNP 1.7 -0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 5.1 -0.6 0.3 0.1
  Per Cent of Labour Force (ILO Basis)       
Unemployment rate - ILO 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.4 3.6 3.2 2.6 4.3 4.2 3.6 2.7
  In Thousands       
Net Immigration, 
Thousands 32 53 30 27 27 29 31 34 37 26 53 31 44 
 
29 See Chapter 4 for an outline of how potential growth is estimated for a given scenario. 
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Beyond 2010 the strong growth performance of the manufacturing sector 
begins to slow, with a greater contribution to growth coming from the services 
sector. This is reflected in a continuation of the gradual move to a higher share 
of services exports in total exports and an improvement in the terms of trade.  
The gap between GNP and GNDI, which is driven by changes in the terms of 
trade and transfer income, finally closes by 2010. The exceptionally strong 
growth in the Irish economy in the 1990s led to full convergence with the EU 
average in terms of GNP per head by the end of that decade. In our High 
Growth forecast the growth in GNP per head continues to outperform the EU-
15 average so that by 2010 Irish GNP per head is an astonishing 11 percentage 
points higher than the EU-15 average (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1: GNP Per Head Relative to EU-15 Average 
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Beyond 2010 the performance of the economy begins to slow. The gradual 
shift to lower productivity services output coupled with a very tight labour 
market, rising wage demands and very substantial immigration flows fuelling 
congestion costs, means that the economy is no longer on a sustainable growth 
path and at some time in the next decade an adjustment to a lower growth 
path must occur no matter what happens in the external environment. We 
discuss the longer-term growth prospects in Chapter 6. 
In this Chapter, we present detailed annual forecasts out to 2012, together 
with indicative forecasts out to 2015. Our forecasts are based on the National 
Income and Expenditure (NIE) 200430 accounts together with the Autumn 2005 
Quarterly Economic Commentary31 forecasts for 2005 and 2006. The ESRI’s 
medium-term macroeconomic model, HERMES, was used to produce the 
majority of the forecasts. 
Section 5.2 looks at the crucially important supply side of the economy, the 
driving force behind the growth process. Given the supply side, we then move 
on to look at incomes, expenditure and prices in Section 5.3, clearly of much 
importance in terms of likely future implications of growth in living standards. 
Within this section our forecasts for income levels, consumption, and prices 
are discussed. Section 5.4 then looks at the labour market with forecasts for 
employment and unemployment presented out to 2012. Section 5.5 discusses 
the balance of payments, savings and sets out our assumptions for the public 
 
30 The databank we used for estimation of the HERMES model was based on the NIE 2003 
accounts since the full NIE 2004 accounts have yet to become available. This means that 
reported growth rates in some aggregates may differ slightly from the official NIE 2004 
numbers. 
31 Barrett, A. et al., 2005. Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute.  
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finances. The implications of the overall economic forecasts for the housing 
market and for the environment are analysed in Sections 5.6 and 5.7.  
 
 The supply side of the economy determines the long-term potential to 
generate output and employment growth and thus improvements in living 
standards in the country.  It comprises both the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors.  Output in the tradable sector is driven by world demand, which in 
turn is determined by two main factors, the rate of growth in the world 
economy and the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector’s 
output.  Output in the non-tradable sector is driven by domestic demand.  The 
non-tradable sector is closely linked to the overall competitiveness of the 
economy, as prices and wages in that sector affect the costs of production of 
output in the traded sector.    
5.2  
The Supply Side 
The structure of the supply side of the economy has changed over time 
with a shift from a largely agrarian driven economy to an industrial and 
manufacturing driven one having occurred. A shift towards a services driven 
economy is now underway, as the role of the services sector has increased 
consistently over time; for example, in 1980 the services sector accounted for 
around 50 per cent of employment in the economy and by 2004 its 
contribution had increased to over 65 per cent. Not only is the services sector 
accounting for larger proportions of employment, but also of value added. 
The economy witnessed record levels of output growth throughout the 
1990s, before a sharp slowdown at the beginning of this decade in 2001 and 
2002.  Since then growth rates have gradually recovered and we are forecasting 
that this recovery will continue to accelerate out to the end of the decade, with 
output growing above potential.  We predict that real GNP will increase by an 
average of 4.9 per cent per annum over the latter half of the current decade. 
INDUSTRY 
The ESRI HERMES macroeconomic model makes a distinction between that 
part of the industrial sector which is tradable and that part which is generally 
non-tradable. The tradable sector includes the manufacturing industries while 
the non-tradable sector includes industries in the building and utilities sectors. 
Within the tradable sector, manufacturing is further disaggregated into three 
components; the high-technology sector, the traditional manufacturing sector 
and the food processing sector.32   
MANUFACTURING 
The manufacturing sector performed extremely well throughout the 1990s, 
with average annual growth rates of almost 11.0 per cent recorded in the 
volume of output in the sector over the decade.  In the early years of the 
current decade, the sector has witnessed a significantly slower rate of growth, 
averaging an estimated 5.4 per cent per annum to 2005 on average. Looking 
ahead to the end of the decade, it is expected that growth in the sector will 
accelerate to an average of around 7.0 per cent per annum. The contribution of 
the sector to economy wide growth is gradually falling over time, however 
under this High Growth scenario its contribution remains strong out to 2010, 
mainly driven by strong growth in the high-tech sector.  Within manufacturing, 
the role of the traditional and food processing sectors is expected to decline, 
given the increasing competitiveness pressures these sectors will face.  
 
32 The high-technology sector includes industries involved in chemical, metal and engineering 
activities. The traditional manufacturing group of industries includes mining and quarrying, drink 
and tobacco, textiles, leather, wood products, clothing and footwear, paper and printing, and 
other miscellaneous industries. 
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Figure 5.2: Output in Manufacturing 
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Throughout the 1990s growth in the high-technology industries 
significantly outpaced growth in the rest of the manufacturing sector; gross 
output in the high-technology sectors expanded by an average 15.7 per cent 
between 1990 and 1999 while gross output in traditional manufacturing 
expanded by 4.9 per cent and that of the food processing industries grew by 
5.9 per cent over the same period. The phenomenal growth in the high-
technology sector was driven largely by significant productivity gains in the 
sector as well as substantial investment in the form of FDI.  This pattern came 
to an abrupt halt in the global recession period for the high-technology sector 
during 2001-2002; since then growth rates have recovered and this sector is 
expected to grow at an annual average of 7.8 per cent per annum out to the 
end of the decade.  
The traditional manufacturing industries while lagging behind the high-
technology industries in terms of output growth, nonetheless performed well 
over the 1990s. These industries have come under increasing competitiveness 
pressures in recent times given the emergence of lower cost manufacturing 
sources throughout Asia and the new EU member states, the sustained 
appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar, as well as increasing domestic cost 
bases. We thus expect lower growth rates in the sector out to 2012 averaging 
2.7 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010, and approximately 1.7 per 
cent thereafter. 
The performance of the food processing industry is closely linked to the 
performance of the agricultural sector, primarily because the industry draws 
most of its inputs from the agricultural sector, though this dependence has 
decreased somewhat in recent years. The food-processing sector performed 
well between 1980 and 1995, deteriorating significantly thereafter, owing in 
large part to the loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis the UK as well as exogenous 
shocks in the agricultural sector such as the BSE scare; gross output in the 
sector expanded by around 5.5 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1995.  
Performance in the sector decelerated between 1995 and 2000, as gross output 
expanded by 3.1 per cent per annum, mirroring the slowdown in the 
agricultural sector. Between 2000 and 2005, gross output is estimated to have 
recovered slightly to an annual growth rate of 4.1 per cent per year. Moving 
out over the next decade, we forecast that growth in the sector will decelerate, 
with an average annual growth rate in gross output of 1.3 per cent forecast for 
2005 to 2010, and a further slowdown to 0.4 per cent in 2012.   
 
 
 
 
54 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2005-2012 
Table 5.2: Percentage Change in Output, GDP at Factor Cost at Constant 1995 Prices 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010-
           2000 2005 2010 2015 
  Per Cent Annual Average % Growth 
Agriculture 1.8 -0.5 -0.6 1.8 2.3 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.0 
Industry 3.9 5.6 4.0 8.4 7.8 6.9 6.3 4.7 4.3 13.5 5.4 6.7 3.8 
  Manufacturing 2.9 5.4 3.9 8.5 8.0 7.6 7.3 5.5 4.7 14.4 5.4 7.0 4.6 
  Utilities 8.0 8.0 6.8 5.9 7.3 5.2 1.8 0.8 9.6 5.3 5.8 5.4 3.4 
  Building 9.5 6.1 3.5 8.3 6.1 2.7 0.8 -0.5 -1.4 10.8 5.4 4.3 -3.1 
               
Market Services 4.8 7.5 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.6 5.1 4.3 8.4 5.8 5.3 4.3 
Distribution 2.8 6.4 4.8 4.2 4.4 4.3 5.6 5.0 4.6 10.4 4.9 4.7 4.3 
Transport & 
Communications 2.8 6.5 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.3 6.0 5.5 5.0 12.8 4.8 5.3 4.9 
Other Market 
Services 6.2 8.3 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.1 4.0 6.7 6.5 5.6 4.1 
               
Non-Market Services 3.0 3.3 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.2 4.0 2.7 
Health & Education 4.0 3.4 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 5.2 3.8 2.8 
Public Administration 0.6 3.0 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.2 2.6 2.5 1.7 1.9 4.5 2.5 
Adjustment for Fin. 
Services (-) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 2.4 0.0 0.0 
GDP at Factor Cost 4.1 5.3 4.4 6.5 6.2 5.8 5.7 4.7 4.2 9.6 5.5 5.7 3.8 
Taxes on Expenditure 6.1 8.7 7.9 3.8 3.6 3.4 4.6 4.0 3.7 8.9 4.0 4.6 3.6 
Subsidies -5.2 7.2 -0.6 1.9 2.1 1.5 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.1 
GDP at Market Prices 4.5 5.7 4.9 6.2 6.0 5.5 5.6 4.7 4.1 9.8 5.4 5.7 3.9 
Net Factor Income 6.9 6.1 5.4 8.6 9.6 8.7 9.2 5.7 6.2 16.4 11.9 8.3 5.7 
GNP at Market Prices 4.0 5.6 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.4 3.5 8.8 4.0 4.9 3.3 
 
Accompanying the robust expansion in output in the manufacturing sector 
throughout the 1990s was respectable employment growth which increased 
Ireland’s share of total manufacturing employment in the EU33 (See Figure 
5.3), employment grew by an average 2.6 per cent per annum up to 1999 and 
continued up to 2001 when strong growth of 3.5 per cent was registered. 
Thereafter, employment fell in the sector, with a contraction in the numbers 
engaged in the high-technology industries being the main cause. Given the 
expected upturn in output growth in total manufacturing to the end of this 
decade, it is also forecast that employment growth in the sector will pick up 
slightly. Accordingly, we predict that employment will increase by an average 
of 0.4 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010, before contracting in the 
years thereafter. This reversal in the trend of falling employment numbers 
occurs solely in the high- technology sector post 2006, such that these 
industries will drive the small rise in the numbers employed in total 
manufacturing over the forecast period. We predict that employment in the 
high-technology sector will increase by an average of 1.8 per cent per annum 
while employment in the traditional and food processing sectors are expected 
to contract by 0.7 and 1.4 per cent respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 O’Malley, E., 2004. “Competitive Performance in Irish Industry” in D. McCoy et al., Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Winter 2004, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
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Figure 5.3: Employment in Manufacturing 
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The divergence in the growth rates of output and employment in 
manufacturing throughout the latter half of the 1990s means that productivity 
was high in that decade, averaging around 11.1 per cent per annum in value-
added terms between 1995 and 2000 and driven in large part by significant 
productivity growth in the high-technology sector. Since then, productivity 
growth has fallen, though estimated to have remained significant at around 6.5 
per cent per annum in value added terms between 2000 and 2005. Average 
annual productivity growth in manufacturing is expected to be around 7 per 
cent out to 2010. 
BUILDING 
The robust growth in the economy and incomes throughout the period of high 
growth was accompanied by an accelerator effect in the housing sector, 
contributing to significant growth in investment in building over these years.  
In addition, the expansion in the industrial and services sectors resulted in 
increased demand for commercial and industrial properties, while the 
government objective of increasing the stock of infrastructure also meant 
increased investment in this area. As a result, real output in building grew by an 
annual average of 10.8 per cent between 1995 and 2000 (Table 5.2). The pace 
of growth tapered off in the following years, though still remaining strong; the 
average annual growth in output between 2000 and 2005 is estimated at 5.4 per 
cent. Over the next five years, it is anticipated that the demand for housing 
output will remain strong (as discussed in Section 5.6) as well as robust 
demand for commercial building output and continued investment in 
infrastructure. Accordingly, we forecast that output will expand by an average 
of 4.3 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010. 
Trends in employment in building closely follow output trends in the 
sector; by its nature, the building sector is highly employment intensive and 
thus strong employment growth coincided with strong output growth 
throughout the 1990s. There was phenomenal employment growth during the 
1995 to 2000 period, with annual averages of 14.6 per cent growth registered, 
while in the years 2000 to 2005, it is estimated that annual growth in 
employment will average 7.4 per cent. By 2005 it is estimated that the building 
sector accounted for 13 per cent of total employment. Given the continued 
strong growth in the sector out to 2010 we forecast that this share will remain 
stable, with an average 2 per cent growth per year expected, equating to an 
increase of 25,000 jobs in the sector between these years. 
Productivity in the building sector has traditionally been low and this trend 
looks set to continue in the medium term with a minor increase in productivity 
levels of approximately 2 per cent in value-added terms expected per annum 
over the 2005 to 2010 period.  
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UTILITIES 
Growth in the utilities sector (which includes electricity, gas and water) has 
nce 1990, with average increases of over 5.0 per cent 
al output per annum. Growth in the sector is driven by demand 
 between 1990 and 1995. Despite the output expansion between 1995 
and
 performed poorly 
nterparts during the 1990s; real output growth 
 per cent per annum over the period 1990 to 1995 and 1.1 
lar we expect the numbers employed in the sector to fall by an average 
of 
 under three separate headings: 
communications, and other market services.  In the 
rvices was driven solely by domestic demand, as these 
arket services was higher than for any other sector in 
the
been fairly stable si
recorded in re
for energy in the rest of the economy (see Section 5.7), particularly in the 
commercial sector. Given the sustained expansion expected out to 2010 in the 
economy and the commercial sector, we forecast that real output will grow by 
around 5.4 per cent per annum on average.  Beyond this, growth is expected to 
slow.  
The performance of the sector in terms of employment growth has varied 
over time. The numbers engaged in the sector increased by 1.6 per cent per 
annum
 2000, employment actually fell by 2.5 per cent, due primarily to 
restructuring in the electricity sector. It is anticipated that employment growth 
will average 3.2 per cent per annum over the 2000 to 2005 period, before 
falling to 0.8 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010. 
AGRICULTURE 
The agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing)
relative to its sectoral cou
averaged a mere 0.1
per cent per annum over the period 1995 to 2000. Prospects for the sector 
remain poor with a 0.6 per cent average yearly growth rate expected for the 
2000 to 2005 period. We expect growth to remain weak over the remainder of 
the decade and envisage that output growth will remain low in the medium 
term. 
Employment in the sector has been declining steadily for the past three 
decades and we expect this trend to continue over the forecast horizon. In 
particu
over 2.5 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010.  This rate of decline is 
expected to continue in the medium term. 
MARKET SERVICES 
The market services sector is modelled
distribution, transport and 
past, output in market se
sectors comprised mainly non-tradables. The rapid economic growth in the 
latter half of the 1990s was accompanied by significant growth in personal 
disposable incomes. There has been a marked expansion in the sector during 
these years; over the period 1995 to 2000, real output in market services grew 
by an average 8.4 per cent per annum, as compared to an average annual 3.1 
per cent expansion over the 1990 to 1995 period. In recent years, the external 
market has become an important driver of growth in the sector, as 
technological advancements and the move towards trade liberalisation in 
services markets have contributed to an expansion in invisible exports. The 
role played by the external market is likely to increase further in the future. 
Accompanying this will be an increasing exposure to competitiveness pressures 
in the sector. Our forecasts are for growth in real output to average 5.8 per 
cent per annum over the 2000 to 2005 period and 5.3 per cent per annum over 
the 2005 to 2010 period. 
Given the labour intensity of market services, output trends have important 
implications for employment in the sector. Throughout the 1990s, 
employment growth in m
 economy, with an average of almost 5.0 per cent increases recorded per 
annum. Over the current decade, 2000 to 2009, we forecast that the market 
services sector will continue to account for the largest proportion of 
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employment growth, with around 3.6 per cent per annum projected. Looking 
beyond the current decade, the role of the market services sector will increase 
further, as it continues to account for ever increasing proportions of output 
and employment growth, as the economy shifts more towards a services driven 
economy. 
Figure 5.4: Output and Employment in Market Services 
1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Value Added Employment
nnual % GrowthAverage A
9
 
DISTRIBUTION 
The performance of the distribution sector (which includes wholesale and 
domestic demand and in particular on 
mption in the domestic economy. Consumption in turn is 
However, given the rapid pace of change in 
tec
retail services) is highly dependent on 
the volume of consu
driven by a wide variety of factors, changes in personal disposable incomes 
being key. The demographic profile of a country also tends to be important for 
the distribution sector, as for example, a relatively young and employed 
population leads to a demand for specific types of goods and services, many of 
which tend to have relatively high margins. The changes that have occurred in 
the Irish economy over the last two decades have thus had important 
implications for consumption patterns and the distribution sector. There have 
been changes in the supply of output from the sector; with the advent of 
technological advances (such as internet shopping), efficiency in the sector has 
increased on a number of levels (for example, there has been a fall in the use of 
wholesalers as one can often purchase directly from the manufacturer), and 
this is set to continue in the future. The Irish wholesale and retail sectors have 
also become increasingly internationalised.  Given these changes, real output in 
the sector expanded substantially over the 1995 to 2000 period, when average 
annual growth rates of 10.4 per cent were recorded. Output growth over the 
current decade is expected to stabilise at a much lower average of 4.8 per cent 
per annum.  Beyond the current decade, growth in the sector is likely to remain 
strong at around this level.   
Between 1995 and 2000, the numbers employed in the sector rose by an 
average 4.4 per cent per annum, as compared to a 1.8 per cent expansion in the 
previous five year period. 
hnology used in the sector, and in particular the move towards increased 
computerisation, there has been a fall off in employment growth in recent 
times. Over the period 2000 to 2005, it is expected that employment growth 
will average 3.6 per cent per annum, before slowing to 1.8 per cent over the 
2005 to 2010 period. Employment growth is expected to slow further over the 
next decade.  
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TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Th composition of the transport and communications sector is different from 
the other market services sectors in a number of respects because of 
mi-state bodies. The structure 
egulation leading to increased 
in the pace of output growth from 2001, the rate of employment 
gro
nal services (for example, hairdressing, motor 
(for example, banking, insurance and 
et services sectors, a key driver of output in 
 1995 to 2000 period. The sector continued to perform well 
int
per cent of total market 
services employment. In 2000, 333,000 people were employed in the sector, 
e 
government involvement and intervention in se
of the sector has changed over time with der
competition in the sector, particularly in the aviation and telecommunications 
industries. However, like the other market services sectors, domestic demand 
is the main driver of output in the sector. In addition, given the changes in 
regulation in the sector, and the increased competition and efficiency, the role 
of output from the transport and communications sector has become 
increasingly important for other productive sectors in the economy, as the 
degree of contracting out to this sector appears to be increasing over time. 
Given these facts, the sector expanded significantly throughout the 1990s, with 
growth in the latter years proving most substantial. The 1995 to 2000 period 
saw average growth in real output of 12.8 per cent per annum. This 
exceptional growth was driven in large part by significant investment in 
expanding the stock of capital in the sector.  Following this period, a 
slowdown in growth was recorded, though still remaining high with 4.8 per 
cent average annual growth over the 2000 to 2005 period.  In light of forecasts 
for the economy as a whole, continued strong output growth is expected over 
the next five years, with 5.3 per cent increases forecast per year over the 2005 
to 2010 period.  We anticipate that growth will remain strong early into the 
next decade. 
Trends in employment growth have followed trends in output growth 
throughout the 1990s, with the exceptionally high output growth of the 1995 
to 2000 period accompanied by significant employment growth of 5.6 per cent.  
With the fall 
wth also fell, with an average annual expansion in the numbers employed 
over the 2000 to 2005 expected at 2.3 per cent, before falling slightly to 1.7 per 
cent over the 2005 to 2010 period, with continued restructuring in the sector 
responsible for some of the slowdown. Employment growth in the next 
decade is likely to remain low. 
OTHER MARKET SERVICES 
The other market services sector comprises a broad range of diverse service 
activities, including both perso
repairs, hotels) and professional services 
legal services). Like the other mark
this sector is domestic demand, though external demand now also plays an 
important role, and given technological advances and continued liberalisation 
of international services markets, it is likely to play an increasingly important 
role in the future. 
In line with the phenomenal growth in the Irish economy throughout the 
latter half of the 1990s, output in the other market services sector grew 
substantially, with average annual growth in real output of 6.7 per cent 
registered over the
o the early 21st century as growth averaged 6.5 per cent over the 2000 to 
2005 period and is expected to average 5.6 per cent per annum over the 2005 
to 2010 period, driven in large part by strong predicted growth in private 
consumption and production. As such, growth in the other market services 
sector is expected to outpace growth in any of the other components of total 
market services out to the end of the current decade. 
The importance of the sector for employment growth in the economy has 
increased over time, and this trend is expected to continue out to 2010 and 
into the next decade. In 1990, 177,000 people were employed in the other 
market services sector, accounting for around 40.0 
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rep
services are mainly funded by the 
ave “public good” characteristics. While the 
 provide a certain level of these services, the 
 per cent expansions in real output forecast on average for each 
yea
 
mployment growth is expected to remain close to 4.0 per cent per annum 
ov
imilar growth rates over the next five years. The share of total 
em
resenting over 50.0 per cent of the total. We anticipate that the importance 
of this sector for employment will remain high throughout the current decade, 
with average annual growth of 4.4 per cent expected for the period 2000 to 
2005 and average growth of 4.2 per cent forecast for 2005 to 2010. Based on 
these forecasts other market services will account for 55.0 per cent of total 
market services employment in 2010.  
NON-MARKET SERVICES 
The non-market services sector is identified under two separate headings in the 
ESRI HERMES macroeconomic model; health and education, and public 
administration and defence. These 
government and many of them h
government will always have to
actual output of the sector will depend on demographic and budgetary 
considerations (see Section 5.5 for our assumptions regarding public 
expenditure).   
Growth in real output in the sector averaged approximately 3.0 per cent 
over the 1990s, and is expected to average around 4.1 per cent over the current 
decade. The health and education sector is expected to witness higher output 
growth rates than the public administration sector over the current decade, 
with around 4.5
r in the health sector and approximately 3.2 per cent for the public 
administration sector. 
Figure 5.5: Output and Employment in Non-Market Services 
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Productivity in the non-market services sector has been consistently low 
over time.  However, this is partly due to the fact that it is difficult to measure 
output in the sector with precision because of the nature of the service
involved.   
E
er the current decade, having been just below this in the previous decade.  
Stronger employment growth took place in the health and education sector 
between 2000 and 2005 than in the public administration sector. However, we 
anticipate s
ployment accounted for by non-market services is expected to remain 
constant at around 22.0 per cent out to 2010 before increasing slightly to 
approximately 24.0 per cent in the next decade.  
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Non-agricultural incomes have continued to grow rapidly in the period 2000 
05, at an average of 9.2 per cent per annum, following double-digit 
Table 5.3: Personal Income, P
to 20
growth rate of 12.1 per cent in the period 1995 to 2000.  We expect this to 
remain strong to the end of the decade underpinned by strong employment 
growth. The growth in transfer income is expected to be more modest, while 
the continued decline in the national debt burden is expected to lead to a fall in 
national debt interest payments over the forecast period.34 The pace of growth 
in personal disposable income and personal consumption are expected to be 
very similar between 2005 to 2010, which means the savings ratio should 
remain stable.  
ercentage Change 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010-
           2000 2005 2010 2015 
  % Average Annual % Growth 
Agricultural Incomes 3.3 1.2 2.0 3.0 6.2 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.4 -0.7 0.5 4.2 4.2 
Non-Ag. Wage 
Income 9.4 10.0 7.3 6.4 6.8 6.9 8.2 8.3 9.0 12.1 9.2 7.1 9.0 
Transfer Income 7.1 16.4 4.0 6.0 5.7 5.8 6.2 7.7 8.6 7.0 12.5 5.5 9.9 
O onal ther Pers
Income -5.3 -1.5 7.1 2.0 -0.3 0.3 0.9 5.3 3.5 15.3 2.3 2.0 4.5 
Non-Ag. Profits etc. 2.8 6.3 7.1 9.1 7.7 7.4 7.9 8.7 8.3 17.6 6.4 7.8 8.7 
National Debt Interest 6.4 2.5 2.1 -8.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.3 -6.2 -2.7 -0.5 -1.1 
Net Factor Income 7.2 3.0 7.8 10.6 11.4 10.4 11.3 8.0 8.7 20.2 10.3 10.3 8.6 
Other Private Income -0.4 8.4 5.4 7.1 4.4 4.5 4.4 9.1 7.5 13.8 6.2 5.2 8.4 
Personal Income 6.0 8.8 6.5 5.6 5.5 5.7 6.8 7.7 8.1 11.1 8.1 6.0 8.5 
Taxes on Personal 
Income 14.5 7.2 8.2 5.2 5.3 6.1 0.6 5.9 8.5 10.8 6.8 5.1 8.6 
Personal Disposable 
Income 4.2 9.2 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.6 8.2 8.1 8.0 11.1 8.4 6.2 8.5 
Personal 
Consumption 6.5 7.5 7.8 5.6 5.3 5.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 11.1 7.8 6.3 8.0 
Personal Savings -11.1 23.4 -6.1 6.3 8.0 8.5 14.3 13.3 11.7 11.5 13.8 6.0 11.9 
 % of Disposable Income     
Tax Ratio (% Pers. 
Income) 19.0 18.7 19.0 18.9 18.9 19.0 17.9 17.6 17.6     
Savings Ratio (% 
Disposable Income 10.9 12.3 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.5 12.2 12.8 13.2     
CONSUM O
olume of consumption averaged 7.7 
 by 4.3 per cent per year between 2000 and 2005. The 
 
5.3  
PTI N 
Income, 
Expenditure and 
Prices 
Between 1995 and 2000, growth in the v
per year, and it rose
drivers have included record job creation contributing to a significant increase 
in real income.  Real non-agricultural wage growth averaged 2.3 per cent each 
year between 2000 and 2005. In the context of a rapidly expanding labour 
force, the annual increase in personal income was 8.1 per cent over the same 
period.  Positive wealth effects deriving from buoyant property price trends 
were a further support to consumption. New house prices rose dramatically in 
the latter half of the 1990s and this trend underpinned consumer confidence. 
The cost of borrowing also fell dramatically with Ireland’s entry to EMU. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 The returns on the national pension reserve fund are netted off. 
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Table 5.4: Expen ture on GNP, Constant Prices, Percentage Change di
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2000-
05 
2005-
10 
2010-
15 
  % 
Average Annual % 
Change 
Personal Consumption 5.2 5.2 5.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.7 
Public Consumption 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.5 5.5 3.8 2.6 
Fixed Investment 6.9 7.3 4.3 2.5 3.1 2.9 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.4 
  Building 8.3 5.2 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.1 4.9 4.5 4.0 6.0 2.6 3.5 
  Machinery 4.9 10.4 7.2 3.8 4.5 3.8 4.7 4.0 3.6 1.2 4.8 3.3 
Total Exports 6.7 4.6 4.3 7.8 6.9 6.9 6.4 5.8 5.2 5.4 6.4 5.0 
Total Imports 7.1 5.0 4.1 5.6 5.0 5.3 5.7 5.6 5.1 4.4 5.1 5.0 
Gross Domestic Product 4.5 5.7 4.9 6.2 6.0 5.5 5.6 4.7 4.1 5.4 5.7 3.9 
Net Factor Income 6.9 6.1 5.4 8.6 9.6 8.7 9.2 5.7 6.2 11.9 8.3 5.7 
Gross National Product 4.0 5.6 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.4 3.5 4.0 4.9 3.3 
 
h atu  of Special Sa s ntive Accoun SS   m  
00
 
 2000, the volume of annual investment growth averaged 
T e m ring ving Ince ts ( IAs) from id-
2 6 to mid-2007 will provide some boost to consumer expenditure.  
Continued strong employment growth averaging 2.4 per cent per year between 
2005 and 2010 will accompany personal disposable income growth of 6.2 per 
cent over the same period. This will be particularly conducive to consumption 
growth because of the fall in the personal taxation rate anticipated to occur 
over the forecast period. Interest rates are anticipated to rise by about one and 
a half percentage points between 2005 and 2012, and this is one factor which 
will temper consumption trends. Solid house price growth in excess of 
inflation will continue, and this factor will be supportive of consumption 
spending increases. Looking to the future, solid consumption growth is 
expected to continue throughout the forecast period. The volume of personal 
consumption will rise by an average of 4 per cent per year until 2010, and by 
3.7 per cent over the following five years.   
The volume of public consumption rose by 5.9 per cent per year from 1995 
to 2000, and by 5.5 per cent annually between 2000 and 2005.  It is forecast 
that growth will be 3.8 per cent per annum from 2005 to 2010, and 2.2 per 
cent annually over the following five year period. The assumptions underlying 
this level of public service provision are discussed later in the section on the 
public finances. 
INVESTMENT
Between 1995 and
14.8 per cent, slowing dramatically to 3.8 per cent between 2000 and 2005.  In 
the last number of years, much of the investment growth in the Irish economy 
has been driven by house-building with house completions totalling a record 
77,000 in 2004.  The volume of housing investment grew by 8.0 per cent per 
year between 2000 and 2005, and activity is forecast to stabilise over the 
coming five years. The strong performance of the house-building sector thus 
far has been supported by strong population and employment increases, as 
well as an accommodative interest rate environment characterised by low or 
even negative real interest rates. Strong demand for housing has also resulted 
from disposable income growth. Further robust employment growth until 
2010 and more sizeable increases in disposable income will ensure that house-
building remains at a high level, although its contribution to investment growth 
will be lower than in the past. 
Other types of investment have grown strongly over the last number of 
years.  This is largely due to a high level of activity in the corporate sector in 
terms of equipment and machinery acquisitions, as well as plant construction.  
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Interest rate developments will not impinge on investment growth in a 
significant way, with the cost of borrowing rising only gradually over the Review 
period.  Between 2005 and 2010, investment growth will be strongest in the 
market services sector, with growth of 5.2 per cent annually. Investment in the 
agricultural sector is forecast to fall by 2.2 per cent per year over the same 
timescale, with sturdy investment growth in industry of 4.7 per cent.  Public 
infrastructural projects will ensure that growth in transport investment is 
significant. 
EXPORTS 
5 and 2000, the volume of exports grew by 17.4 per cent annually, 
 
ter
es exports growth will be somewhat stronger than the corresponding 
me
orts will rise by 5.8 per cent annually from 
200
.1 per cent annually 
bet
Between 199
slowing to growth of 5.4 per cent per year over the period between 2000 and 
2005.  Since 2000 this growth was heavily concentrated in services exports, and 
was a relatively healthy outturn given the weak international environment over 
this period, as well as a strong euro appreciation relative to the dollar and a 
sizeable positive inflation differential between Ireland and its trading partners. 
Our High Growth assumes that no significant adjustment will take place in
ms of the US external imbalances. Therefore, the exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
dollar will only change gradually between now and 2012.  This, taken together 
with the fact that Ireland’s rate of inflation will remain low out to at least 2009 
and close to that of its trading partners, ensures that no significant loss of price 
competitiveness is likely until the end of the decade.  Furthermore, economic 
growth in the US economy is assumed to average 3.1 per cent annually 
between 2005 and 2010, providing some stimulus to Irish export demand. 
Growth in the UK economy and the Euro Area is likely to be more muted. 
Total export growth of 6.4 per cent per annum is forecast for the 2005 to 2010 
period, before slowing to 5.0 per cent annually over the subsequent five year 
period.   
Servic
rchandise figure.  In particular, growth in the other services category of 
exports will be sizeable.  Its forecast annual growth rate is 8.2 per cent from 
2005 to 2010, and 6.9 per cent after 2010.  Tourism exports, on the other 
hand, will show modest growth averaging 3.2 per cent annually between 2005 
and 2010, slowing to 1.0 per cent per annum after 2010. This deceleration is 
due to the tourism sector’s particular vulnerability to the accumulation of price 
competitiveness losses in the past. 
The volume of merchandise exp
5 to 2010, and slow to a 4.3 per cent annual growth rate from 2010 to 
2015. This growth will be driven exclusively by the industrial sector, whose 
exports will show 6.3 per cent growth from 2005 to 2010, and 4.5 per cent 
growth from 2010 to 2015.  Continued strong external demand for products 
from the information and communications technology and pharmaceutical 
sectors is the main driver of this growth. In contrast, the volume of agricultural 
exports will slump in coming years, falling by 3.9 per cent per year between 
2005 and 2010, and contracting at an annual average rate of 4.8 per cent from 
2010 to 2015.  This outturn reflects the increasing market share of low cost 
agricultural produce from Eastern European economies. 
Growth in the volume of imports is projected at 5
ween 2005 and 2010.  This actually represents a slight acceleration on the 
4.4 per cent growth rate between 2000 and 2005, but is a sharp slowdown 
from the 17.6 per cent a year growth achieved in the latter half of the 1990s.  
Strong domestic demand growth was an important source of import stimulus 
in the past. 
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Table 5.5: Exports by Sector, Co tant Prices, Percentage Changes  ns
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2000- 2005- 2010- 
           2005 2010 2015 
  % Annual Av % Grerage owth 
Agriculture 1.7 -3.8 -10.5 1.2 -3.0 -3.3 -3.3 -4.3 -4.5 3.3 -3.9 -4.8 
Industry 5.4 4.4 5.2 7.4 6.6 6.5 6.0 5.4 4.7 3.0 6.3 4.5 
Merchandise 5.2 3.8 4.2 7.1 6.1 6.1 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.0 5.8 4.3 
Tourism -5.8 4.1 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.5 2.8 2.1 1.5 0.6 3.2 1.0 
Other Services 12.4 6.6 4.6 10.0 9.0 9.1 8.5 7.8 7.1 15.0 8.2 6.9 
Services 10.7 6.4 4.5 9.5 8.7 8.7 8.1 7.4 6.7 13.4 7.9 6.6 
Goods and 
Services 6.7 4.6 4.3 7.8 6.9 6.9 6.4 5.8 5.2 5.4 6.4 5..0 
 
 5.6 port a rt Growth 
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NET FACTOR INCOMES 
Net factor incomes is the d
assets located abroad and the return from foreign-owned assets located in 
Ireland. The predominance of multi-national corporations in Ireland’s 
manufacturing sector ensures that the latter component of this equation is very 
large and that Ireland’s net factor incomes balance is significantly negative.  
The total output of multi-national corporations, therefore, is included in 
Ireland’s GDP figure but only the relatively small wage component shows up 
in GNP, the remainder being accounted for by profit repatriations. The net 
factor incomes deficit rose from €14.9 billion in 2000 to €23.6 billion in 2004.  
It is forecast to rise to €40 billion in value in 2010. 
This large shortfall is arithmetically responsible for the large and growing 
wedge between the GDP and GNP measures of economic activity, with the 
former considerably exceeding the latter. In 2000, the ratio of GNP to GDP 
was 85.5 per cent, this gap widened further to 83.8 per cent in 2004, and will 
slip to 83 per cent by 2010.  
tribution of Net Factor Flows 
  1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 
National Debt Interest -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Profits etc. Outflows -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 -3.4 -2.5 -1.8 -1.0 
Other Factor Income 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.1 -0.5 -0.8 
Net Factor Income -1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -2.4 -2.6 -2.2 -1.8 
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GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
The medium term is likely to witness a continuation of the deceleration of 
GDP growth from the record 9.8 per cent rate recorded annually during the 
late 1990s to the more sustainable 5.4 per cent rate between 2000 and 2005.  
The 2005 to 2010 period will see annual GDP growth picking up slightly, 
averaging 5.7 per cent, with a slower 3.9 per cent rate likely between 2010 and 
2015. The strong growth which we forecast in the net factor incomes deficit 
will result in weaker GNP growth.  Between 2005 and 2010, GNP will increase 
by 4.9 per cent per year, and rise at a rate of 3.3 per cent annually from 2010 to 
2015. 
Figure 5.7: GNP as a Proportion of GDP 
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GROSS NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) is a measure which adjusts GNP 
to take account of net current transfers from abroad and changes in the terms 
of trade. In the past, the development of GNDI and GNP has been similar in 
terms of growth.  GNDI rose strongly between 1995 and 2000, by 8.2 per cent 
annually.  It slowed to a 3.5 per cent growth rate between 2000 and 2005.  Our 
forecast is for GNDI growth of 4.5 per cent annually between 2005 and 2010. 
The reduction in net transfers from the EU exerted a small negative effect on 
growth between 2000 and 2005. However, the move to become a net 
contributor to the EU between 2005 and 2010 will not have a significant effect 
on the growth of GNDI. Despite high fuel prices, terms of trade 
developments are likely to be more positive in the future, as services constitute 
a larger share of total exports and the unit value of services tends to grow over 
time relative to that for goods. 
Figure 5.8:  GDP, GNP and GNDI Growth 
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PRICES AND WAGES 
Developments in Irish prices represent the outcome of an interplay between a 
host of domestic and external stimuli.  It must be stressed that this report does 
not forecast changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the most 
conventionally invoked measure of the inflation rate.  Instead, forecast changes 
in the personal consumption deflator are published.  For the purpose of 
analysis, the price level can be divided into two categories, namely goods prices 
and services prices, based on the fact that different factors drive price changes 
in each category. Goods prices tend to reflect external factors. In the latter half 
on the 1990s when the consumption deflator grew by 3.2 per cent yearly, 
international economic developments served to increase Ireland’s rate of 
inflation.  These included the depreciation of the euro, especially relative to the 
dollar, which increased import prices. Relatively low rates of inflation in 
countries from which Ireland imports was a factor which partly offset the 
effects of exchange rate changes. 
Services inflation, on the other hand, is primarily domestically generated.  
Wage and labour productivity trends are key component drivers of services 
sector inflation because of its labour intensive nature.  Wage growth has been 
quite rapid due to the tightness of the Irish labour market.  Productivity 
growth has decelerated in recent years, with the overall effect being to boost 
unit labour costs, and heighten services inflation. Developments in goods 
prices have also served to induce inflationary forces in the services sector by 
causing wage demands to rise.   
The future is likely to witness a continued divergence in goods and services 
inflation. External forces are likely to ensure that goods inflation is moderate. 
The euro is forecast to appreciate gradually against both the dollar and sterling 
over the medium term, and the Euro Area and UK economies will experience 
low rates of inflation. The increased availability of goods from low-cost, 
manufacturing based economies like China will further dampen goods price 
inflation. Though oil prices are unlikely to retreat from the high level touched 
this year, future price increases will be modest and their effect on inflation 
rates will be small.  The overall context indicates that subdued goods price 
inflation will be experienced. 
Services price inflation is likely to be more significant. The move to a 
permanently higher oil price will ultimately trigger some second round effects 
in the form of higher wage demands, something to which the services sector is 
especially vulnerable. A falling unemployment rate and robust employment 
growth will place added upward pressure on wage rates. Labour productivity in 
value added terms increased by 1.9 per cent annually between 2000 and 2005. 
Between 2005 and 2010 this will accelerate slightly to 2.2 per cent per annum. 
Productivity increases which accompany wage rises will help in some way 
towards keeping unit labour costs in check. 
The tightness of the labour market which is predicted for the medium term 
will ensure that wage increases across the economy overall are significant. 
However, the aggregate figure masks the divergence which will occur in wage 
developments across the economy. The supply of skilled labour will rise 
significantly in coming years. This is due to increased numbers of third level 
graduates, as well as a high proportion of skilled workers amongst the large 
immigrant cohort. The increasing share of skilled labour in the workforce 
implies a reduction in the supply of unskilled labour. The implications of this 
in terms of wages are that growth in unskilled wages will be stronger than 
skilled wage growth.  
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Table 5.7: Prices and Wages, Percentage Change 
           2000- 2005- 2010- 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2010 2015 
  Prices, % Change Annual Average % Change
Personal 
Consumption 1.2 2.1 2.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.4 2.1 4.1 
Public Consumption 6.9 4.7 5.0 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.5 4.2 5.4 5.7 3.2 5.9 
  Building 8.0 3.7 2.1 1.9 3.4 4.1 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.9 3.4 5.9 
  Machinery -0.1 3.4 4.3 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.9 0.6 2.1 2.1 
Total Exports -0.8 -0.1 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 -0.5 1.7 2.7 
  Imports - Energy 17.4 42.0 4.8 -0.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 7.8 1.7 1.4 
  Imports - Non-
Energy -0.8 0.2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 19 -0.4 1.9 1.9 
Agricultural Output - 
Gross 1.0 0.4 0.1 -0.9 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Manufacturing Output 
- Gross -2.6 0.4 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 -4.2 0.6 0.9 
  Average Annual Earnings, % Change  
Industry 5.7 4.8 4.7 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.6 5.2 6.0 5.2 4.2 6.8 
Non Market - Public 
Admin. 7.8 4.0 2.9 4.4 4.2 4.2 5.0 5.6 6.5 5.4 4.1 7.0 
Non Agricultural 5.7 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.7 5.4 6.3 5.5 4.3 6.9 
 
 Employment grew on average by 5 per cent per annum in the period 1995 to 
2000, an unprecedented rate of growth over the last forty years. Over the same 
period the labour force grew by an average of 3.4 per cent per annum so that 
the unemployment rate35 fell continuously by 6 percentage points from 12.2 in 
1995 to 4.3 in 2000, a rate which many commentators agree represents a full 
employment labour market. 
5.4  
The Labour 
Market 
Since 2000 the growth in employment has moderated to average what is 
still a high growth rate of 3.1 per cent over the 2000 to 2005 period. 
Underlying these growth rates is a significant shift in the composition of 
employment. In 1995 building accounted for 6.7 per cent of total employment, 
by 2005 it is estimated that this share has risen to 12.6 per cent. Over the same 
period the share of manufacturing in total employment has fallen from 20.3 
per cent to 15 per cent. This very rapid growth in the importance of 
construction in the labour market raises concerns about the sustainability of 
such a level of employment over the medium term.  
The details of our forecast for the labour market in the medium term under 
the High Growth scenario are shown in Table 5.8. Around 56 per cent of the 
increase in employment between now and 2010 will be in the market services 
sector. A further 36 per cent of this growth is forecast to come from the non-
market services sector while the numbers employed in manufacturing are 
forecast to show only a small increase.  Employment in the building sector is 
forecast to continue to rise further by 25,000 or just over 10 per cent of the 
total between now and 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Throughout the Review we use the PES definition of employment rather than the ILO 
definition, as only consistent series of the former are available back to the 1970s. When referring 
to the unemployment rate we use ILO definitions. 
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Table 5.8: Employment and the Labour Force, Percentage Change, Mid-April 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15
              
Agriculture 3.5 -3.1 -1.5 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 
Industry 2.2 4.3 0.9 -0.2 1.1 1.4 2.7 1.4 0.7 6.0 2.3 1.2 0.3 
Manufacturing:              
    Traditional -2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -2.2 -2.7 0.0 -0.9 -0.7 -3.2 
    Food Processing -1.8 0.1 -0.1 -1.7 -1.7 -1.4 -2.0 -3.6 -4.3 1.1 0.8 -1.4 -4.5 
    High-technology -1.6 -5.9 -2.1 1.5 2.6 3.4 3.8 1.2 0.2 6.1 -1.7 1.8 -0.4 
Manufacturing -1.9 -2.9 -1.1 0.1 0.7 1.1 1.2 -0.7 -1.4 2.9 -1.0 0.4 -1.9 
Utilities 6.6 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.6 1.5 -0.7 -6.9 -2.5 3.2 0.8 -2.4 
Building 8.2 14.7 3.3 -0.7 1.6 1.7 4.4 3.9 3.3 14.6 7.4 2.0 2.7 
Market Services 4.7 6.3 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.0 6.4 3.8 3.1 2.5 
Distribution 4.6 6.5 3.6 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 4.4 3.6 1.8 0.3 
Transport & Comm 1.3 0.1 -0.3 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.4 1.3 -0.1 5.6 2.3 1.7 -0.8 
Other Market Services 5.8 8.0 3.5 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.1 8.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 
Non-Market Services 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.5 4.3 4.6 3.8 2.6 
Health & Education 4.0 3.4 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.1 4.8 3.8 2.8 
Public Administration 0.0 2.9 4.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.1 3.9 3.8 2.0 
Total Employment 3.5 4.5 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.3 5.0 3.1 2.4 1.7 
Unemployment -6.6 -3.9 4.9 12.7 1.3 -2.4 -12.7 -5.6 -13.5 -10.6 -0.7 0.4 -2.2 
Labour Force 2.9 4.0 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.6 3.4 2.9 2.3 1.5 
          For end year 
          2000 2005 2010 2015 
Unemployment Rate 
  (ILO) 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.4 3.6 3.2 2.6 4.3 4.2 3.6 2.7 
Net Immigration, 
  Thousands 32 53 30 27 27 29 31 34 37 26 53 31 44 
 
Within manufacturing there will be some further growth in employment in 
the high-technology sector. Employment in both the traditional and food 
sectors is in secular decline as these sectors face strong competitive pressures. 
Beyond 2010 employment in manufacturing is expected to decline gradually. 
By contrast employment in the building sector under this scenario continues to 
grow over the forecast horizon.  
The main engine of growth in the labour market is the services sector, in 
particular in other market services, health and education and public 
administration. Employment growth in market services has consistently 
remained above the average for the economy as a whole and this trend is 
expected to continue over the forecast horizon. Within this sector employment 
growth in other market services is expected to dominate. Employment growth 
in non-market services is expected to exceed that of market services in 
percentage terms out to 2010. Annual average employment growth in non-
market services is estimated to be 4.6 per cent between 2000 and 2005 before 
slowing to a still very high 3.8 per cent rate out to 2010. Beyond 2010 the 
growth in employment in non-market services is forecast to slow to 2.6 per 
cent per annum. 
Sluggish employment growth is forecast for the remaining sectors of the 
economy with numbers employed in agriculture, traditional manufacturing, 
food processing and utilities expected to fall over the forecast horizon. The fall 
is most marked in the agricultural sector. This is the continuation of a trend 
that has long been evident in the sector. Numbers employed in agriculture are 
expected to decline by 17,000, from 109,000 in 2006 to 97,000 in 2010. 
The majority of the forecast increase in employment will be in “high 
skilled” areas such as the other market services sector (which includes 
professional services such as banking, insurance as well as internationally 
traded services) and also in the non-market services sector. These activities, 
being human capital intensive, require a skilled labour force. These two sectors 
alone will account for 50 per cent of total employment in 2012. The decline in 
the numbers employed in agriculture, food processing and traditional 
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manufacturing will have a disproportionate effect on unskilled labour, although 
some of this will be offset by continued employment growth in the building 
sector. 
This profile of the labour market is based on a continuation of modest 
wage increases out to 2009, beyond that point wage inflation begins to rise (see 
Table 5.3). The continuation of strong employment growth with modest wage 
demands will be enabled by continued growth in the labour force. Over the 
period 2005 to 2010 labour force growth can be attributed in almost equal 
measure to the natural increase in the population, rising female participation 
rates and immigration. Beyond that date there is limited scope for further 
contributions from female participation or the natural increase (see Chapter 2) 
so that net inward migration flows have to provide all the additional workers 
necessary to clear the market. Beyond 2010 the migration inflows rise steadily 
from an average of just under 29,000 per annum in the period 2006-2010 to 
reach 44,000 by 2015. These very high and rising rates of immigration inflows 
are driven by the strong growth in employment.  
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 5.5  
The Balance of 
Payments, 
Public Finances 
The dramatic change in the fortunes of the Irish economy was accompanied by 
a substantial change in the current account of the balance of payments which 
moved into surplus at the beginning of the 1990s, averaging 3 per cent of 
GNP between 1990 and 1999. This positive performance is a reflection of the 
growth in exports over the period, see Section 5.3. Since 2000 the current 
account has moved back into deficit, and is expected to remain in deficit until 
2008. This deficit is much smaller than those experienced throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Between 2005 and 2010 we forecast an average current 
account deficit of 0.6 per cent of GNP. This partly reflects the fact that we 
anticipate a narrower difference between export and import growth. 
Furthermore, net factor income flows abroad will continue to grow and 
Ireland is expected to become a net contributor to the EU. The current 
account is expected to move back into small surplus from 2009 onwards.  
Figure 5.9: Balance of Payments Surplus as a Percentage of GNP 
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PUBLIC FINANCES 
Our projections for the public finances over the next decade remain positive. 
In particular we have assumed that there will be a small surplus on the General 
Government Balance of between 0.2 and 0.4 per cent a year each year between 
2007 and 2012. Corresponding to this surplus there is assumed to be a small 
deficit each year in the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement.  On the basis of 
this scenario the continuing relatively high growth of the economy will see 
significant revenue buoyancy.  
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This scenario will see a continuing improvement in the state’s net 
liability/asset position (here taken to be the difference between the General 
Government Debt and the market valuation of the assets of the National 
Pension Reserve Fund). From a net liability of around 22.4 per cent of GNP 
today this should fall to around 15.2 per cent of GNP in 2012. In turn, this 
improvement in the state’s net liability/asset position will see a further decline 
in the net payment of interest on the state’s liabilities.36  
The favourable economic circumstances will also tend to reduce pressures 
on current public expenditure below what they might otherwise be. We assume 
that the growth in the volume of net current expenditure on goods and 
services will remain relatively high at around 3.8 per cent per year, compared to 
around 5.5 per cent a year between 2000 and 2005. With a significant rise in 
the deflator this would translate into a value increase of around 7.2 per cent a 
year. Thereafter, we forecast growth in volume of 3.5 per cent per annum in 
this item out to 2012. It is possible that pressures for improved public services 
could see a higher volume growth.  
Rates of transfer payments are assumed to rise roughly in line with nominal 
wage rates over the forecast period. In addition, there will be a volume increase 
of between 1 and 2 per cent each year reflecting the gradual increase in the 
number of people in the retired age groups and some rise in the number of 
young children. 
In the last Review we assumed that the bulk of the infrastructural investment 
would have been completed by 2015, resulting in a fall in public authorities’ 
capital expenditures after 2015. However, it now seems likely that it will be 
some time between 2015 and 2020 when this target will be achieved. In the 
meantime in the period out to 2012 we assume that government capital 
expenditure remains around its current very high share of GNP.  
Some of the cost of the increased provision of public services will be 
recovered by increased user charges.  We assume that from 2007 to 2012 there 
will be a gradual increase in charges for parking as well as the introduction of 
charges for the use of urban road space, disposal of waste, and water 
distribution.  We assume that these charges will rise to 1.0 per cent of GNP by 
2012. For national accounting reasons this increased revenue is netted off 
government current expenditure on goods and services. Thus, while the 
scenario described here would produce a fall in government expenditure as a 
share of GNP of two percentage points by 2012, the reality would be a fall of 
around 1 percentage point. 
On the revenue side it is assumed that there is no major change in policy, 
with the SSIA scheme not being renewed in the period to 2012. However, in 
order to achieve the assumed profile on the GGB (General Government 
Balance) of a small surplus the model automatically adjusts the average direct 
tax rate. Given the relatively benign nature of the underlying economic 
scenario this results in the model generating a small fall in the average personal 
tax rate by 2012 of around 1 percentage point. Even with a somewhat faster 
growth in current expenditure and a small increase in the rate, the relatively 
benign demographic outlook, combined with an assumed favourable external 
economic climate, would see Ireland continuing to have one of the lowest 
shares of output accounted for by public expenditure within the EU. 
SAVINGS 
Since the introduction of the Special Savings Incentive Accounts (SSIAs) in 
Budget 2001 the topic of savings in the Irish economy has received much 
attention. As is evident from Figure 5.10 the personal savings ratio has risen in 
 
36 Where the returns on the state’s financial assets is netted off debt interest payments made in 
respect of liabilities. 
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recent years, peaking at 12.8 per cent in 2003, the highest rate since 1993. 
Having averaged 9.1 per cent between 1995 and 2000 the annual average 
savings rate is expected to have increased to 10.8 per cent between 2000 and 
2005. Continued income growth and rising interest rates are expected to 
underpin a similar savings rate between 2005 and 2010. 
Figure 5.10: Personal Savings Ratio Per Cent of Personal Disposable Income 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
%
 
An increasing concern about the economy is the rapid growth in personal 
borrowing and the exposure of consumers to high personal debt levels. Figure 
5.11 shows the level of gross personal debt as a percentage of personal 
disposable income. Increases in the indebtedness of the personal sector were 
relatively marginal between 1990 and 1996. However, since 1996 there has 
been a dramatic increase, rising from a proportion of personal disposable 
income equivalent to 48.6 per cent in 1996 to 105.7 per cent in 2004. The 
extent of the increase indicates that growth in debt has greatly outpaced 
income growth over the period. It is evident from Figure 5.11 that the growth 
in personal sector indebtedness has been primarily due to increased borrowing 
for housing purposes. Household debt for housing purposes rose to the 
equivalent of 85.3 per cent of personal disposable income in 2004, compared 
with 37.6 per cent in 1996.  
 
Figure 5.11: Household Debt* as a Per Cent of Personal Disposable Income 
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The above figures represent gross debt and so do not adjust for savings by 
the household sector. Figure 5.12 shows the proportions of gross savings by 
the personal and the company sectors that have been used to acquire financial 
assets. Rising investment in housing by the personal sector has resulted in this 
sector becoming a net borrower, in contrast to the past when the household 
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sector was a net saver. Forecasts to 2012 suggest that household sector will 
remain a net borrower over the medium term due to the need to finance 
investment in housing. Although there will be some decline from the trough 
reached in 2004, the level of net indebtedness of the household sector is thus 
expected to increase every year over the rest of the decade. This will increase 
the household sector’s exposure to the housing market. 
In contrast the forecasts indicate the company sector continues to benefit 
from the strength of the Irish economy and will remain a net saver over the 
medium term, allowing this sectors own resources to play a role in financing 
investment. 
Figure 5.12: Ratio of Net Acquisitions of Financial Assets to Gross Savings  
 by Sector, 1990-2012 
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 The importance of the housing market for the Irish economy has increased 
in recent years as both house prices and housing completions have continued 
to grow. Between 1995 and 2000 new house prices rose by an annual average 
of 16.8 per cent before slowing to an estimated annual average increase of 8.8 
per cent between 2000 and 2005. At the same time each year between 1994 
and 2004 has seen the number of housing completions exceed the peak of the 
previous year. 
5.6  
The Housing 
Market  
This High Growth forecast suggests that the factors underpinning the 
housing market are expected to remain positive in the medium term. 
Economic growth is expected to continue, along with employment and income 
growth. Demographic trends will also support the housing market. For 
example, net immigration is forecast to average around 34,000 per annum 
between 2002 and 2012. To date a significant proportion of immigrants are 
aged between 25 and 44 years, the key household formation age groups. 
Furthermore, a large proportion of the Irish population, nearly 31 per cent, is 
aged between 25 and 44 years. Although there is evidence from Census 2002 of 
a marginal decline in the home-ownership rate, probably due to the recent 
period of high price growth, Ireland has one of the highest home-ownership 
rates at around 80 per cent, substantially above the EU average of 
approximately 60 per cent. 
The demand for housing units consists of the growth in the number of 
households, driven by population change as a result of the natural increase, 
migration flows and changing headship,37 the growth in the demand for second 
dwellings and the building of replacement dwellings. 
The demographic forecasts underpinning this Medium-Term Review have 
assumed that Irish headship rates rise from current levels to reach UK levels 
 
37 The headship rate is the proportion of a people in a particular age group who are heads of 
households. 
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by 2021.  This implies that the average number of adults (persons aged 20 
years or over) per household in Ireland will fall from 2.2 in 2000 to 2.0 by 2010 
and eventually to 1.8 by 2020. 
The housing sector of the economy is modelled as a separate sub-
component of the HERMES macromodel with equations for house prices and 
completions. The forecasts for the high growth scenario suggest that price 
growth in the period 2005 to 2010 will be more moderate than in the late 
1990s, with average annual growth in house prices of 4.9 per cent between 
2005 and 2010.  
Figure 5.13: House Price Inflation, Average Annual Change 
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Despite the rapid house price inflation of recent years demand has 
remained strong in the housing market. The user cost approach has developed 
to reflect the opportunity cost of investing in the housing market. Thus, rising 
prices provide capital gains, making owner-occupancy attractive and so 
demand for housing can remain strong even in a period of rapid price growth 
if people expect it to continue. 
The rate of return, or the user cost of housing provides a measure of the 
cost of owning a house and aims to take account of capital appreciation. This 
can be crudely calculated as the mortgage interest rate minus the change in new 
house prices. More elaborate measures take account of tax, loan-to-value ratio 
and house price expectations. The user cost of new housing has been negative 
since 1996. This helps explain why demand for new dwellings continued to 
rise, even at a time of rapid price growth. New houses, although highly priced, 
were relatively cheap to live in because of low real interest rates and expected 
capital gains.  
Figure 5.14: User Cost of New Houses, 1972-2012 
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Figure 5.15 shows a breakdown of housing needs into five main categories 
– the change in demand due to population change, the change due to rising 
headship (the proportion of people in each age group who are heads of 
households); dwellings needed to house the inflow of returning emigrants and 
immigrants into the Irish economy; the change due to the demand for second 
dwellings; and the change due to the replacement of obsolescent stock. 
Demographic factors are a key driver of the housing market, accounting for an 
annual average of 26,800 units to housing demand between 1997 and 2002. 
The main component of this, the natural increase in population, is estimated to 
have contributed an average of 20,000 units per annum over the period. This 
component is expected to continue to make a positive contribution to housing 
demand over the forecast period, estimated at an annual average of 22,500 
between 2003 and 2006, before moderating slightly to an annual average of 
17,800 between 2007 and 2011. 
Possibly reflecting the rapid rate of house price inflation the change in 
headship between 1997 and 2002 made a very low contribution to housing 
demand. Indeed, the continuing low headship rates by international standards, 
at a time when incomes in the Irish economy increased substantially, suggests 
that there may be “pent-up” demand for housing from aspiring homeowners. 
On the basis of our assumption the Irish headship rates will move towards 
current UK headship rates by 2012.  Changing headship is estimated to have 
accounted for almost 12,000 units per annum between 2003 and 2006. A 
further increase to an annual average of 13,500 units between 2007 and 2011 is 
also forecast. 
Previous ESRI analysis suggests that one of the key drivers of the demand 
for housing in recent years has been the demand for second dwellings.38 
Higher wealth, a result of the economic boom, has increased the demand for 
second dwellings or holiday homes, which now account for a significant 
proportion of new dwellings. The analysis shows that the share of the total 
stock of habitable dwellings accounted for by second or vacant dwellings 
showed a small rise between 1996 and 2002, from 10.8 to 11.7 per cent. 
However, this is in the context of a very rapid rise in the number of 
households. Indeed, the Census data suggests that the number of second or 
vacant dwelling reached over 170,000 by 2002. The period 1997-2002 saw 
second dwellings contribute an annual average of 6,400 units to the overall 
demand for dwellings. With incomes and living standards continuing to rise 
this component is expected to make a major contribution to the demand for 
housing over the period, estimated at an annual average of 18,800 units 
between 2003 and 2006, before declining marginally to an annual average of 
17,200 between 2007 and 2011. Fitz Gerald (2005) also derives an estimate of 
the depreciation rate for housing. This estimate is used to forecast the number 
of dwellings demanded to account for obsolescent stock, averaging 13,400 
units per annum between 2003 and 2006, and 11,100 units per annum between 
2007 and 2011. 
One reflection of the strength of the Irish economy has been the sustained 
change in direction of migration flows. Having had for many years a net 
outflow of people from the country the economy now faces a substantial net 
inflow. A large proportion of immigrants are in the key household formation 
age groups between 25 and 44 years old. Having made no contribution to 
housing demand between 1991 and 1996 migration contributed an annual 
average of 6,000 units between 1997 and 2002. The estimated impact on the 
housing demand in the current period is slightly higher at an annual average of 
8,300 units and the strength of the continued net inflow over the remainder of 
 
38 Fitz Gerald, J., 2005. “The Irish Housing Stock: Growth in the Number of Vacant 
Dwellings”, ESRI, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
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the forecast period is expected to account for an annual average of 12,300 
housing units between 2007 and 2011. However, the forecast continued rise in 
house prices may have negative impacts on migration. Duffy, Fitz Gerald and 
Kearney (2005)39 show that one consequence of high house prices has been to 
increase the slope of the labour supply curve, see Box A. 
On the basis of these figures it is estimated that the demand for housing 
units averaged 44,800 units per annum between 1997 and 2002. The current 
period has seen much higher demand, averaging 74,800 dwellings on an annual 
basis. With economic growth expected to continue, as well as income and 
employment growth and a net inflow of people into the country the demand 
for housing is forecast at an average of 71,900 units between 2007 and 2011, 
see Figure 5.15 and Table 5.9.  
Figure 5.15: Decomposition of Housing Demand, Thousands, Annual Averages 
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Table 5.9: Decomposition of Housing Demand, Thousands, Annual Averages 
  1991-1996 1997-2002 2003-2006 2007-2011 
Population Growth 16.5 20.0 22.5 17.8 
Change in Headship 3.1 0.9 11.8 13.5 
Migration 0.0 5.9 8.3 12.3 
Vacant 0.1 6.4 18.8 17.2 
Obsolescence 4.9 11.6 13.4 11.1 
Total 24.7 44.8 74.8 71.9 
Box B: House Prices and Migration 
Traditionally Ireland has had an infinitely elastic labour supply curve due to an 
extremely open labour market, with migration ensuring an elastic labour supply 
and a weak Phillips Curve effect (Honohan, 1992 and Curtis and Fitz Gerald, 
1994). The limiting case of this, an infinitely elastic labour supply curve, is 
shown as the flat segment of the labour supply curve, Ls, in Figure below. One 
of the results of the boom in the late 1990s was that the Irish economy 
effectively reached full employment and a significant trade-off between wages 
and unemployment emerged. In the diagram this is shown as an upward 
sloping labour supply curve, Ls1 beyond the full employment level L0. Full 
employment also saw the emergence of infrastructural constraints as growth in 
output outpaced capacity. House prices rose sharply, so the decision to migrate 
to Ireland was now influenced, not only by relative employment opportunities 
and relative wages, but also by the rapid rise in house prices. This resulted in 
labour supply becoming even more inelastic, represented in Figure below by 
the more steeply upward sloping labour supply curve Ls2. Since many 
 
39 Duffy, D., J. Fitz Gerald and I.Kearney, (forthcoming 2005). “Rising House Prices in 
an Open Labour Market”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter. 
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immigrants are in the household formation age group, and tend to be highly 
skilled, the boom in house prices in Ireland could reduce the attractiveness of 
Ireland for potential immigrants. This would, in turn, reduce potential labour 
supply in the medium term and act as a brake on medium-term growth in 
output and employment. Thus, housing emerges as an important 
infrastructural constraint in the labour market. 
Figure: The “Pure” Housing Constraint Effect (E2-E1) 
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Now if we assume a positive external shock to the demand for Irish output, 
this would increase the demand for labour, a derived demand, so that the 
labour demand curve would shift outwards from Ld1 to Ld2. If there were no 
housing constraint labour market equilibrium would move from E0 to E1, with 
higher wages (W1>W0) and higher employment (L1>L0). With a housing 
constraint, however, the equilibrium point is E2 with wages higher (W2>W1) 
and employment lower (L2<L1) than at point E1. 
Simulation results indicate that the housing constraint significantly reduces 
the medium-term growth potential of the economy and shifts the balance of 
labour market growth from employment to wages, with a consequent 
deterioration in competitiveness. The welfare effects differ for different 
groups, with unambiguous gains for current homeowners while immigrants, 
first time buyers and those with lower labour market skills are the net losers. 
 
The housing component of the ESRI HERMES macro model includes an 
equation, derived from Murphy (1998), to estimate the number of house 
completions. One of the main drivers of new housing supply is new house 
prices. In the short run changes in house prices have a significant effect in 
boosting housing completions. In the long run completions are particularly 
influenced by real new house prices and the mark-up of house prices over 
costs. This mark-up or profitability measure indicates that if house prices 
increase relative to the cost of building then profitability rises and this 
increases the rate of house completions. However, the equation does not take 
account of changes in some of the other costs of building, such as the price of 
land. Figures indicate that this has risen substantially in recent years and now 
accounts for approximately 23 per cent of new house prices. Given the 
continued growth in house prices and the strength of demand as outlined 
above it is expected that the level of house completions will remain high over 
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the medium-term, averaging 74,800 units per annum between 2003 and 2006, 
before moderating to 71,900 per annum out to 2011.  
Figure 5.16:  Cost of Land as a Proportion of New House Price 
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Ireland is not the only economy with a strong housing market. The very 
different real interest rates facing the household sector across the Euro Area in 
recent years have provided rather different incentives for housing investment. 
Not surprisingly in Spain and Ireland the low (and even negative) real interest 
rates for households that have resulted from EMU membership have provided 
a very strong stimulus to the housing market. As shown in Figure 5.17, 
housing completions in Ireland and Spain have more than doubled in number 
since the mid-1990s. This compares to the situation in the UK where the 
number of dwellings completed has remained relatively stable 
Figure 5.17: Housing Completions, 1995=100 
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The result of this boom in house building is that the construction of 
dwellings accounts for a substantially larger share of GDP in Ireland and Spain 
than is the case for the rest of the EU. As shown in Figure 5.18, while housing 
activity has increased its share of GDP in the EU between 1996 and 2004, the 
increase has been particularly large in the Euro Area economies of Spain and 
Ireland. A marked increase is also evident in the UK. In both Ireland and 
Spain the housing sector accounts for a significant share of economic activity. 
In the case of Ireland it is now approaching an eighth of all economic activity. 
   THE HIGH GROWTH FORECAST 77 
Figure 5.18: Investment in Dwellings as a Percentage of GDP 
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With the housing sector accounting for such a large share of overall 
economic activity in these two economies they are vulnerable to any price or 
output shock to the sector. Experience in Scandinavia and the United 
Kingdom in the late 1980s indicates that this sector of the economy can suffer 
from sudden and dramatic reversals in fortune. Any such reversal in fortune in 
Spain and Ireland would have a very significant direct impact on economic 
activity in those countries. While the exposure of Spain and Ireland to shocks 
to the housing market is of some concern, there is clearly no danger to the 
wider Euro Area economy. As shown in Figure 5.18, the housing sector in 
France and Germany, for example, accounts for a significantly smaller share of 
economic activity than in Ireland and Spain, a share that is not very different 
from the long-term average for these economies. The impact of a housing 
shock on the Irish economy is explored in Chapter 6. 
 
 The serious problem of how Ireland is going to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions to meet its target, as agreed under the Kyoto protocol, remains a 
crucial issue in energy policy. The HERMES model incorporates a model of 
the energy sector that allows the generation of consistent forecasts of energy 
demand and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.40 A separate electricity sub-
model is used that takes account of the economics of different types of types 
of generators (using different fuels) and of the varying load on the system over 
the average day.41 The modelling framework used allows the incorporation of 
the impact of various policies used to reduce GHG emissions. Under the 
Kyoto protocol, the EU needs to reduce its GHG emissions by 8 per cent of 
the level they were at in 1990 by the years 2008-2012. Because of Ireland’s 
relatively low level of development in 1990, it was agreed that for the 2008-
2012 period Ireland’s emissions could exceed their 1990 level by 13 per cent. 
In 2004 GHG emissions were around 26 per cent above the Kyoto base year 
level highlighting the magnitude of the task ahead. 
5.7  
Energy and the 
Environment 
One of the key instruments being used to achieve the required reduction in 
GHG emissions is a scheme of tradable emissions permits, which apply to a 
range of energy-intensive sectors such as electricity generation, cement, steel 
and certain chemical plants. The scheme came into effect this year. The impact 
of such a regime should be to raise the cost of burning fossil fuels and so 
encourage more moderate use. However, the decision of the EU governments 
 
40 A complete description of the energy model is available in ESRI Working Paper 146. 
41 A complete description of the electricity model is available in ESRI Working Paper 168. 
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to allocate at least 95 per cent of the quotas for free for firms involved in 
trading is seriously flawed. FitzGerald (2004) argues that giving the permits for 
free (referred to as “grand parenting” them) rather than auctioning them will 
mean there is no revenue available to the government to offset the negative 
competitiveness effects of the rise in energy prices as a result of the trading 
regime.42 In addition, when there are multiple rounds where permits are 
allocated for free, as is the case with the EU scheme, this seriously distorts the 
market greatly reducing the likelihood of any significant environmental change 
coming about. This will raise the economic cost of reducing emissions by any 
given amount. 
TRENDS IN ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
Energy demand is a derived demand driven by economic growth. It is 
moderated by changes in relative energy prices and technological progress 
which cause a substitution away from energy products or result in more 
efficient use of fuels. Figure 5.19 plots primary energy demand and GNP from 
1970 to 2004. Excluding the periods of the oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 
1979-80, energy demand rises as GNP rises and there is little or no growth 
when GNP is stagnant (as in the early 1980s). Since 1990, there has been a 
decoupling of energy demand from growth, which is more marked in recent 
years. Several factors help explain this pattern. Economic growth in recent 
years has taken place in less energy-intensive sectors. There has been a rapid 
decline in the use of solid fuels (coal and peat) as consumers switch towards 
fuels with higher end-use efficiencies, such as gas. In the household sector, as 
consumption reaches saturation, the rate of growth begins to slow. Finally, the 
oil price hikes in the 1970s triggered the development of more energy-efficient 
equipment and practices. 
Figure 5.19: Total Primary Energy Demand and GNP, 1970 to 2004 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
GNP Primary Energy Demand
1970=100
 
Total final consumption (TFC) of energy is the sum of the consumption of 
each fuel by sector, excluding the energy transformation sector. Figure 5.20 
illustrates the breakdown of TFC by fuel in 1984 and 2004 so the change in the 
fuel mix over the past twenty years is evident. Oil continues to be the 
dominant fuel consumed with its share in TFC rising from 55 per cent in 1984 
to 63 per cent in 2004. Electricity is the second most important and its share 
has risen modestly from 13 per cent to 17 per cent over the twenty-year 
period. The consumption of coal and peat, as a share of the total has fallen 
 
42 See Fitz Gerald, 2004, for further details and a critique of the emissions trading regime, 
available in “An Expensive Way to Combat Global Warming: Reform Needed in the EU 
Emissions Trading Regime”, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute. 
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over the period, as households and firms switch to more efficient fuels such as 
gas. 
 
Figure 5.20: Total Final Consumption of Energy by Fuel 
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ENERGY DEMAND FORECASTS43 
On the basis of the High Growth Forecast for economic growth over the next 
decade, consumption of energy is expected to rise considerably, albeit at more 
moderate rates than in the past decade (see Table 5.10).44 These forecasts are 
based on the assumption that from 2010 a carbon tax is imposed on those 
sectors not covered by emissions trading. In the High Growth forecast Total 
Final Consumption (TFC) is expected to increase to 15.7 million Tonnes of 
Oil Equivalent (TOE) by 2015, representing a 25 per cent increase from 2005. 
The impact of higher energy prices will partially offset the effects of continuing 
economic growth. The rising number of households over the coming decade 
will see a rise in energy demand from that sector. Over the next decade the 
most significant increase in energy demand will be from the transport sector, 
where demand is expected to be 33 per cent greater than in 2005, at over 6.7 
million TOE. The services and industrial sector will also witness strong growth 
between 2005 and 2010, and more moderate growth thereafter, in line with the 
economic forecasts for these sectors, outlined earlier in this chapter.  
Table 5.10: Final Energy Consumption by Sector, Thousand TOE 
       Average Annual Growth Rates 
 
1990       1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
 High Growth 
Household 2,190 2,177 2,571 2,999 3,095 3,325  3.4 3.1 0.6 1.4  
Industry 1,722 1,749 2,253 2,111 2,492 2,766  5.2 -1.3 3.4 2.1  
Services 1,007 1,228 1,569 2,034 2,382 2,597  5.0 5.3 3.2 1.7  
Agriculture 252 288 334 310 296 283  3.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.9  
Transport 2,026 2,461 3,902 5,117 6,227 6,746  9.7 5.6 4.0 1.6  
Total 7,197 7,903 10,629 12,571 14,491 15,717  6.1 3.4 2.9 1.6  
 Low Growth 
Household    3,027 3,028 3,185    0.0 1.0 
Industry    2,439 2,682 2,980    1.9 2.1 
Services    2,343 2,460 2,620    1.0 1.3 
Agriculture    296 289 289    -0.5 0.0 
Transport    6,184 6,570 7,013    1.2 1.3 
Total    14,289 15,029 16,087    1.0 1.4 
 
43 Our forecast is based on the following assumptions about energy prices: there will be a real 
increase in the price of oil and gas of 5.4 per cent per year between 2004 and 2010; the real price 
of coal and peat will remain unchanged to 2010; the real price of carbon dioxide for the energy 
transformation sector is €20/tonne in 2010. 
44 Underlying our forecast is the assumption that the government introduces a carbon tax in 
2010 affecting sectors not covered by emissions trading. It is assumed that it would be levied at a 
rate of €20 a tonne of carbon dioxide and that it would be indexed to consumer price growth 
thereafter. This would encourage energy saving and fuel switching to less polluting fuels. 
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Table 5.10 also presents the energy demand forecasts under the Low Growth 
scenario which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. If and when the 
economy switches to a lower growth path at some point in the future, as in the 
Low Growth scenario, this will have a substantial impact on our forecasts for 
energy demand. As outlined in the previous chapter, we feel that at some point 
in the next decade the economy will shift to a lower growth path. Total Final 
Consumption (TFC) of energy would rise by an annual average 1.0 per cent 
between 2010 and 2015, compared to 1.6 per cent under the High Growth 
Forecast. Under the Low Growth scenario, TFC of energy is forecast to be 16 
million TOE by 2020 or 12 per cent higher than 2010 levels.  
The demand for different kinds of energy is shown in Table 5.11. Under 
the High Growth scenario oil is expected to remain the dominant fuel, with 
demand estimated to increase by 28 per cent over the ten year period 2005 to 
2015. The decline in the consumption of solid fuel is expected to continue, and 
by 2015 coal and peat will account for 1.7 per cent and 0.7 per cent 
respectively of TFC. The demand for electricity is expected to remain constant 
as a share of the total at 17 per cent over the period 2005 to 2015. The share of 
gas is expected to increase from 12 per cent in 2005 to 15 per cent in 2015, 
enhanced by the expansion of its availability in urban areas. Our forecasts for 
the Low Growth scenario indicate a faster decline in coal and peat and more 
moderate growth for the remaining fuels. 
Table 5.11: Final Energy Consumption by Fuel, Thousand TOE 
       Average Annual Growth Rates 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
 High Growth 
Coal 848 380 528 563 344 269  6.8 1.3 -9.4 -4.8  
Oil 3,875 4,756 6,713 7,978 9,340 10,210  7.1 3.5 3.2 1.8  
Gas 576 738 1,203 1,466 1,916 2,283  10.3 4.0 5.5 3.6  
Peat 757 615 303 260 168 112  -13.2 -3.0 -8.3 -7.9  
Renewables 109 130 140 190 187 184  1.5 6.3 -0.3 -0.3  
Electricity 1,032 1,284 1,742 2,114 2,536 2,658  6.3 3.9 3.7 0.9  
Total 7,197 7,903 10,629 12,571 14,491 15,717  6.1 3.4 2.9 1.6  
 Low Growth 
Coal     338 253 200    -5.6 -4.6 
Oil     9222 9827 10552    1.3 1.4 
Gas     1870 2122 2280    2.6 1.4 
Peat     164 101 65    -9.2 -8.4 
Renewables     187 184 181    -0.3 -0.3 
Electricity     2507 2542 2808    0.3 2.0 
Total     14,289 15,029 16,087    1.0 1.4 
 
Electricity demand will see significant growth out to the end of this decade. 
Although growth will be more moderate than in the period up to 2000, it will 
still require major investment to ensure that demand is satisfied. We have 
assumed that electricity generation plant commissioning and decommissioning 
has been implemented according to the announced timetables. In order to 
meet the growing demand, we have assumed that there will be adequate 
additional generating capacity. More specifically, we assume that: Total wind 
capacity grows to 1100MW in 2010. The electricity model suggests that 
1,100MW of new Combined Cycle Gas-fired Turbines (CCGT) are needed. 
This will result in an increase in the share of gas in electricity generation. 
By 2020, we expect that the Irish economy will have shifted to a lower 
growth path as described in the Low Growth scenario and the direct effect of 
the slowdown on the electricity market would be lower growth in electricity 
demand.  The forecast depreciation of the dollar against the euro under this 
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scenario would dampen the expected increase of worldwide oil and gas prices 
in euro terms. 
The following assumptions are instrumental in deriving the 2020 forecast 
for electricity generation: 
We expect the real price of CO2 emissions to grow to €30/tonne by 2020. 
All other things being equal, this will lower the proportion of electricity 
generation fuelled by coal and peat, which produce high levels of CO2 
emissions during generation. The capacity of wind generation is assumed to 
grow from 1100MW in 2010 to 1800MW in 2020. There is assumed to be an 
increase in gas CCGT capacity. This is necessary in order for electricity 
generation to be able to meet demand. In particular, the model suggests that 
there will be an additional 500MW of new Combined Cycle Gas-fired Turbines 
(CCGT) and an additional 800MW of Open Cycle Gas-fired Turbines 
(OCGT) with respect to 2010. About 30 per cent of the energy produced by 
peat plants will come from burning biomass. This is based on research by SEI 
and Coford (National Council for Forest Research and Development) which 
suggests that at current prices it would be economic to substitute some 
biomass for peat. 
 The emissions trading scheme will push up the cost of plants that use solid 
fuel in 2020. Moneypoint is likely to be still generating in 2020, but coal 
powered plants produce a gradually smaller amount of electricity after 2010. 
The decrease in the use of coal is compensated in part by an increase in the use 
of renewable energy, which accounts for more than 20.0 per cent of total 
generation by 2020. Renewables include hydro-electric (excluding pumped 
storage), wind, landfill gas, and biomass powered plants. 
Due to the new CCGT and OCGT plants needed to meet demand, gas 
powered plants gradually increase in importance and by 2020 they are 
responsible for 68 per cent of total electricity generation. The decision about 
which plants generate electricity each period is based solely on the goal of 
optimally dispatching plants. However, it should be noted that policy 
considerations might recommend against relying so heavily on a single fuel 
type. 
The forecast final demand for energy and the forecast development of the 
electricity sector are combined to give a forecast for primary energy demand in 
Table 5.12. The combination of slower growth in the economy and the fact 
that the economy is maturing in terms of energy use will result in slower 
growth in primary energy demand over time.45 
FORECAST GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
The forecasts described here for energy demand have significant implications 
for the environment. The burning of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide (CO2), 
which is the largest contributor to GHG emissions in to the environment. To 
estimate CO2 emissions, total final consumption by fuel type is multiplied by 
an appropriate ‘emissions factor’, since each fuel will release a different amount 
of CO2 when burned.46 Despite the decline in consumption of the dirtier fuels, 
such as coal and peat, over the forecast period, CO2 emissions are set to 
increase significantly in the next five years. Total emissions of CO2 were over 
31 million tonnes in 1990 and by 2010 this is likely to have increased to over 
 
45 Note that the losses in conversion of biomass into electricity have not been taken into 
account in these numbers. To this extent the demand for primary energy in 2020 would be very 
slightly higher than shown in Table 5.12. 
46 An adjustment has to be made for emissions from electricity as they depend on the fuel mix 
and the efficiency of generation. By breaking down the final consumption of electricity into a 
primary energy requirement for each fuel, the CO2 emissions for electricity. Emissions from 
electricity generation tend to be disproportionately high, as much of the energy of the individual 
fuels is lost in generation. 
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53 million tonnes under the high growth scenario, representing a 72 per cent 
increase on 1990. Post-2010, we anticipate some fall in CO2 emissions on the 
back of slower growth in the economy. 
Table 5.12: Demand for Primary Energy by Fuel, Thousand TOE 
       Average Annual Growth Rates 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
 High Growth 
Coal 2,163 1,917 1,989 1,995 2,168 1,488  0.7 0.1 1.7 -7.2  
Oil 4,285 5,454 7,868 8,784 9,471 10,341  7.6 2.2 1.5 1.8  
Gas 1,447 1,916 3,059 3,918 5,320 6,123  9.8 5.1 6.3 2.9  
Peat 1,358 1,214 804 925 834 687  -7.9 2.9 -2.1 -3.8  
Renewables 110 132 187 294 411 489  7.2 9.4 7.0 3.5  
Electricity 59 60 73 71 153 209  4.0 -0.7 16.8 6.4  
Feedstock 430 423 384 0 0 0  -1.9 -100.0    
Total 9,852 11,116 14,364 15,987 18,358 19,338  5.3 2.2 2.8 1.0  
 Low Growth  
Coal     2,163 1,472 814    -7.4 -11.2 
Oil     9,354 9,958 10,683    1.3 1.4 
Gas     5,211 5,709 6,605    1.8 3.0 
Peat     829 677 551    -4.0 -4.0 
Renewables     411 489 568    3.5 3.0 
Electricity     153 209 264    6.4 4.8 
Feedstock     0 0 0      
Total     18,121 18,514 19,485    0.4 1.0 
 
Table 5.13 shows the forecast for CO2 emissions by sector. The major 
contributor to the increase in CO2 emissions is the transport sector, which will 
account for approximately 38 per cent of CO2 emissions by 2010 in the High 
Growth forecast. 
The Kyoto Protocol allows a 13 per cent increase in total emissions from 
the 1990 base year. To forecast future greenhouse gas emissions information 
on the country’s emissions of other GHGs, namely methane and nitrous oxide 
as well as the extent of sequestration as a result of carbon sinks is needed 
(Table 5.13). Ireland currently stands about 30 per cent above the Kyoto limit 
of 13 per cent above 1990 levels. Given our forecasts for energy demand, 
GHG emissions are expected to continue rising out to 2015. It is more realistic 
to use the low growth scenario for emissions in 2020. Under this scenario 
emissions of GHGs would stand at around 32 per cent above the 1990 level, 
not much different from today. Significant policy changes over and above the 
assumed carbon tax will be required in order to restrict GHG emissions; 
otherwise Ireland will fail to meet its Kyoto target. Whether these policies use 
fiscal instruments or other approaches there is significant scope to improve the 
energy efficiency of the economy without significantly impacting on the 
prospects for growth. 
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Table 5.13: Forecast CO2 Emissions from Energy, by Sector (‘000 Tonnes) 
       Average Annual Growth Rates 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
 High Growth  
Household 10,429 10,262 11,198 12,120 12,172 12,037  1.8 1.6 0.1 -0.2  
Industry 7,956 8,611 10,353 8,692 9,593 9,615  3.8 -3.4 2.0 0.0  
Services 4,816 5,839 7,359 9,560 10,810 10,636  4.7 5.4 2.5 -0.3  
Agriculture 1,048 1,193 1,300 1,174 1,107 999  1.7 -2.0 -1.2 -2.0  
Transport 6,200 7,534 11,941 15,697 19,087 20,660  9.7 5.6 4.0 1.6  
Feedstock 989 973 883 0 0 0  -1.9 
-
100.0    
Transmission 
Losses etc. 304 442 369 566 600 616  -3.5 8.9 1.2 0.5  
Total 31,742 34,853 43,403 47,809 53,368 54,561  4.5 2.0 2.2 0.4  
% Change on 
1990 0 10.1 36.3 48.2 65.4 68.5       
 Low Growth  
Household     11,970 11,047 10,751    -1.6 -0.5 
Industry     9,424 9,382 9,775    -0.1 0.8 
Services     10,660 10,151 9,852    -1.0 -0.6 
Agriculture     1,109 1,010 996    -1.8 -0.3 
Transport     18,954 20,124 21,466    1.2 1.3 
Feedstock     0 0 0      
Transmission 
Losses etc.     599 615 626    0.5 0.4 
Total     52,716 52,330 53,465    -0.1 0.4 
% Change on 
1990     63.2 61.6 64.7      
 
6. THE OUTLOOK TO 2020 
In this Review we have chosen to present our view on the future growth 
prospects for the Irish economy using two different scenarios. The first High 
Growth scenario discussed in Chapter 5 assumes that there is no adjustment in 
the US economy over the medium term; we argue that this scenario is only 
realistic at most over the next five to seven years. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
over the longer term, we feel that adjustment in the US economy is inevitable, 
albeit that the timing and scale of any such adjustment is uncertain. To capture 
the likely effects of such an adjustment on the longer-term prospects for the 
Irish economy we have developed an alternative Low Growth scenario which 
assumes that the US economy begins a gradual adjustment to a more 
sustainable growth path from 2007 onwards. In this chapter we present the 
results of this scenario over the period out to 2020. 
6.1 
Background 
In this Low Growth scenario we assume that the adjustment process is 
gradually spread over a number of years. In practice, if it is to occur, the 
adjustment may be more of a short sharp shock. This could portend a much 
more unpleasant environment for the Irish economy in the year it happened, 
but provided that the sharper adjustment did not provoke a collapse in the 
domestic housing market the more rapid restoration of the world to a 
sustainable growth path could prove beneficial. Furthermore, the timing of 
such an adjustment is uncertain; it may begin in 2007 or may not occur until 
well into the next decade. However, if the assumption that such a correction 
must happen within the forecast horizon out to 2020 is correct, then the results 
of this Low Growth scenario presents a picture of the likely path the Irish 
economy will follow out to 2020.  
There are several domestic factors which could also see the economy 
growing below potential over the medium term, which if compounded with a 
sharp US adjustment could lead to significantly lower employment and living 
standards. In previous Reviews we have presented such a “wasted opportunity” 
scenario where excessive domestic cost increases combined with a failure to 
fully implement the necessary infrastructural investment over the coming 
decade could create a wage-price spiral. In turn, this could lead to much lower 
growth in GNP and income and possibly even a resumption of emigration.  
We do not to present such a scenario in this Review, the results are well 
rehearsed in previous Reviews; instead we have chosen to focus on one 
domestic shock originating in the housing market. The boom in housing 
demand and house prices over the past number of years has led to an 
unprecedented rate of house building, with the building sector’s share of total 
employment swelling from 6.5 per cent in 1995 to over 12 per cent by 2005. 
The importance of this sector for employment, coupled with the wealth effects 
of the sharp rise in house prices on the household sector, mean that any 
adverse movements in house prices could have strongly negative effects on 
employment and consumption over the medium term. In Section 6.4 we 
present this shock to the housing sector as a “consequence” of the adverse 
external environment portrayed in the Low Growth scenario. However, such a 
housing shock could be caused by other independent factors. This scenario 
gives an indication of what would be the impact of any such sudden change in 
the conditions facing the building and construction sector. 
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Table 6.147 summarises the major aggregates under this Low Growth scenario 
out to 2020. The cost of an immediate US adjustment beginning in 2007 is 
reflected in a fall in the average growth rate of Irish GNP to 3.5 per cent per 
annum between 2005-10, well below the estimated potential growth rate of 4.4 
(Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). This underperformance would continue in the 
opening years of the following decade with GNP growing at 3.1 per cent per 
annum out to 2015 against a potential growth rate of 3.5. Beyond 2015, as the 
US economy returned to a sustainable growth path and began to grow again at 
near its long-term potential, the Irish economy would also start to pick up. By 
the end of the next decade the Irish growth rate would exceed its potential, 
catching up on some of the lost potential output of the years of adjustment.  
6.2  
Low Growth - 
Summary 
Table 6.1:  Low Growth Forecast, Growth in Major Aggregates 
  1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Average Annual % Growth  
GDP 9.8 5.4 4.2 3.1 3.2 
GNP 8.8 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.3 
GNDI 8.2 3.5 3.1 2.9 3.4 
GNP per head 7.7 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.2 
Investment/ GNP ratio 25.6 28.6 28.6 27.4 26.5 
Personal Consumption 7.7 4.3 2.6 1.7 2.6 
Employment(PES) - % change 5.0 3.1 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Real after tax non-ag  wage rates, % 2.8 2.3 1.5 0.5 1.3 
Non ag wage rates % 6.0 5.5 4.1 2.8 3.2 
Per Cent of GNP 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Balance of payments surplus -0.3 -1.8 -0.4 3.0 6.0 
Debt/GNP ratio 34.3 22.4 18.6 15.5 12.5 
General Government Balance as % of  
GNP 5.1 -0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Per Cent of Labour Force (ILO Basis)  
Unemployment rate - ILO 4.3 4.2 7.1 6.4 4.1 
In Thousands  
Net Immigration, Thousands 26 53 23 18 13 
 
The sluggish growth performance in the period after 2007 would lead to a 
rise in unemployment while the adjustment process was under way, and a 
gradual easing of wage inflation. The deterioration in employment prospects 
and the reduced rate of growth in incomes would together feed into a low rate 
of personal consumption growth. Such a dampening of employment prospects 
relative to the past ten years would lead to an easing of net inward migration 
flows relative to those recorded in recent years. While some net immigration 
would be expected to continue, the inflow in 2010 would be less than half that 
recorded in 2005 and by 2020 net immigration flows could fall to around 
13,000. 
This scenario presents a more sombre picture of the prospects for the Irish 
economy over the medium term than in the case of the High Growth scenario of 
Chapter 5. As shown in Figure 6.1 during the adjustment process, for five years 
the growth in GNP per would be significantly lower than in the High Growth 
case. However, after 2012 growth would be somewhat higher than in the 
scenario presented in Chapter 5, although the lost ground of the 2007-2012 
period would never be fully made up. Under this Low Growth scenario by 2010 
the level of GNP would be almost 7 per cent lower  than  in the High  
  
 
47 We have chosen to present all tabulated results in this chapter using five year averages since our focus is 
on the longer term. 
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Figure 6.1: Low Growth - Comparison of Growth Rates of GNP 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0
1
2
3
4
5
%
 o
f G
N
P
Low Growth High Growth
  
 
Growth scenario with 90,000 fewer jobs. This sluggishness would be entirely 
attributable to external factors throwing the Irish economy off its current 
growth path. Nonetheless, the results of the High Growth simulation presented 
in Chapter 5 point to emerging pressures in the labour market by the end of 
the current decade and suggest that even with a continued benign external 
environment internal pressures could lead to a gradual unwinding of Ireland’s 
competitive position over the longer term.  
 
 Here we outline the alternative Low Growth scenario out to 2020. Detailed 
tables for this scenario are shown in Appendix 3 to this Review. This scenario is 
based on a return of the US to a sustainable growth path with that process 
beginning in 2007. The consequence of this alternative set of external 
assumptions is a much slower growth rate of the economy in the period to 
2012 than that portrayed in the previous chapter. When looking out to 2020 we 
feel that this more conservative forecast is likely to prove closer to reality. 
6.3 
Low Growth - 
Details 
Following exceptional growth in the manufacturing sector over the course 
of the past decade, growth was much lower in the period 2000-2005, with zero 
growth recorded in 2003. Since then the growth rate has begun to pick up to a 
more respectable 5.4 per cent estimated for 2005. However, the consequence 
of an adjustment of the US economy beginning in 2007 would be to further 
hasten the decline of the manufacturing sector, with average growth rates 
falling further out to 2010. The consequences of lower US demand would be 
to reduce the growth performance of the key high-tech manufacturing sector. 
The traditional and food processing sectors are currently facing competitive 
difficulties internationally but it would be the reduced performance of the high-
tech sector that would drive the lower output performance in this scenario. 
The reduction in employment possibilities and lower immigration flows would 
mean that the current very high levels of investment in housing would unwind 
more rapidly over the coming five years and output in the building sector 
would begin to fall in the next decade. 
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Table 6.2: Percentage Change in Output, GDP at Factor Cost at Constant 1995 
Prices 
  1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Average Annual % Growth 
Agriculture 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.8 0.3 
Industry 13.5 5.4 4.7 3.3 3.3 
  Manufacturing 14.4 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.9 
  Utilities 5.3 5.8 5.3 3.1 4.7 
  Building 10.8 5.4 4.8 -0.8 -3.2 
       
Market Services 8.4 5.8 4.3 3.5 3.5 
  Distribution 10.4 4.9 3.4 3.2 3.8 
  Transport & Communications 12.8 4.8 4.0 3.8 4.0 
  Other Market Services 6.7 6.5 4.7 3.5 3.3 
       
Non-Market Services 3.2 4.2 2.9 1.6 1.6 
  Health & Education 3.8 5.2 2.6 1.5 1.5 
  Public Administration 1.7 1.9 3.7 2.0 1.8 
GDP at Market Prices 9.8 5.4 4.2 3.1 3.2 
Net Factor Income 16.4 11.9 6.6 3.1 2.9 
GNP at Market Prices 8.8 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.3 
 
Over the next decade the manufacturing sector would continue to grow 
somewhat more rapidly than GNP. Because market services are still strongly 
dependent on domestic demand its performance would also suffer as a result 
of lower growth in manufacturing output and the slump in the building sector. 
Even by the end of the next decade the performance of the market services 
sector would be significantly below the heady days of 1995-2000. In Table 6.3 
it is clear why this occurs. The growth in personal income in 2000-2005 was 8.1 
per cent per annum, and under this Low Growth scenario the growth rate would 
fall to 4.8 per cent in the period 2005-2010, and 4.1 per cent in 2010-2015, 
before gradually recovering by the end of the decade.  
Table 6.3:  Personal Income, Percentage Change 
  1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Average Annual % Growth  
Agricultural Incomes -0.7 0.5 4.3 4.4 3.7 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 12.1 9.2 5.9 4.3 4.8 
Transfer Income 7.0 12.5 5.8 5.3 6.2 
Personal Income 11.1 8.1 4.8 4.1 4.8 
Personal Disposable Income 11.1 8.4 4.4 3.9 4.7 
Personal Consumption 11.1 7.8 4.8 3.8 4.6 
% of disposable income 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Tax Rate 19.9 18.7 20.4 21.3 21.4 
Savings Ratio (% Disposable Income 9.7 12.3 10.5 10.8 11.6 
 
The component of expenditure that would take the most severe hit from a 
US adjustment would be the growth rate in personal consumption, which 
would record an average growth of just 2.6 per cent per annum in the period 
2005-2010 (Table 6.4), falling even further to 1.7 per cent in 2010-2015.  This 
would reflect the rise in unemployment and the slower growth in wages under 
this scenario. The rate of investment would also be lower, due to the much 
slower growth in the housing sector. This slower growth would be the 
consequence of a number of factors. Lower growth in the economy as a whole 
and a lower growth in employment would result in much lower net 
immigration than in the High Growth scenario. In turn this would result in 
slower growth in the number of households. Also, the much slower growth in 
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real personal disposable income than in the High Growth scenario would reduce 
demand for houses below that shown in Chapter 5. In turn, house prices 
would rise much more slowly, roughly keeping pace with the underlying rate of 
inflation. 
Table: 6.4 Expenditure on GNP, Constant Prices, Percentage Change 
  1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Average Annual % Growth  
Personal Consumption 7.7 4.3 2.6 1.7 2.6 
Public Consumption 5.9 5.5 3.0 1.9 1.7 
Fixed Investment 14.8 3.8 2.3 2.4 2.5 
  Building 13.0 6.0 1.1 1.8 1.9 
  Machinery 17.0 1.2 4.0 3.0 3.1 
Total Exports 17.4 5.4 4.7 4.3 3.8 
Total Imports 17.6 4.4 3.4 3.8 3.4 
Gross Domestic Product 9.8 5.4 4.2 3.1 3.2 
Net Factor Income 16.4 11.9 6.6 3.1 2.9 
Gross National Product 8.8 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.3 
 
With rising unemployment and growth rates below potential, the rate of 
increase of prices and wages in the economy in the years up to 2010 would 
slow from current levels. The growth in non-agricultural wage rates (Table 6.5) 
in particular slows from 5.5 per cent per annum in 2000-2005 to 4.1 in the five-
year period out to 2010, before slowing further to 2.8 per cent in 2010-2015. 
This slowdown would be brought about by the higher level of unemployment 
under this scenario. If we contrast this rate of growth in wage rates number 
with the equivalent 6.9 per cent under the High Growth scenario we can begin to 
uncover the reasons for the recovery in output under the Low Growth scenario 
(improved competitiveness) and the dangers that have built up in the High 
Growth scenario. The gradual improvement in competitiveness in this scenario 
after 2010 would begin to price the Irish economy back into markets it had 
lost. Thus the growth rate in the latter part of the period would be higher than 
in the scenario in Chapter 5. 
Table 6.5: Prices and Wages, Percentage Change  
  1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Average Annual % Growth  
Personal Consumption 3.2 3.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 
Average Annual Earnings, % change      
Non Agricultural 6.0 5.5 4.1 2.8 3.2 
 
This lower rate of wage growth is directly attributable to sluggish labour 
demand. Table 6.6 shows the five year average sectoral employment growth 
rates. This represents a dramatic slowdown compared to the 2000-2005 period. 
As a consequence, there would be a substantial rise in the unemployment rate 
from 2007 to 2010. Thereafter, as the economy would begin to adjust through 
a reduction in wage rates and an improvement in competitiveness, the 
unemployment rate would begin to fall. By the end of the next decade it could 
be expected that in spite of the lower growth rate in output, full employment 
would have been restored, albeit at a lower level of GNP and with a lower 
population.  
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Table 6.6: Employment and the Labour Force, Percentage Change, Mid-April 
  1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Average Annual % Growth 
Agriculture -2.7 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 
Industry 6.0 2.3 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Manufacturing 2.9 -1.0 -0.2 -1.6 -1.7 
Utilities -2.5 3.2 0.6 -1.8 -8.0 
Building 14.6 7.4 0.7 1.7 1.8 
Distribution 4.4 3.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 
Transport & Communications 5.6 2.3 0.7 2.1 1.8 
Other  8.3 4.4 3.5 3.1 3.3 
Non-Market Services 4.3 4.6 2.7 1.5 1.5 
Health & Education 5.1 4.8 2.6 1.5 1.5 
Public Administration 2.1 3.9 3.0 1.5 1.5 
Total Employment 5.0 3.1 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Labour Force 3.4 2.9 2.1 1.1 0.7 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Unemployment Rate 
(ILO) 4.3 4.2 7.1 6.4 4.0 
Net Immigration, Thousands 
Th d
26 53 23 18 13 
 
This scenario is prepared on the basis that the government runs a small 
general government surplus over the full fifteen-year period to 2020. This is 
achieved by adjusting the rate of growth in current public expenditure 
downwards and using the personal tax rate to balance the budget from year to 
year. In addition, it is assumed that the government would react to the much 
slower growth in the economy by slowing the growth of current expenditure; 
the result would be that the ratio of current expenditure to GNP would remain 
fairly stable over the forecast period. Figure 6.2 plots the balance of payments 
surplus and the personal savings ratio. The personal savings ratio remains 
stable throughout the period. It is the balance of payments surplus that, 
following an initial negative balance, begins to rise strongly in the second half 
of the next decade. The low growth in consumption, which affects the demand 
for imports, means that the balance of trade rises strongly over the longer term 
with exports of other services driving the growth in total exports.  
The rise in the surplus after 2015 in this scenario is not realistic. If such a 
scenario were to be played out in real life what would be likely to happen is 
either the company sector would raise investment or the private sector would 
react to the increasing net external asset position through increasing 
consumption. In either case the rate of growth would be slightly stronger after 
2015 resulting in more of the “lost ground” being made up.  
 
Figure 6.2: Personal Savings Ratio and Balance of Payments Surplus 
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 The long-term scenario discussed above considers how the Irish economy 
would be affected by a gradual process of adjustment by the US economy 
which returned it to a sustainable growth path in the next decade. In that 
stylised scenario it is assumed that the adjustment begins in 2007, although it is 
quite possible that it could be postponed well into the next decade. The 
adjustment process portrayed above is a smooth one: the US does not 
suddenly jump to a position of external and internal balance. In turn, there is a 
gradual adjustment in the rest of the world including Ireland. However, reality 
is often different from this stylised pattern of gradual adjustment. Smooth 
transitions are not that common when asset markets are involved. There is a 
tendency for assets prices to suddenly jump from one state to another. For 
example, when expectations change the value of the exchange rate may show a 
very substantial change over a short period of time reflecting the new 
information available to the market. 
6.4  
A Shock to the 
Housing Sector 
In the case of the Irish economy, as discussed earlier in this Review, there is 
a considerable exposure to any disturbance affecting the building sector. In the 
US Adjustment or Low Growth scenario described in Section 6.2 there would in 
any event be a rise in unemployment consequent on the economic slowdown 
in 2007. While in the case of a smooth adjustment the unemployment rate 
would peak at under 8 per cent of the labour force, such a rise could unsettle 
the confidence of the household sector. The demand for housing is particularly 
sensitive to changes in personal disposable income and the rise in 
unemployment could give rise to significant fears among many of those still 
employed about their job security. Given the high level of indebtedness of the 
household sector many households are not in a good position to sustain a 
prolonged loss of employment. Such a loss of confidence could precipitate a 
much more dramatic internal adjustment process affecting the building and 
construction sector. Some of those who lost their jobs could be forced to sell 
on a market where many potential buyers were holding off buying until their 
own personal position was clarified. Even if the number of forced sales were 
limited, the consequence could be a major fall in house prices over a short 
period of time. 
Table 6.7: International Experience of Real House Price Falls 
 Maximum Fall in Price 
Denmark -37 
Finland -50 
France -18 
Germany -15 
Ireland 48 -27 
Netherlands -50 
Sweden -38 
United Kingdom -34 
United States -14 
Source: OECD, 2005 Economic Outlook, No. 78, November. 
 
It is not possible to model the possible magnitude of the fall in house prices 
that might occur in the face of a sudden deterioration in the expectations of the 
household sector. To gauge what might occur under very unfavourable 
circumstances it is useful to look at the magnitude of the falls in house prices 
that have occurred in other countries in the face of shocks affecting 
expectations. Table 6.7 shows the maximum fall in house prices that has 
occurred in any cyclical downturn in the relevant economies. Larger economies 
tend to experience smaller falls because of the regional diversity in their 
housing markets. Also, home ownership is lower in countries such as Germany 
and France, which reduces their exposure to changes in sentiment by the 
 
48 In Ireland the fall in real house prices was experienced between the third quarter of 1981 and the second 
quarter of 1987. 
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household sector. For the smaller countries shown in the table and for the 
United Kingdom the biggest falls in house prices experienced in the past range 
from -27 for Ireland up to -50 for the Netherlands and Finland. 
Here we examine what would happen if just such a sudden loss of 
confidence did occur in Ireland. We have calibrated a housing price shock with 
an illustrative fall in house prices of approximately a third in 2007 – within the 
range shown above. Obviously, this does not represent a forecast as to whether 
a fall in house prices will actually occur or if it should occur as to what its 
magnitude and timing would be. However, it allows us to examine what would 
be the consequences of what would in any terms be a fairly severe recession. 
This illustrative fall in house prices would contrast with the steady small rise in 
prices of 2 per cent a year envisaged in the Low Growth scenario. In this case we 
assume that house prices do not begin to recover till after 2010 and we analyse 
the potential impact of these major changes on the economy as a whole over 
the period 2007 to 2010.  
Figure 6.3: Housing Shock – Housing Completions 
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Figure 6.4: Housing Shock – GNP, % Change 
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Such a sudden large decline in house prices would precipitate a rapid 
adjustment in the output of the building industry. Builders would see their 
profits turning to losses and they would rapidly adjust their activity rate. 
Instead of housing completions falling from their peak of between 70,000 and 
80,000 next year to around 62,000 in 2010 as in the US Adjustment Low Growth 
scenario, they would fall to under 40,000 in 2009 in the housing shock scenario 
(Figure 6.3). This would represent a near halving of output over a three year 
period. Such a fall in output would, in turn, trigger a very large cumulative fall 
in employment in the building and construction sector of 15 per cent spread 
over 2007-09. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the building sector represents a very large share 
of the economy today so such a large shock to that sector would have major 
consequences for the economy as a whole. As shown in Figure 6.4 GNP would 
grow by only just over 1 per cent in 2007 as a result of the collapse of the 
housing market and it would still grow at less than 3 per cent in the second 
year of the shock, 2008. It is only from 2009 onwards that the economy would 
begin to recover with the growth in GNP per head rising more rapidly than in 
the Low Growth case. The consequence of this would be that unemployment 
would rise very rapidly to 10 per cent or more from 2008 to 2010 (Figure 6.5). 
Such a large rise in the unemployment rate would further aggravate uncertainty 
about the future.  
Many of those who would lose their jobs as a result of such a downturn 
would seek employment elsewhere provided that the rest of Europe did not 
suffer as serious a decline in output. The consequence would be that by 2010 
net immigration would almost cease, further reducing the potential demand for 
dwellings. This reduction in immigration would see a reduction in the 
population below the Low Growth case. 
Figure 6.6: Housing Shock – Wage Rates 
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These simulations suggest that the worst effects of the downturn in the 
housing market would be felt in 2007 and 2008. By 2010 the economy would 
be beginning to recover. An important part of the recovery would be a very 
much lower growth in wage rates than is assumed in the Low Growth scenario 
(see Figure 6.6). The reduction in the rate of increase in nominal wage rates, 
with a small fall in nominal wages in 2010, would be a consequence of the very 
high rate of unemployment. By contrast with the 1970s and the 1980s, today 
we see a significant Philips curve effect, with wage rates responding to 
unemployment and growing at a slower rate. This would help improve the 
competitiveness of the economy in the period after 2010. However, even with 
an improvement in competitiveness it would be some considerable time before 
employment growth in other sectors of the economy would come to replace 
the jobs lost in the building sector. It would probably take about five to seven 
years for the economy to recover fully from this very substantial shock, 
returning employment to near the level it would have attained without the 
collapse in housing prices. 
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In this scenario we have assumed that the government would react to the 
severe loss of revenue and the growth in expenditure on transfers to the 
unemployed by raising taxes or cutting other forms of expenditure. The result 
would be that the government’s borrowing would not rise, in spite of the fall in 
revenue from taxes such as stamp duty. If all the adjustment were concentrated 
on income tax the share of such tax in personal income might have to rise 
dramatically out to 2009, falling back thereafter as the economy recovered. 
This would be a very procyclical response to the shock.  
If, instead, the government allowed the deficit to rise without responding, 
the impact on the public finances would be quite large. By 2009 the deficit 
would be almost 3.5 percentage points of GNP higher than in the Low Growth 
scenario. Such a neutral fiscal policy would provide some insulation to the 
economy from the shock, and GNP might recover to the level it would 
otherwise have been at by 2010 rather than 2011. Given the low levels of debt, 
such a neutral fiscal policy stance might well be appropriate. However, the 
feasibility of adopting such a course of action would depend on the public 
finances being in a strong position prior to the shock occurring. This highlights 
the importance of governments maintaining a significant surplus while the 
economy is growing rapidly and while there remains this major exposure to a 
shock to the building industry. 
This scenario, where the economy would recover from the housing price 
shock by 2010 or 2011 (though it would take longer for full employment to be 
achieved), would represent a satisfactory outcome to a very serious shock. If 
the labour market were to prove less flexible than we expect, the consequence 
could be a much more prolonged period of adjustment, with higher costs for 
all those who would be unemployed. In addition, this scenario assumes that the 
financial sector would prove to be robust in the face of the major shock to the 
housing sector and the very rapid doubling in the unemployment rate. Should 
significant problems arise due to the high level of household indebtedness this 
could greatly complicate the recovery process. 
 
 Given the uncertainty that surrounds any forecasting exercise it is always 
unwise to rely on a single projection for the future. In this Review we view the 
High Growth forecast shown in Chapter 5 as being unsustainable in the long 
term. While it represents the more likely outturn for the next few years, the 
Low Growth scenario presented in this chapter seems more likely to describe the 
progress of the economy over the longer term to 2020.  
6.5 
 Conclusions 
However, even this Low Growth scenario could prove too optimistic in the 
medium term. If, for example, the rise in unemployment in the Low Growth 
scenario were to trigger a loss of confidence in the housing market, the 
consequences could be a severe downturn resulting in unemployment rising 
above 10 per cent of the labour force. The simulation described in this chapter 
point to the importance of adopting policy measures which would minimise 
the risk of such a serious shock occurring in the foreseeable future. 
There are a range of other possible shocks or surprises which could occur 
over the coming decade, some of which were considered in the last Review. 
There we examined the likely consequences of a deterioration in Ireland’s 
competitiveness through a combination of wage demands above productivity 
and a failure to address the current infrastructural deficit. The additional wage 
inflation under such a scenario would translate into significantly higher price 
increases in the non-traded goods and services sectors of the economy. The 
results suggested that there are significant downside risks over the medium 
term if policy does not focus on promoting competitiveness on world markets; 
growth and employment could fall significantly and living standards could be 
10 per cent lower in the medium term than would otherwise be the case.  
Successive Medium-Term Reviews have been too pessimistic about Ireland’s 
future growth prospects. In the last Review a second scenario was considered 
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where it was assumed that Ireland became more competitive over the medium 
term than was assumed in the standard Benchmark. This simulation suggested 
that GNP could grow at 0.7 per cent per year above the Benchmark growth rate 
under these circumstances. However, because of the current congestion 
problems facing the economy this was felt to represent a likely upward bound 
on the possible growth rate of the economy over the medium term. Everything 
that has happened over the last two and a half years would tend to reinforce 
this view that the future growth of the economy is limited by the pressures 
accumulating as a result of past successes. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Before looking to the future it is important to acknowledge the huge 
economic achievements of the last decade. While even five years ago there 
were still some observers outside Ireland who believed that the rapid growth of 
the Irish economy was a mirage, it is now clear to all that remarkable growth in 
living standards has taken place. It is also true that the new Irish economy is 
reasonably robust in the face of economic shocks. The downturn in 2001-2002 
did no lasting damage and the flexibility of the labour market ensured that 
there was no major rise in unemployment. By any standards this must be 
classified as a very robust performance. 
7.1 
Introduction 
Since the last Medium-Term Review was published two and a half years ago, 
the Irish economy has seen a period of sustained growth in output, 
accompanied by a very rapid increase in the labour force and in the numbers 
employed. As a result, unemployment remains low, especially by comparison 
with our EU neighbours.  A better measure of welfare is the rate of growth in 
GNP per head. This takes account of the fact that a significant part of the 
additional output was only made possible by the high rate of net immigration 
and that the fruits of this output, i.e., higher incomes, is shared with all those 
living in Ireland. On this basis the improvement in living standards over the 
last five years has also been significant though, much slower than in the late 
1990s: a growth rate of 2.2 per cent a year between 2000 and 2005 rather than 
the 7.7 per cent a year between 1995 and 2000.  
The analysis in this Review suggests that the economy has the potential to 
continue growing at between 4 and 5 per cent a year out to the end of the 
decade. While this is a significantly slower rate of growth in potential output 
than was experienced in the late 1990s, it is still substantially greater than for 
the EU as a whole.  
The potential for the Irish economy to grow is declining over this decade as 
the unutilised resources available in the economy, not least the skilled labour, 
are used up. Also, while there has been a major improvement in the quality of 
the infrastructure of the economy over the last decade, this development has 
been partially matched by growth in pressures on that same infrastructure. As a 
result, the economy remains constrained by the limited stock of dwellings, and 
consequent high price, and the problems of congestion. For the next five years 
our analysis suggests that income per head could grow at something under 3.5 
per cent a year, before slowing to a rate of increase of around 1.5 to 2 per cent 
a year over the following decade. 
While the growth in GNP per head is a very important measure of welfare, 
it does not take account of a number of other important features of our 
society. The increased congestion costs and the growing pressures on the 
environment as a result of the rapid economic growth must both be taken into 
account when assessing the welfare implications of economic development 
over the current decade.  
This chapter considers some of the risks that the economy faces over the 
coming five or ten years. It then considers the medium-term policy 
implications of the demographic and economic changes under way. Finally, 
consideration is given to a number of longer term issues which merit attention 
by policy-makers today. 
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 The major purpose in undertaking the analysis in this Review is not just to 
provide forecasts, forecasts that will inevitably be overtaken by events, but 
instead to help understand the processes driving the Irish economy. For it is 
only with such an understanding that it is possible for policy to effectively 
influence future events. One important feature of this Review, as with previous 
Reviews, is that we pay special attention to what might go wrong. It is not that 
we are natural pessimists, but rather that pleasant surprises can be easily 
handled by a flexible economy, whereas unpleasant surprises may pose lasting 
problems. Thus we focus in particular on how policy can be made robust in the 
face of major uncertainty about the future, to help avoid future problems or to 
prepare the economy to face them from a position of strength.  
7.2 
Managing Risk 
In particular we are concerned about the exposure of this economy to the 
necessary international adjustment process that will take place at some time in 
the future to reverse the current growing international imbalances. Because of 
its openness the Irish economy is probably more exposed to international 
shocks emanating from the US than are our EU partners.49 However, our 
concerns are greatly heightened by Ireland’s current exceptional dependence on 
the building and construction industry to fuel economic growth. No other 
economy in the EU is anywhere near as exposed as is Ireland in this regard. 
While there is always the possibility that the building and construction 
industry will achieve a soft landing over the next decade and a half, such a 
desirable scenario is looking increasingly unlikely as the building and 
construction sector continues to increase its share of national output. With the 
potential output of the economy constrained by a limited capital stock and a 
labour supply that is adversely affected by domestic congestion costs, the 
building and construction industry has to bid scarce resources from other 
sectors of the economy to maintain its momentum. This process happens 
indirectly as the cost of the output of the building industry rises in relative 
terms. While the Irish labour market is very flexible, with Irish and foreign 
workers coming from abroad, they can only come at the cost of higher wage 
rates and further pressure on the market for accommodation. In turn the rising 
cost of accommodation and increasing pressures on infrastructure are adversely 
affecting the competitiveness of the tradable sector of the economy.50 
The result of the higher labour costs and higher cost for the output of the 
building industry is that the rest of the economy is being squeezed. This is 
particularly true for the tradable sector, especially manufacturing. The rapid rise 
in labour costs has forced many firms in the manufacturing sector to close, 
thus releasing the resources that the building industry needs. While in a 
successful economy such a process of change goes on all the time, it has 
dangers if the need for the shift in resources is unlikely to be permanent. For 
example, if there is a rapid slowdown in the building and construction industry 
in the future releasing resources, both capital and labour, for use elsewhere in 
the economy, it seems very unlikely that the manufacturing firms that have 
closed will rapidly reappear to use these resources. The consequence is that the 
sectoral shift in favour of building cannot be rapidly reversed without 
considerable pain. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, in the long run the building and construction 
industry is likely to account for a much smaller share of the economy. In 
particular, the extent of the resources being devoted to building new dwellings 
is truly exceptional. This sector is very vulnerable to a shock, in particular any 
 
49 Duffy, D. and J. Fitzgerald, 2000, “Has Ireland’s Exposure to a Sterling Shock Changed?”, 
Irish Banking Review Winter 2000. 
50 The importance of housing costs in determining Irish competitiveness is modelled directly in 
Duffy, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2005., “Rising House Prices in an Open Labour Market”, 
Economic and Social Review, forthcoming. 
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change in external circumstances which would cause unemployment to rise and 
expectations about future incomes to fall. Such a change could bring about a 
collapse in the housing market, including in housing prices. As illustrated in the 
scenario examined in Chapter 6, this could have very serious consequences for 
the domestic economy. It could take a number of years to recover from such a 
downturn and the intervening years could be extremely unpleasant no matter 
how wise the policies pursued. 
Under these circumstances what would be a prudent policy to follow? 
Because of the very considerable risks inherent in reallocating so much of our 
national resources to the building sector it would seem desirable to stop using 
public policy to boost the growth of the building and construction sector.  It 
would also be prudent to manage the public finances to leave scope for 
government action to offset, albeit to a limited extent, the consequences of a 
sudden and unexpected collapse in the building and construction sector. 
The policy levers needed to slow the building industry are well understood. 
They involve taking money out of the sector, thereby reducing demand. This 
can be done both through raising taxes that directly affect demand for the 
output of the building and construction sector and also through changing the 
pattern and timing of government capital expenditure.  
There are a range of tax changes that would differentially affect investment 
in building and construction, including housing. In particular,  the ending of all 
tax write-offs for such investment would be a key first step. If that proved 
insufficient, consideration could be given to a range of additional measures As 
suggested in Fitz Gerald (2001),51 the ending of tax relief on mortgages, would 
help reduce demand for dwellings. Further measures, such as a property tax,52 
as suggested recently by the Competitiveness Council could also be considered. 
Obviously, it would not be appropriate to implement all such changes. 
Much will depend on the political economy of such policies. In practice the 
most feasible instrument would probably be the ending of tax reliefs that 
encourage investment.  
At present Irish public investment is absorbing an exceptionally high share 
of national output relative to our neighbours. While the rising cost and slow 
delivery of public investment has been a major problem in recent years, very 
significant progress has been made in developing the physical infrastructure of 
the economy.  Nonetheless, a large infrastructural deficit still remains to be 
made up. The ability of the state to close the deficit in physical infrastructure is 
not constrained by lack of financial resources. Rather it is the ability of the 
economy to produce the necessary infrastructure at a reasonable price that is 
the key constraint.  
At this stage it is not clear when this deficit will be made good. However, in 
the short term, the other possible prong for government action designed to 
reduce the economy’s exposure to shocks would be to limit government 
demand for the output of the building and construction sector. The 
disadvantage of such a course of action would be that some major 
infrastructure projects which could relieve constraints in the economy could be 
delayed. To avoid such a danger it would be important to reprioritise within the 
Public Capital Programme.The issue of the appropriate strategy for public 
investment in infrastructure and the appropriate prioritisation of different types 
of public investment will be further addressed in future research being 
undertaken by the ESRI for the Department of Finance. 
Finally, it is appropriate for fiscal policy to run significant surpluses so long 
as the economy is continuing to grow rapidly. Any accumulated surpluses 
 
51 Fitz Gerald, J., 2001. “Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: The Case of Ireland” in McCoy et 
al., Quarterly Economic Commentary, March,  Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
52Callan, T., 1991. “Property Tax: Principles and Policy Options”. Policy Research Series, 
No.12, July, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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could then be used to fund continuing public investment in the event of a 
sudden downturn in the economy. 
The cost of prudent policy is likely to be only a temporary slowdown in the 
growth in incomes. If it also reduced inflationary pressures the cost could be 
further minimised. Any lost growth would be recovered when the economy 
eventually slows. Thus caution only delays the gratification of our national 
needs. The benefit of such a policy would be a reduction in the risk of a future 
very disruptive recession and an enhancement of the ability of the public sector 
to tackle such a recession should it occur. 
 
 The scenarios for the next decade painted in earlier chapters suggest a major 
change in the economic and social structure of the country over the coming 
decade. Among the different forms that these changes will take will be: 
7.3  
Implications of 
Change • The growth in the importance of the cohort of those in their 30s and 
the effects of this on the market for childcare. 
• The growth of a multicultural economy. 
THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF THE COHORT IN THEIR 
THIRTIES 
While today the biggest cohort in the population is those in their twenties, this 
cohort will be a decade older by 2015. This will have a noticeable effect on the 
pattern of expenditure. While today the bulk of the very large number of those 
in their twenties have no dependants, the bulk of them are likely to be parents 
of small children by 2015. This will change their life-style and consumption 
patterns. Because of the very large size of this cohort, the traditional process of 
family formation will have a wider significance for the economy and society. 
For example, while today a significant share of their disposable income may 
go on entertainment and travel, the advent of children will change their pattern 
of consumption. It may well be that investment in night clubs serving the 
needs of this cohort may today be a profitable occupation, but by 2015 it will 
be services for families, such as childcare facilities, which will be in greater 
demand! 
Even with unchanging fertility, the rise in the numbers in their thirties will 
see a rise in births of around a sixth over the coming decade. As parents 
increasingly choose to remain on in the labour market the demand for 
childcare outside the home will tend to rise. At the same time the analysis in 
earlier chapters points to a reduction in the supply of women with education of 
less than a Leaving Certificate – the traditional suppliers of such childcare. The 
result is likely to be a relative rise in the cost of childcare outside the home. 
This will pose difficult choices for parents, for employers and for government. 
In the United States, where there is a very wide dispersion in earnings, there 
is a very wide use of paid childcare. With many parents on high incomes they 
can afford to pay the low wages that those at the bottom of the income 
distribution can earn looking after their children. This arrangement is profitable 
for both parties. However, in Europe, with typically a much narrower 
dispersion of earnings, the margin between what those on high incomes earn 
after tax and what potential carers need to earn to make it worth their while 
looking after children is much narrower. Thus, European families tend to 
spend a greater amount of time caring for their own children through time out 
of the work force than is the case in the US (Freeman et al., 2004). They may 
also prefer this arrangement, even if the costs were identical.  
Whether any increase in childcare provision is paid for by the state or by 
individual parents it is likely to be increasingly costly for all those involved. The 
effect of the rising cost will be to reduce the incentive for those who would 
otherwise wish to remain in the labour force to do so. In turn, faced with the 
loss of an important supply of potentially skilled labour, wise employers will 
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react through the adaptation of the work place to better meet the needs of 
young parents.  
A possible objection to increased support for families through flexible 
working arrangements, or increased provision of childcare facilities, is that they 
will place further burdens on business. Whether businesses directly fund the 
changes or whether they are funded through taxation may ultimately make little 
difference to who pays. Whichever route is chosen, in an open economy such 
as Ireland’s, it is likely that the result of the wage bargaining process will see the 
bulk of the financial cost ultimately falling on employees who will, in turn, be 
the beneficiaries. This is not a reason for forgoing a change in policy, which 
improves the welfare of many citizens, but the fact that it is not costless must 
be recognised. 
Research has shown that while there was significant discrimination in 
earnings against women in the late 1980s, the discrimination against women 
qua women had largely disappeared by the end of the 1990s (Russell, H., in Fitz 
Gerald, McCarthy, Morgenroth and O’Connell, 2003). However, the research 
also shows that there was a very heavy penalty paid in lost earnings for anyone 
who spent significant time out of the labour force. As it is nearly always 
women who are in this position it means that women, on average, still earn 
significantly less than men if they take time off to look after children. The cost 
of having children is now very high when this opportunity cost of parents’ time 
is taken into account. 
The outcome of these different pressures will be some increase in childcare 
provision by the state, probably some increase in private provision, and a move 
to a more flexible workplace. However, if flexible working arrangements are to 
play a significant role in helping families and employers to find a mutually 
satisfactory outcome, the existing penalty for women availing of such flexibility 
will have to change. If this is to happen, it is more likely to be driven by market 
forces than by legislation: employers will discover that with more women than 
men having the qualifications that they require, to hold this key source of 
skilled labour they will have to adjust the wages paid. Also it is likely that where 
both parents share the childcare burden the labour market penalty for adopting 
such an approach will fall. 
DEVELOPING A MULTICULTURAL ECONOMY 
For a century and a half, many in the Irish population sought, and were 
granted, access to the best labour markets in the world. Over the 1990s this 
process was reversed and Ireland was transformed into a sought-after location 
for foreign migrants. The bulk of the immigration into Ireland over the 1990s 
was skilled labour, with about half being returning Irish emigrants. The 
majority of the rest were EU citizens with a high level of education. Many of 
those coming to Ireland were spouses or partners of Irish citizens. 
This influx of skilled labour played an important role in expanding the 
productive capacity of the economy, allowing the economy to grow more 
rapidly and helping to solve the problem of long-term unemployment (Barrett, 
Fitz Gerald and Nolan, 2002; Barrett, Bergin and Duffy, 2005). In addition, it 
has been shown that returned emigrants have higher productivity and higher 
earnings because of their experience abroad. (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001.) 
With almost a third of the younger cohorts being returned emigrants, this 
effect on individual productivity is affecting the economy as a whole. This 
improved the welfare of the least skilled in the labour force at the expense of 
lower wages for skilled labour. The immigration had wider benefits, making the 
economy more cosmopolitan and increasing productivity. 
The substantial influx of immigrants over the last four years into less skilled 
employment potentially has rather different effects. While also enhancing the 
cosmopolitan nature of the economy and relieving unskilled wage pressures, if 
continued indefinitely it could push unskilled wage rates down and raise the 
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rate of unemployment. However, the fact that the individuals have a high level 
of education means that either they get jobs more commensurate with their 
skills as their command of English improves or else they are likely to return 
home. This situation is rather different from that in many other countries 
where most immigrants have limited education and are destined to remain in 
low paid employment. 
Any discussion of policy on immigration must take place in the context of 
the fact that citizens of the ten EU accession states have had full access to the 
Irish labour market since May 2004. As a result, Ireland has one of the most 
open labour markets in the world and so discussions about policy on admission 
are not relevant for a large proportion of potential immigrants into Ireland.  
For this group policy in respect of integration is the main component of 
“immigration policy”. Nonetheless, policy on admission for non-EEA 
nationals is still important so we will set out here our views on the desirable 
features of an immigration system. A framework to allow for some of the 
elements we propose are contained in the Employment Permits Bill 200553 so 
our hope would be to see this bill enacted and built upon. 
What is required is an explicit policy on immigration that is seen to be both 
transparent and fair. There is a choice between two different approaches: 
allowing limited immigration of unskilled labour through a transparent 
programme or, alternatively, an open door policy that allows fairly free inward 
movement. A policy of limited immigration of unskilled labour would be 
consistent with the maintenance of a substantial domestic social safety net. 
Evidence from the US suggests that an open door policy on unskilled 
immigration would probably enhance the growth potential of the economy and 
would be good for skilled Irish citizens, but it would have an adverse impact 
on unskilled labour and place the welfare system under very serious pressure. 
On the basis of past experience, skilled immigration is likely to enhance both 
the output potential of the economy and the labour market prospects of 
unskilled labour. As such, it should be left to be determined by market forces. 
From an economic point of view any immigration system should have a 
number of characteristics. First, it should be transparent: a points based 
system, such as that operated by Canada, could allow necessary free 
immigration of skilled labour, while also allowing whatever inflow of unskilled 
labour that was deemed appropriate. Second, such a scheme should be 
administered by the state in a transparent fashion, along the lines of the 
Canadian or US systems. Where it is not done on a points system it should 
involve a lottery. Applications for entry should be made directly to the state, 
not through intermediate private agencies. Third, the visa (work-permit) should 
not be tied to a particular employer or sector; conditions of employment 
should be the same as for existing residents. 
Such a policy would be an improvement on the current economically 
inefficient approach to unskilled immigration where individuals are sponsored 
by companies. The economy has grown and prospered through Irish 
employees seeking out the most profitable places of employment. In so doing 
they increase production in the firms that are making the maximum 
contribution to growth. By tying immigrants to particular firms, whatever the 
firms’ level of efficiency, national productivity is impaired. 
The current practice carries the danger that the rights of immigrants may be 
abused. It leaves a wide opportunity for sponsoring agencies abroad to charge 
substantial fees. This can give rise to abuse, with potential immigrants 
borrowing heavily to buy entry, leaving them in the position of “bonded 
labourers”. It introduces the danger that such debts would be enforced 
through illegal means.  
 
53 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2005), “Minister Martin Outlines Details 
of New Employment Permits Policy for Migrant Workers”, Press Release 12 October. 
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If Ireland fails to embrace and build on the benefits of becoming a 
multicultural economy, through allowing appropriate migration, it will rapidly 
fall behind its competitors. Those cities and surrounding regions that have 
gone this route are among the most successful in the world. By accident rather 
than design we have turned what was the curse of emigration in the past into a 
major asset. The experience gained abroad by up to a third of our labour force 
has helped transform the economy. This expertise has been supplemented by 
the influx of skilled non-Irish workers, especially in the late 1990s.  
The attraction of such skilled individuals depends on making it attractive to 
live and work in a city or country. Ireland, especially Dublin, has become 
somewhat less attractive in recent years because of the high cost of 
accommodation and the very poor urban public transport infrastructure 
compared to that available elsewhere in competing locations in the EU. If we 
are to grow as a centre for successful business activity we will have to address 
these factors that make us unattractive both to outsiders and to our own 
children who are still residing abroad. 
 
 In the longer term Ireland must deal with the following: 7.4  
Planning for 
2020 and Beyond 
• The growing importance of China and India. 
• The shift to a service based economy. 
• Weaning itself of dependence on the low corporation tax regime. 
• Preparing for the greying of Ireland. 
HARNESSING THE BENEFITS OF GLOBAL TRADE 
Ireland has been exceptionally successful in exploiting the benefits of the rapid 
growth in international trade over the last half century. However, today fears 
are frequently expressed about the dangers emanating from competition from 
emerging economies such as China and India. However, such fears are based 
on a misunderstanding of the process of trade. 
It is true that both India and China have far more skilled people working in 
their economies than in Ireland or possibly in the EU. However, such skilled 
labour represents a very small share of the total population in those economies. 
We have learned how important the supply of skilled labour is in building a 
prosperous economy. For China and India they have an ever increasing 
demand for skilled labour to work in administration, in providing essential 
business services, and to provide key supervisory staff for the newly developing 
manufacturing sector. The more rapidly these economies develop the more 
rapidly will the demand for skilled labour rise and with it the greater the 
pressure on skilled wage rates.  
China and India have a very large supply of unskilled labour which is 
underemployed in agriculture. It will be a long time before they face pressures 
on unskilled wage rates. Thus they have the potential to continue growing very 
rapidly. The effect of this growth will be to raise skilled wage rates. Thus these 
economies have a limited scope to deploy skilled labour to provide services for 
developed economies, such as Ireland. By contrast they have very considerable 
scope to increase the supply of goods that are produced by unskilled or semi-
skilled labour. 
As a result, while the far East will provide increasing competition to supply 
goods produced using unskilled labour they will continue for the foreseeable 
future to be a buyer of goods and services that require a high skilled input. 
Thus, their growth should be seen as an opportunity to develop profitable 
markets rather than as a serious threat to the services and goods in which the 
Irish economy is gradually specialising. 
 
54 PPPs are likely to be an expensive way to fund infrastructural investment. Their value lies in 
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Over the past fifty years Irish trade policy has been transformed. Until the 
early 1980s the safeguarding and development of Irish agricultural exports was 
still a key priority for policy-makers. However, since joining the EU in 1973 
agricultural exports have fallen continuously in importance. Today they 
represent a very small fraction of total trade. While it remains important for 
Irish farmers to safeguard transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy, the 
fostering of agricultural exports is no longer a priority.  
The importance of free trade was long ago identified as crucial in the 
development of industrial exports and Ireland’s manufacturing sector. 
Membership of the EU in 1973 cemented this policy in place and the Single 
European Market of 1992 brought substantial additional benefits to Ireland. As 
discussed below, increasingly the focus of attention will switch to services 
exports. In this regard it is important to Ireland to pursue policies that will 
open up and keep open markets for Ireland’s tradable services throughout the 
world. While this will also see increasing imports of services, past experience 
has shown that such a policy will provide more of an opportunity than a threat. 
PLANNING FOR A SERVICES BASED ECONOMY 
The policies that have served Ireland well in the past in promoting industrial 
development may need adaptation to a world where success will increasingly 
come from the services sector.  
The most obvious factor that differentiates Ireland from many competitors 
is the supply of skilled labour. As outlined in Chapter 2, the average 
educational attainment of the work force will continue to rise quite rapidly for 
the next fifteen years. This should contribute significantly to the growth in the 
productivity of the economy. In addition, the continued growth in skilled 
labour supply will help maintain the competitiveness of the economy. The 
Enterprise Strategy Report made recommendations on how this asset can be 
further developed. 
A second focus of policy in recent years has been the promotion of 
investment in research and development. Public policy has moved to foster 
R&D in the third level sector. In addition, incentives have been provided to 
persuade the private sector to raise the level of its investment in R&D. 
However, while considerable funds are available to foster this investment in the 
private sector, there remains the danger that such investment could prove 
ineffective and funds could be wasted. It is important that this key area of 
expenditure is subject to continued monitoring to ensure that policy-making 
evolves to produce significant economic benefits.  In the case of the funding of 
basic research, mechanisms have been put in place to ensure a competitive 
environment, which should ensure quality output.  
What is not clear is whether the current exclusive science, technology and 
engineering based focus of the research should be maintained. In so far as this 
research can be expected to have commercial spin-offs it is most likely to occur 
in the manufacturing sector. With the change in emphasis to developing the 
services sector some broadening in the focus of such research might be 
appropriate. While the establishment of a reputation for excellence in 
biomedical research might help in developing a pharmaceutical industry it may 
not be as valuable in promoting the growth of businesses providing 
accountancy services or selling television programming abroad. It is possible 
that excellence as a centre for research in international law or even, say, history 
could also contribute to the long-term growth of the economy. 
An important reason for the success of the Irish economy over the last 
decade has been its ability to attract back as homing pigeons the Irish 
emigrants of the past and, increasingly, skilled individuals from all over the 
world. For firms that plan to export tradable services it will be essential to be 
able to attract the relevant skilled labour from all over the world. However, 
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such skilled labour will only come and work in Ireland if it is attractive for 
them to do so. 
We have seen that even states that are very unattractive to live in can attract 
skilled labour by paying extremely high wage rates. However, in the kind of 
business that is likely to develop in Ireland competitiveness will depend on 
attracting skilled labour at a reasonable price. By making Ireland an appealing 
place to live in the cost of attracting and holding skilled labour will be reduced, 
making the economy more attractive as a destination for investment. 
There is no simple prescription for making and keeping Ireland attractive to 
live in. For different individuals different features will be important. However, 
it is clear that the high cost of accommodation and the ever-rising commuting 
times are a negative feature of Ireland today. To the extent that they are offset 
by wider cultural and environmental attractions, the economy can continue to 
prosper. Generally, in seeking to build a successful economy based on tradable 
services policy must focus on a wider range of issues than in the past. 
However, success in making Ireland an attractive place to do business is likely 
to have the additional benefit that it will enhance the quality of life for all those 
resident in the country. 
When Ireland first introduced the policy of low corporation tax in the late 
1950s it was unique. Within the EU, and even within the wider context of the 
OECD, the Irish rate of corporation tax was and remains far below that of 
most other countries. However, the external environment is gradually 
changing. While it was a key factor in growing the manufacturing sector over 
the last half century, it is becoming less effective as an instrument due to 
enhanced competition from countries such as Estonia. In addition, the shifting 
focus of the economy towards the services sector will require a rather different 
range of instruments for promoting development. 
There are potential strategic dangers for the Irish economy in becoming too 
dependent on the low tax rate. The changing external environment leaves 
Ireland exposed to an asymmetric shock of an unusual kind, where changes in 
legislation in other jurisdictions (or in the EU) could have a sudden and large 
impact on the Irish economy. In addition, the continuing preservation of the 
current status quo may involve increasing costs in terms of Irish political capital 
within the EU, and falling returns in terms of economic benefits for a rapidly 
changing domestic economy. 
The implication of these arguments is not that Ireland should do away with 
its current system of low corporation tax but rather that it needs to wean the 
economy away from excessive dependence on it. This means that the focus of 
public policy should be on attracting and developing firms that are not crucially 
dependent on low corporation tax for their success. Such a policy fits in with 
the need to develop the services sector of the economy, especially tradable 
services. The objective should be to have a very much smaller proportion of 
the economy dependent on the low corporation tax for its survival by 2020. 
 
THE GREYING OF IRELAND 
The gradual increase in the average age of the population and of the 
proportion of the population which is retired will put increasing pressures on 
the economy in the years after 2020. These potential pressures have been 
considered in detail in Barrett and Bergin (2005).  
When looking at the greying of Ireland there are a number of strategies that 
can be adopted to postpone, reduce, or to manage the increased dependency 
burden that this may entail in the distant future. First, the state can promote a 
 
55 Gunnligle, P. and D. McGuire, 2001. “Why Ireland? A Qualitative Review of the Factors 
Influencing the Location of U.S. Multinationals in Ireland with Particular Reference to the 
Impact of Labour Issues”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 32, January 2001, pp 43-68. 
104 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2005-2012 
higher birth rate to produce a more balanced population structure. Second, it is 
possible to increase the average retirement age and change the proportion of 
the population actually working. Third, migration can help restore a more 
balanced population structure. Finally, the state and individuals can save to 
provide for their financial needs in retirement. The outcome is likely to be (and 
should be) a mixture of all of these strategies. 
While the birth rate has fallen dramatically compared to the 1970s, fertility 
is still high by EU standards. The population is currently almost replacing itself, 
with a total fertility rate of around 2. If maintained, in the long run this would 
lead to a stable population. However, even with stability, there will inevitably 
be a major deterioration from the current unsustainably favourable 
demographic structure. 
The option of postponing retirement has already been adopted in Germany 
and Italy (where retirement was at a very young age). With life expectancy 
rising rapidly, there is also a rise in the ability of individuals to continue 
working to a later age than was the case before. This is especially true where 
the nature of work itself has changed away from manual labour. Any sudden 
changes in policy in this area could cause major problems as people plan for 
retirement well in advance. However, with life expectancy rising rapidly, there 
is a strong case for looking at the pattern of retirement in Ireland and what 
retirement actually means. The first priority should be to develop policies that 
encourage people to at least remain in the labour force up to retirement age.  
It is also possible to replace a policy of encouraging people to have more 
children by a policy where a society imports its “children” fully-grown as 
immigrants. On paper this may sound like a good idea. Immigration is an 
important factor in why the US is keeping itself “young”. It avoids the costs of 
bringing up children, including the necessary investment by the state in 
education. However, this does not look to be sustainable in the long run. 
Unless a high proportion of the immigrants are skilled it may not add 
sufficiently to the productive potential of the economy to offset the rising 
dependency rates. A country that is greying rapidly may also not be very 
attractive to skilled immigrants; selling a “retirement home” as a good place to 
live to skilled foreigners in their twenties could be a difficult task!  
However, migration has in the past played a very important role in 
stabilising economies and in promoting economic adjustment. In the 1990s it 
played a significant role in enhancing the growth potential of the Irish 
economy and it will continue to play a role, albeit a subsidiary one, in 
developing the Irish economy in coming decades. 
As part of the preparation for the rising burden in the second quarter of 
this century, the government has established the National Pensions Reserve 
Fund. Current policy is to save 1 per cent a year of GNP out of the public 
finances and put it into the fund. The fund also includes privatisation receipts. 
The fund is being invested so that the proceeds will part-fund the state’s 
pension liabilities after 2030. At a time when the economy is enjoying what 
amounts to a “demographic dividend” it is certainly appropriate that prudent 
provision be made for adverse changes in demographic structure in future 
decades. However, there is a wider issue of intergenerational equity that is only 
beginning to be considered. 
While a range of potential approaches exist to deal with the economic 
challenges posed by population ageing, there appears to be no simple answer 
that is both without cost and easy to implement. In the case of longer working 
lives, the government has only a limited influence on the actual time of 
retirement. Even if it alters the age at which the state pension is granted, people 
with private pensions can retire earlier. As societies get wealthier, there appears 
to be an increasing move towards earlier retirement and so it may become 
more difficult to generate later retirement. In the case of immigration, and as 
noted above, the level of inflows needed to make a significant contribution to 
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slowing the process of population ageing would be so large as to create an 
alternative set of policy challenges.  
Given these difficulties, it is important that the long-run cost implications 
of new policy initiatives are considered before they are implemented. It is also 
important that the public finances continue to be managed with a view to their 
long-run sustainability. By incorporating long-run thinking into the 
management of the public finances in advance of the onset of population 
ageing, Ireland can avoid the problems currently experienced by other EU 
countries. 
  
REFERENCES 
BARRETT, A. and A. BERGIN. 2005. “Assessing Age-related Pressures on the Public Finances, 2005-2050” in 
T. Callan, and A. Doris (eds.), Budget Perspectives 2006, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
BARRETT, A., A. BERGIN and D. DUFFY 2005. “The Labour Market Characteristics and Labour Market 
Impacts of Immigrants in Ireland”, Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) Discussion Paper No. 1553. 
BARRETT, A., A. BERGIN, S. GARRETT, and Y. MCCARTHY 2005. Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
BARRETT, A. and P. J. O’CONNELL 2001. “Is There a Wage Premium for Returning Irish Migrants?”, The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 32, No. 1. 
BARRETT, A., J. FITZ GERALD, and B. NOLAN, 2002. “Earnings Inequality, Returns to Education and 
Immigration into Ireland”, Labour Economics, Vol. 9, No. 5. 
BARRY, F., 2002. The Celtic Tiger Era: Delayed Convergence or Regional Boom?”, in D. MCCoy,  et al., Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Summer, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
BERGIN, A. and I. KEARNEY, 2004. “Human Capital, the Labour Market and Productivity Growth in 
Ireland”, ESRI Working Paper No. 158, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
BLANCHARD, O., J.F. GIAVAZZI, and F.G. SA, 2005. “The U.S. Current Account and the Dollar”, MIT 
Department of Economics Working Paper,  No. 05-02. 
CALLAN, T., 1991. “Property Tax: Principles and Policy Options”, Policy Research Series, No.12, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
CURTIS, J. and J. FITZ GERALD, 1994. “Convergence in an Open Labour Market”, ESRI Working 
Paper No.45, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
CURTIS, J. and J. FITZ GERALD, 1993. “The Changing Structure of the Irish Economy: As Reflected 
in the 1985 Input-Output Table”, ESRI Technical Series, No.8, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, 2005. “Minister Martin Outlines 
Details of New Employment Permits Policy for Migrant Workers”, Press Release 12 October. 
DUFFY, D., 2002. “A Descriptive Analysis of the Irish Housing Market”, in D. McCoy et al., Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Summer, pp. 40-55, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
DUFFY, D. and J. FITZGERALD, 1998. “Has Ireland’s Exposure to a Sterling Shock Changed?”, Irish Banking 
Review, Winter 2000. 
DUFFY, D., J. FITZ GERALD, and I. KEARNEY, 2005 (forthcoming). “Rising House Prices in an Open 
Labour Market”,  The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter. 
EUROFRAME-EFN, 2005. “Economic Assessment of the Euro Area: Forecasts and Policy Analysis”, Autumn 
2005 Report, available at www.euroframe.org. 
FITZ GERALD, J., 2006. “Lessons from 20 Years of Cohesion” in S. Mundschenk, M. Stierle, U. Stierle-von 
Schütz and I. Trasitaru (eds.), Competitiveness and Growth in Europe: Lessons and Policy Implications for the Lisbon 
Strategy,  Edward Elgar. 
FITZ GERALD, J, 2005. “The Irish Housing Stock: Growth in the Number of Vacant Dwellings”, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Spring, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
FITZ GERALD J., 2004. “An Expensive Way to Combat Global Warming: Reform Needed in the EU 
Emissions Trading Regime”, in D. McCoy et al., Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
FITZ GERALD, J., C. McCARTHY, E. MORGENROTH and P. O’CONNELL, 2003. Mid-Term Evaluation of 
the National Development Plan and Community Support Framework for Ireland 2000 to 2006, Policy Research Series 
No. 50, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
FITZGERALD, J., 2001. “Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: The Case of Ireland” in D. McCoy et al., Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, March, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
FREEMAN, R., and R. SCHETTKAT, 2004. “Jobs and Home Work”, Economic Policy, January, pp. 5-50. 
GOURINCHAS, P. O. and H. REY, 2005. “International Financial Adjustment,” NBER Working Paper No. 
11155, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
  REFERENCES 107 
 
GREENSPAN, ALAN, remarks by Federal Reserve Board Chairman before the Banco de Mexico’s 80th 
Anniversary Conference, Mexico City, November 14th, 2005. 
HONOHAN, P., 1992. “The Link between Irish and UK Unemployment”, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring, 
pp.33-44, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
HONOHAN, P. and B.WALSH, 2002. “Catching up with the Leaders: the Irish Hare”, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity,  Vol. 1, pp. 1-57. 
IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/ 
2005/02/ 
KOMAN, R. and D. MARIN, 1997. “Human Capital and Macroeconomic Growth: Austria and Germany, 1960-
92”, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1551. 
McCARTHY, Y., 2005. “The Structure of the Irish Economy: A Shift to Services Driven Growth?”, Seminar 
Paper, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
MANN, C., 2003. “The US Current Account, New Economy Services, and Implications for Sustainability”, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, August.  
MURPHY, A., 1998. “Modelling Irish House Prices: A Review”, Irish Economic Association Conference, April. 
MURPHY, A, 1998. “Appendix E: Econometric Modelling of the Irish Housing Market” in P. Bacon, F. 
MacCabe and A. Murphy, An Economic Assessment of Recent House Price Developments, Dublin: The Stationery 
Office, April. 
OBSTFELD, M. and K. ROGOFF, 2005. “Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate 
Adjustments” in W. Brainard and G. Perry (eds.), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 1, pp. 67-146. 
OBSTFELD, M. and K. ROGOFF, 2004. “The Unsustainable US Current Account Position Revisited”, NBER 
Working Paper  No. 10869, October 2004, available at: http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10869.pdf. 
Ó GRÁDA, C., 2002. “Is the Celtic Tiger a Paper Tiger?” in D. McCoy et al., Quarterly Economic Commentary, 
Spring, pp. 51-62., Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
O’MALLEY, E., 2004. “Competitive Performance in Irish Industry” in D. McCoy et al., Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Winter, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
ROMER, P., 1986. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 1002-
1037, October. 
RUSSELL, H., 2003., in J. Fitz Gerald, C. McCarthy, E. Morgenroth, and P. O’Connell, 2003. The Mid-Term 
Evaluation of the National Development Plan and Community Support Framework for Ireland 2000 to 2006, Policy 
Research Series, Number 50,  Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute.  
TILLE, C., 2004. “Financial Integration and the Wealth Effect of Exchange Rate Fluctuations”, Mimeo, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1:  
FORECASTING RECORD OF 
THE MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 
The exercise of preparing medium-term forecasts is in many ways more 
important than the numbers themselves. The exercise of producing a Review 
firstly involves detailed ground work in developing a set of assumptions about 
crucial external variables, especially about the external environment and the 
likely stance of domestic policy, including fiscal policy. Secondly, a model or 
models are developed which translate the assumptions concerning the external 
drivers of the economy into a profile for key variables in the domestic 
economy. Finally, these scenarios can serve to highlight future constraints or 
problems in the domestic economy.  
Introduction 
This exercise develops an understanding of the underlying behaviour of the 
Irish economy. Without such a framework for analysis it is not possible to 
think about the complex web of economic relationships that underpin the 
workings of the economy in a coherent manner.  
The Medium-Term Review (MTR) was first published in 1986 and this Review 
represents the tenth in a series of publications that have appeared every two or 
three years since 1986.While the forecasting accuracy of the Review  may not be 
the only or even the primary reason for undertaking such a research, it is a 
relevant criterion for assessing the value of such work. In this Appendix we 
examine the track record of successive Reviews in forecasting key aggregates – 
GNP, the unemployment rate and the rate of inflation in consumer prices. The 
growth rate of Gross National Product (GNP) volume is first examined.  
Unemployment, as measured by the Present Employment Status (PES) 
measure in April of the year under review is also looked at.  Inflation forecasts 
are evaluated by comparing the forecast growth in the Personal Consumption 
Deflator (PCD) against its outturn as measured in National Accounts data.   
In each case the forecasts contained in the relevant Medium-Term Review are 
compared to the latest published CSO figures for that year. In the case of the 
MTR’s published up to 1999 historical CSO data are available for the bulk of 
the forecast period. For the more recent MTRs the CSO data up to 2004 are 
used for comparison purposes and the forecasts after that year are not included 
in this comparison. It should be noted that the CSO final figures for a year 
only appear quite a number of years after the first publication. Thus the latest 
CSO release has included significant changes in the growth rate back to 2002. 
It will be some time before the final figures for 2004 are available to provide a 
definitive benchmark against which the forecasting record can be measured. 
In successive MTR’s emphasis has been put on the forecast for the average 
growth rate in GNP or inflation over the forecast period rather than on the 
forecasts for individual years. The experience in Ireland and elsewhere is that 
economic forecasters are generally poor at predicting turning points in the 
economy. The same is true of the Medium-Term Review. However, the 
performance in forecasting the average growth rate over a medium-term 
horizon, which tends to smooth out turning points, is somewhat better. 
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Table A1.1 shows a number of measures of the error in successive MTR 
forecasts for GNP. Full details of the forecasts and the historical figures are 
given in Table A1.4.  
Growth in GNP 
Table A1.1: Medium-Term Forecasts of GNP Growth Rates, Percentage Points 
 Average Over Forecast Period Annual Forecast 
 Average Annual Growth Average Error 
Average Absolute 
Error 
Average Absolute 
Error 
 MTR CSO    
MTR 1986 2.8 3.2 0.4 0.4 1.9 
MTR 1987 2.6 3.7 1.0 1.0 1.9 
MTR 1989 4.9 4.4 -0.4 0.4 2.1 
MTR 1991 3.4 5.0 1.6 1.6 2.7 
MTR 1994 5.1 8.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 
MTR 1997 5.0 6.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 
MTR 1999 5.4 5.6 0.2 0.2 1.8 
MTR 2001 4.9 3.9 -1.0 1.0 0.4 
MTR 2003 2.7 4.5 1.8 1.8 1.0 
Average for 9 MTRs   0.9 1.2 1.9 
 
Over the nine previous Medium-Term Reviews the average error in the growth 
rate over the forecast period was 0.9 percentage points. This error is calculated 
by taking the average annual growth rate forecast in each review over the 
relevant time horizon, including the growth rate in the year the forecast was 
published. This growth rate is then compared to the average growth rate 
shown for the same period by the latest CSO national accounts figures.  
On this measure, with regard to the average error, the MTRs have generally 
proved to be pessimistic in their forecasts, underestimating growth over the 
forecast time horizon. The forecast error was particularly large in the 1994 
Medium-Term Review, with a very serious underestimate of the capacity of the 
economy to grow over the rest of the 1990s. Only two of the MTRs have 
overestimated future growth – the 1989 MTR which failed to predict the 
slowdown in the EU economy (and the resulting effects on Ireland) in the 
early 1990s and the 2001 MTR benchmark forecast prepared before September 
the 11th (though published after it) which overestimated the growth rate over 
the early years of this decade.1  
While on average pessimistic, up to the late 1990s the MTR’s forecasts were 
generally felt to be unduly optimistic at the time they were published – the 
general mood was even more pessimistic about future growth prospects than 
was the Review. Since the first MTR was published the research embodied in 
successive publications pointed to the Irish economy having the capacity to 
outperform its neighbours. The use of the standard methodology for 
estimating potential output, used by the EU Commission and others, which 
gives a high weight to past performance, tended to underestimate the growth 
potential of the economy over the 1990s to an even greater extent than the 
MTRs. 
Probably the best measure of the forecasting accuracy is the average 
absolute error of the medium-term forecast in each MTR. For the last nine 
Reviews it averaged 1.2 percentage points. For economies such as our EU 
partners where the growth rate has ranged between 0 and 3 percentage points 
over the last ten or fifteen years such an average absolute error would seem 
 
1 In the case of the 2001 MTR it was published just after September the 11th and an alternative 
low growth scenario was included which, by the time of publication, looked a more likely 
outcome than the benchmark forecast included in Table A1.1. As it happens, that Low Growth 
scenario underestimated growth by almost as much as the high growth scenario overestimated 
growth in the period 2001-4. 
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high. However, over the last twenty years the Irish growth rate has ranged 
between -0.2 and +9.5 per cent. The standard deviation of the annual growth 
rate over that period was 2.8 percentage points. 
The final column in Table A1.1 shows the average absolute error in the year 
by year forecasts in each Review. At 1.9 percentage points it is much higher than 
the error in the forecast of the average growth rate over the forecast time 
horizon. This highlights the fact that successive Reviews have been much better 
at forecasting the future trend of growth than in forecasting the pattern of 
growth over the relevant time horizon. This reflects the experience of short-
term forecasting where forecasters are poor at foreseeing turning points. The 
advantage in medium-term forecasting is that it is less important to foresee the 
precise timing of the business cycle with success owing more to a proper 
understanding of the factors driving potential output in the economy. 
 
 Table A1.2 examines the forecasting record for the deflator of personal 
consumers’ expenditure over successive Reviews. This is probably the most 
appropriate measure of inflation. The standard deviation in the historical 
inflation rate over the period 1986 to 2004 was 1.0 per cent. This is much 
lower than the standard deviation of the growth rate for GNP. Over the nine 
Reviews the average error in the forecast for the chosen time horizon of each 
publication was 0.2 percentage points. The average absolute error over the 
same period was 0.7 percentage points.  
Inflation 
Table A1.2: Medium-Term Forecasts of Inflation, Percentage Points 
 Average Over Forecast Period Annual Forecast 
 Average Annual Growth Average Error Average Absolute 
Error 
Average Absolute 
Error 
 MTR CSO    
MTR 1986 3.8 3.3 -0.5 0.5 1.1 
MTR 1987 3.4 3.1 -0.3 0.3 0.4 
MTR 1989 3.6 2.8 -0.8 0.8 1.0 
MTR 1991 2.8 2.7 -0.1 0.1 2.2 
MTR 1994 2.5 3.3 0.8 0.8 1.8 
MTR 1997 2.1 4.0 1.9 1.9 1.3 
MTR 1999 2.6 3.8 1.2 1.2 0.8 
MTR 2001 4.0 3.6 -0.4 0.4 0.0 
MTR 2003 2.7 2.6 -0.2 0.2 0.0 
Average for 9 MTRs   0.2 0.7 0.9 
 
The earlier Reviews tended to overestimate future inflation over a period 
when the inflation rate was generally falling. By contrast, the publications 
which covered the late 1990s and the early years of the current decade tended 
to underestimate the inflationary pressures. This failure was partly due to the 
apparent change in the underlying process for determining of inflation in 
Ireland, with a slower pass through of the effects of exchange rate changes 
than was the case in the pre-EMU period. The average absolute error in the 
year by year forecast was 0.9 percentage points, not much worse than the 
absolute error in the forecast average growth rate.  
This result is not terribly satisfactory. While in the case of the growth of 
GNP the standard deviation of the actual growth rate was quite high over the 
last twenty years, it was much lower for the inflation rate. Thus the target of 
the inflation forecasts was inherently easier than was the case in forecasting the 
growth of real GNP. 
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In the case of the unemployment rate we have evaluated forecasting 
performance by comparing the forecast unemployed rate for the last year 
shown in each Review with the actual rate for that year.2 As can be seen from 
Table A1.3, with the exception of the 1989 publication, successive Reviews 
greatly overestimated the future unemployment rate. The errors were 
particularly large in the period up to 1997 with a general expectation that the 
intractable problem of unemployment would not be solved within the forecast 
time horizon. This pessimism about the unemployment rate suggests a 
continuing failure to understand the working of the labour market up to the 
late 1990s. 
Unemployment 
Table A1.3: Medium-Term Forecasts of Unemployment Rate (PES), Percentage 
Points of the Labour Force 
 Forecast for End Year of Forecast Period 
 Forecast Actual 
Average 
Error 
Average 
Absolute 
Error 
     
MTR 1986 18.5 13.4 -5.1 5.1 
MTR 1987 18.3 15.9 -2.4 2.4 
MTR 1989 12.7 15.6 2.9 2.9 
MTR 1991 16 12.9 -3.1 3.1 
MTR 1994 13.4 6.4 -7.0 7.0 
MTR 1997 8.4 6.2 -2.2 2.2 
MTR 1999 5.3 5.4 0.1 0.1 
MTR 2001 5.8 5.4 -0.4 0.4 
MTR 2003 5.4 5.4 0.0 0.0 
Average for 9 MTRs   -1.9 2.6 
 
Since 1997, there has been very little variation in the unemployment rate so 
that the much improved forecasting performance is unsurprising. Also the 
experience of the late 1990s, spawning significant research, has enhanced our 
understanding of the factors driving the behaviour of the Irish labour market. 
 
 In this Appendix we have assessed the forecasting performance of the last 
nine Reviews. In many cases the forecasts reflected the perception of policy-
makers around the time that each forecast was made. To the extent policy 
makers believed the forecasts and took action to avoid potential future dangers 
the outturn could have been better than anticipated. However, it is not 
possible to assess whether such “endogeneity” in the forecasting process 
affected outcomes. 
Conclusions 
Looking back over nine Reviews the 1999 publication stands out as having 
had the most accurate predictions. That is in spite of the fact that its forecast 
horizon spanned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US and the 
collapse of the ‘Dot Com’ bubble. With the benefit of hindsight, in covering a 
full cycle of growth from peak to trough its forecast average growth rates 
probably had a better chance of being right.  
The analysis in this Appendix indicates that the forecasts for individual 
years published in this Review should be treated with considerable caution. The 
authors put much more emphasis on the forecast average rate of change over 
the full forecast period. Past performance suggests that these average growth 
rates can provide some useful indications of future performance. However, 
even here there remains considerable uncertainty as is indicated in Chapter 6, 
 
2 In each case it is the PES unemployment rate for the second quarter (April) of the relevant 
year. 
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which discusses two very different scenarios for growth over the next seven 
years. 
Table A1.4: Forecast of Annual Growth in Real GNP, % 
 MTR 
1986 
MTR 
1987 
MTR 
1989 
MTR 
1991 
MTR 
1994 
MTR 
1997 
MTR 
1999 
MTR 
2001 
MTR 
2003 
Actual 
1986 2.5         -0.2 
1987 2.75         3.2 
1988 3 -0.4        1.5 
1989 3 3 4       5.0 
1990 3 3.3 7.1       6.8 
1991  3.7 5.6 2      2.8 
1992  3.6 4.6 3.7      2.3 
1993   4.8 4.3      3.3 
1994   3.2 3.3 4.3     6.7 
1995    3.6 6.9     7.3 
1996    3.7 5.7     7.8 
1997     4.6 5.7    9.4 
1998     4.8 5.9    7.7 
1999     4.7 5.3 6.3   8.5 
2000     4.5 4.4 5.8   9.5 
2001      3.7 5.5 6  3.9 
2002      4.5 5 1.8  2.7 
2003      5.3 4.9 4.2 2.4 5.1 
2004       5 5.1 3 4.0 
 
Table A1.5: Forecast of Annual Inflation Rate for Consumers’ Expenditure, % 
 MTR 
1986 
MTR 
1987 
MTR 
1989 
MTR 
1991 
MTR 
1994 
MTR 
1997 
MTR 
1999 
MTR 
2001 
MTR 
2003 
Actual 
1986 4.5         3.7 
1987 4         2.7 
1988 4 3        4.0 
1989 3.5 3 3.3       4.0 
1990 3 3.7 4.2       2.0 
1991  3.7 4.2 2.7      2.7 
1992  3.7 3.5 2.4      3.0 
1993   3 2.6      2.2 
1994   3.5 3 3     2.8 
1995    3.1 2.6     2.8 
1996    3.1 2.3     2.7 
1997     2.3 2.1    2.6 
1998     2.4 1.9    4.0 
1999     2.4 2.1 1.8   3.2 
2000     2.4 2.2 2.2   4.8 
2001      2.1 2.9 4.8  4.3 
2002      2.1 2.9 3.9  5.2 
2003      2.1 2.9 3.8 3.5 4.0 
2004       3 3.5 2 1.2 
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Table A1.6: Forecast of Unemployment Rate (PES), % of Labour Force 
 MTR 
1986 
MTR 
1987 
MTR 
1989 
MTR 
1991 
MTR 
1994 
MTR 
1997 
MTR 
1999 
MTR 
2001 
MTR 
2003 
Actual 
1986 17         17.4 
1987 17.5         17.6 
1988 18 19.5        16.7 
1989 18.25 19.1 16       15.6 
1990 18.5 18.5 14.6       13.4 
1991  18.2 13.4 15.8      15.5 
1992  18.3 13 15.9      15.9 
1993   12.8 15.7      16.6 
1994   12.7 16 16.9     15.6 
1995    16 16.1     13.3 
1996    16 15.3     12.9 
1997     14.6 10.9    11.8 
1998     14.2 9.1    9.8 
1999     13.7 8.3 6.5   7.6 
2000     13.4 8.6 5.6   6.4 
2001      8.8 5.4 3.8  5.7 
2002      8.9 5.3 3.6  6.3 
2003      8.4 5.4 4.3 4.9 6.4 
2004       5.3 5.3 5.7 5.8 
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Table A2.1: Expenditure on GNP 
 2004 Volume Price 2005 Cont. to Volume Price 2006 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 67,079 5.2 2.1 72,080 3.2 5.0 2.7 77,714 3.0 
Public Consumption 20,761 3.4 4.7 22,477 0.6 3.6 5.0 24,452 0.6 
Fixed Investment 36,156 7.3 2.9 39,903 1.8 4.3 1.9 42,412 1.1 
  Building 27,090 5.2 3.7 29,562 0.8 2.2 2.1 30,849 0.3 
  Machinery 9,068 10.4 3.4 10,348 1.1 7.2 4.3 11,574 0.8 
Final Domestic Demand 123,997 5.4 2.8 134,460 5.5 4.6 2.8 144,578 4.7 
Stock Building 793   294 0.1   286 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 124,790 5.6 2.3 134,755 5.7 4.7 2.7 144,864 4.8 
Total Exports 122,301 4.6 -0.1 127,758 6.2 4.3 1.7 135,570 5.8 
  Merchandise 81,058 3.8 -0.9 83,378 3.7 4.2 1.3 88,020 4.1 
  Services 41,243 6.4 1.2 44,381 2.5 4.5 2.5 47,550 1.7 
Total Demand 247,091 5.0 1.2 262,513 11.9 4.5 2.3 280,434 10.6 
Total Imports 100,446 5.0 0.6 106,101 5.6 4.1 1.9 112,486 4.5 
Gross Domestic Product 145,939 5.7 2.3 157,746 7.1 4.9 2.2 169,177 6.2 
Net Factor Income -23,624 6.1 -2.9 -24,323 -1.6 5.4 2.3 -26,209 -1.4 
Gross National Product 122,315 5.6 3.3 133,423 5.6 4.8 2.2 142,968 4.8 
        
 2006 Volume Price 2007 Cont. to Volume Price 2008 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 77,714 3.7 1.8 82,046 2.3 3.5 1.7 86,362 2.1 
Public Consumption 24,452 3.9 2.5 26,047 0.6 3.9 2.5 27,743 0.6 
Fixed Investment 42,412 2.5 1.6 44,187 0.6 3.1 2.5 46,716 0.8 
  Building 30,849 1.5 1.9 31,911 0.2 2.0 3.4 33,660 0.3 
  Machinery 11,574 3.8 2.1 12,269 0.4 4.5 1.4 13,003 0.5 
Final Domestic Demand 144,578 3.5 1.8 152,280 3.5 3.5 2.1 160,822 3.5 
Stock Building 286   630 -0.1   839 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 144,864 3.4 2.1 152,910 3.5 3.6 2.0 161,661 3.6 
Total Exports 135,570 7.8 1.8 148,716 10.4 6.9 1.6 161,517 9.4 
  Merchandise 88,020 7.1 1.6 95,746 6.8 6.1 1.4 102,997 5.9 
  Services 47,550 9.5 1.8 52,970 3.7 8.7 1.7 58,520 3.5 
Total Demand 280,434 5.9 1.6 301,626 13.9 5.5 1.6 323,178 13.0 
Total Imports 112,486 5.6 1.9 120,967 6.1 5.0 1.9 129,432 5.5 
Gross Domestic Product 169,177 6.2 1.2 181,887 7.8 6.0 1.2 194,975 7.5 
Net Factor Income -26,209 8.6 1.8 -28,975 -2.2 9.6 1.6 -32,270 -2.6 
Gross National Product 142,968 5.6 1.3 152,912 5.6 5.0 1.4 16,2704 5.0 
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Table A2.1 (continued): Expenditure on GNP 
 2008 Volume Price 2009 Cont. to Volume Price 2010 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 86,362 3.3 1.9 90,897 1.9 4.7 2.6 97,622 2.7 
Public Consumption 27,743 3.9 2.7 29,579 0.6 3.8 3.5 31,787 0.6 
Fixed Investment 46,716 2.9 3.1 49,522 0.7 4.9 4.5 54,248 1.2 
  Building 33,660 2.1 4.1 35,771 0.3 4.9 5.6 39,643 0.7 
  Machinery 13,003 3.8 1.2 13,667 0.4 4.7 1.3 14,508 0.5 
Final Domestic Demand 160,822 3.3 2.4 169,998 3.2 4.6 3.3 183,657 4.4 
Stock Building 839   1,013 0.1   1,163 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 161,661 3.4 2.4 171,011 3.3 4.6 3.3 184,820 4.5 
Total Exports 161,517 6.9 1.6 175,361 9.6 6.4 1.9 190,136 9.1 
  Merchandise 102,997 6.1 1.1 110,526 6.0 5.6 1.3 118,204 5.5 
  Services 58,520 8.7 1.9 64,836 3.6 8.1 2.6 71,932 3.5 
Total Demand 323,178 5.4 1.7 346,372 12.9 5.7 2.5 374,956 13.6 
Total Imports 129,432 5.3 1.9 138,882 5.8 5.7 1.9 149,568 6.3 
Gross Domestic Product 194,975 5.5 1.4 208,718 7.1 5.6 2.8 226,617 7.3 
Net Factor Income -32,270 8.7 1.6 -35,624 -2.4 9.2 1.9 -39,656 -2.7 
Gross National Product 162,704 4.7 1.6 173,095 4.7 4.6 3.3 186,961 4.6 
 
 
    
 2010 Volume Price 2011 Cont. to Volume Price 2012 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 97,622 4.1 3.1 104,809 2.4 3.7 3.6 112,650 2.1 
Public Consumption 31,787 3.5 4.2 34,274 0.5 3.5 5.4 37,388 0.5 
Fixed Investment 54,248 4.3 4.6 59,189 1.0 3.8 4.9 64,480 0.9 
  Building 39,643 4.5 5.7 43,784 0.6 4.0 5.9 48,200 0.5 
  Machinery 14,508 4.0 1.5 15,316 0.4 3.6 1.9 16,178 0.4 
Final Domestic Demand 183,657 4.0 3.8 198,272 3.9 3.7 4.3 214,518 3.6 
Stock Building 1,163   1,240 0.0   1,301 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 184,820 4.1 3.7 199,512 3.9 3.7 4.3 215,819 3.6 
Total Exports 190,136 5.8 2.2 205,508 8.3 5.2 2.4 221,299 7.6 
  Merchandise 118,204 5.0 1.3 125,790 5.0 4.4 1.3 133,111 4.5 
  Services 71,932 7.4 3.1 79,718 3.3 6.7 3.6 88,189 3.1 
Total Demand 374,956 5.1 2.8 405,020 12.3 4.6 3.2 437,118 11.2 
Total Imports 149,568 5.6 1.9 160,875 6.2 5.1 1.9 172,306 5.8 
Gross Domestic Product 226,617 4.7 3.4 245,373 6.1 4.1 4.1 266,040 5.4 
Net Factor Income -39,656 5.7 2.2 -42,833 -1.7 6.2 2.4 -46,561 -1.9 
Gross National Product 186,961 4.4 3.8 202,540 4.4 3.5 4.7 219,480 3.5 
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Table A2.2: Output 
 2004 Volume Price 2005 Cont. to Volume Price 2006 Cont. to 
 €m % % €m Growth % % % €m Growth % 
Agriculture 3,687 -0.5 0.5 3,685 0.0 -0.6 1.2 3,707 0.0 
Industry 48,382 5.6 1.4 51,788 2.8 4.0 2.7 55,287 2.0 
  Manufacturing 34,673 5.4 1.1 36,951 2.3 3.9 3.1 39,606 1.7 
  Utilities 1,517 8.0 -1.3 1,618 0.1 6.8 -1.6 1,700 0.1 
  Building 12,192 6.1 2.2 13,220 0.4 3.5 2.2 13,981 0.2 
Market Services 59,007 7.5 4.0 66,005 3.5 5.2 1.6 70,592 2.5 
  Distribution 13,842 6.4 2.4 15,090 0.7 4.8 2.0 16,133 0.6 
  Transport & 
Communications 
7,545 6.5 2.5 8,232 0.4 4.8 2.0 8,800 0.3 
  Other Market Services 37,620 8.3 4.8 42,684 2.3 5.5 1.4 45,659 1.6 
Non-Market Services 17,172 3.3 4.3 18,495 0.4 3.6 3.2 19,765 0.4 
  Health & Education 12,415 3.4 4.5 13,407 0.3 3.0 3.4 14,279 0.3 
  Public Administration 4,757 3.0 3.8 5,088 0.1 5.0 2.7 5,486 0.2 
GDP at Factor Cost 128,953 5.3 2.1 138,640 5.9 4.4 2.4 148,123 4.9 
Taxes on Expenditure 19,639 8.7 3.0 21,993 1.4 7.9 1.1 23,980 1.3 
Subsidies 2,652 7.2 1.5 2,887 0.2 -0.6 2.0 2,927 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 145,939 5.7 2.3 157,746 7.1 4.9 2.2 169,177 6.2 
Net Factor Income -23,624 6.1 -2.9 -24,323 -1.6 5.4 2.3 -26,209 -1.4 
GNP at Market Prices 122,315 5.6 3.3 133,423 5.6 4.8 2.2 142,968 4.8 
 
 
    
 2006 Volume    Price 2007 Cont. to Volume Price 2008 Cont. to 
 €m % % €m Growth % % % €m Growth % 
Agriculture 3,707 1.8 1.1 3,815 0.1 2.3 3.0 4,020 0.1 
Industry 55,287 8.4 0.7 60,305 4.2 7.8 0.4 65,257 4.0 
  Manufacturing 39,606 8.5 1.1 43,446 3.5 8.0 -0.2 46,848 3.5 
  Utilities 1,700 5.9 6.9 1,924 0.1 7.3 -4.5 1,971 0.1 
  Building 13,981 8.3 -1.4 14,935 0.5 6.1 3.7 16,438 0.4 
Market Services 70,592 5.3 0.7 74,890 2.5 5.2 0.8 79,439 2.4 
  Distribution 16,133 4.2 0.2 16,853 0.5 4.4 0.0 17,593 0.5 
  Transport & 
Communications 
8,800 5.0 0.6 9,296 0.3 5.2 0.8 9,853 0.4 
  Other Market Services 45,659 5.8 0.9 48,741 1.7 5.5 1.1 51,993 1.6 
Non-Market Services 19,765 4.2 4.1 21,430 0.5 4.1 4.0 23,199 0.5 
  Health & Education 14,279 4.0 4.4 15,502 0.3 4.0 4.2 16,805 0.3 
  Public Administration 5,486 4.6 3.3 5,927 0.1 4.4 3.3 6,395 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 148,123 6.5 0.9 159,211 7.2 6.2 0.9 170,687 7.0 
Taxes on Expenditure 23,980 3.8 3.0 25,636 0.6 3.6 2.8 27,285 0.6 
Subsidies 2,927 1.9 -0.7 2,960 0.1 2.1 -0.9 2,997 0.1 
GDP at Market Prices 169,177 6.2 1.2 181,887 7.8 6.0 1.2 194,975 7.5 
Net Factor Income -26,209 8.6 1.8 -2,8975 -2.2 9.6 1.6 -32,270 -2.6 
GNP at Market Prices 142,968 5.6 1.3 152,912 5.6 5.0 1.4 162,704 5.0 
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Table A2.2 (continued): Output 
 2008 Volume Price 2009 Cont. to Volume Price 2010 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Agriculture 4,020 1.3 3.1 4,197 0.1 1.8 2.4 4,377 0.1 
Industry 65,257 6.9 1.1 70,484 3.6 6.3 1.9 76,368 3.4 
  Manufacturing 46,848 7.6 -0.5 50,118 3.3 7.3 -0.3 53,578 3.3 
  Utilities 1,971 5.2 6.5 2,210 0.1 1.8 -21.1 1,777 0.0 
  Building 16,438 2.7 7.5 18,156 0.2 0.8 14.8 21,013 0.1 
Market Services 79,439 5.1 0.8 84,191 2.4 5.6 1.6 90,312 2.6 
  Distribution 17,593 4.3 0.1 18,365 0.5 5.6 0.4 19,480 0.6 
  Transport & 
Communications 
9,853 5.3 0.8 10,464 0.4 6.0 0.9 11,191 0.4 
  Other Market Services 51,993 5.4 1.0 55,362 1.6 5.5 2.1 59,640 1.6 
Non-Market Services 23,199 4.1 4.0 25,107 0.5 4.1 4.8 27,370 0.5 
  Health & Education 16,805 4.0 4.2 18,211 0.3 4.0 5.0 19,878 0.3 
  Public Administration 6,395 4.3 3.4 6,896 0.1 4.2 4.3 7,492 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 170,687 5.8 1.2 182,751 6.6 5.7 2.1 197,198 6.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 27,285 3.4 2.9 29,006 0.6 4.6 7.2 32,520 0.8 
Subsidies 2,997 1.5 -0.1 3,039 0.0 2.2 -0.1 3,101 0.1 
GDP at Market Prices 194,975 5.5 1.4 208,718 7.1 5.6 2.8 226,617 7.3 
Net Factor Income -32,270 8.7 1.6 -35,624 -2.4 9.2 1.9 -39,656 -2.7 
GNP at Market Prices 162,704 4.7 1.6 173,095 4.7 4.6 3.3 186,961 4.6 
    
    
 2010 Volume Price 2011 Cont. to Volume Price 2012 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth % % €m Growth 
% 
Agriculture 4,377 1.1 3.2 4,566 0.0 1.1 3.0 4,753 0.0 
Industry 76,368 4.7 3.6 82,796 2.5 4.3 1.1 87,314 2.3 
  Manufacturing 53,578 5.5 -1.0 55,984 2.6 4.7 -1.1 57,980 2.2 
  Utilities 1,777 0.8 52.9 2,737 0.0 9.6 -33.8 1,985 0.2 
  Building 21,013 -0.5 15.1 24,076 0.0 -1.4 15.2 27,349 -0.1 
Market Services 90,312 5.1 2.4 97,258 2.5 4.3 5.8 107,293 2.1 
  Distribution 19,480 5.0 0.9 20,645 0.6 4.6 1.5 21,916 0.5 
  Transport & 
Communications 
11,191 5.5 0.9 11,919 0.4 5.0 1.0 12,632 0.3 
  Other Market Services 59,640 5.1 3.2 64,695 1.5 4.0 8.1 72,745 1.2 
Non-Market Services 27,370 3.6 5.5 29,907 0.4 3.6 6.4 32,968 0.4 
  Health & Education 19,878 4.0 5.6 21,836 0.3 4.0 6.5 24,197 0.3 
  Public Administration 7,492 2.6 5.0 8,071 0.1 2.5 6.0 8,772 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 197,198 4.7 3.3 213,300 5.5 4.2 4.0 231,100 4.8 
Taxes on Expenditure 32,520 4.0 4.3 35,285 0.7 3.7 4.7 38,279 0.6 
Subsidies 3,101 1.4 2.1 3,211 0.0 1.3 2.7 3,339 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 226,617 4.7 3.4 245,373 6.1 4.1 4.1 266,040 5.4 
Net Factor Income -39,656 5.7 2.2 -42,833 -1.7 6.2 2.4 -46,561 -1.9 
GNP at Market Prices 186,961 4.4 3.8 202,540 4.4 3.5 4.7 219,480 3.5 
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Table A2.3: National Income and National Product, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural Incomes 2,998 3,035 3,097 3,190 3,387 3,556 3,726 3,900 4,070 
Non-Agric. Wage Income 58,701 64,562 69,248 73,700 78,690 84,097 90,973 98,508 107,327 
Non-Agric. Profits Net 51,505 53,897 57,806 63,057 67,981 73,018 78,823 85,706 92,806 
Non-Agric. Profits Gross 51,196 54,406 58,256 63,563 68,484 73,547 79,383 86,298 93,429 
Adjustment for Stock 
Appreciation 
-309 509 450 507 503 529 560 592 623 
Domestic Income 113,204 121,494 130,151 139,947 150,057 160,670 173,522 188,114 204,203 
Depreciation 15,749 17,146 17,972 19,265 20,629 22,081 2,3675 25,186 26,897 
GDP (Factor Cost) 128,953 138,640 148,123 159,211 170,687 182,751 197,198 213,300 231,100 
Taxes on Expenditure 19,639 21,993 23,980 25,636 27,285 29,006 32,520 35,285 38,279 
  Domestic 19,23 21,263 23,160 24,743 26,313 27,946 31,360 34,039 36,935 
  EC 316 730 820 893 972 1,060 1,160 1,246 1,343 
Subsidies (-) 2,652 2,887 2,27 2,960 2,997 3,039 3,01 3,211 3,339 
  Domestic 864 905 920 957 1,001 1,047 1,103 1,161 1,224 
  EC 1,788 1,982 2,007 2,04 1,996 1,992 1,999 2,050 2,115 
          
GDP (Market Prices) 145,939 157,746 169,177 181,887 194,975 208,718 226,617 245,373 266,040 
Net Factor Income -23,624 -24,323 -26,209 -28,975 -32,270 -35,624 -39,656 -42,833 -46,561 
Gross National Product 122,315 133,423 142,968 152,912 162,704 173,095 186,961 202,540 219,480 
 
Table A2.4: Personal Income and Personal Expenditure, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural Incomes 2,998 3,035 3,097 3,190 3,387 3,556 3,726 3,900 4,070 
Non-Agric. Wage Income 58,701 64,562 69,248 73,700 78,690 84,097 90,973 98,508 107,327 
Transfer Income 15,498 18,038 18,757 19,886 21,026 22,238 23,624 25,438 2,7621 
Domestic 15,457 17,534 18,024 19,120 2,0231 21,413 22,753 24,515 26,633 
Foreign 41 504 733 766 795 826 871 924 988 
Other Personal Income 15,703 15,460 16,564 16,890 16,842 16,888 17,032 17,926 18,556 
Non-Agricultural Profits 51,196 54,406 58,256 63,563 68,484 73,547 79,383 86,298 93,429 
National Debt Interest 1,747 1,790 1,828 1,680 1,703 1,724 1,743 1,746 1,751 
Net Factor Income -23,624 -24,323 -26,209 -28,975 -32,270 -35,624 -39,656 -42,833 -46,561 
Government Trading & 
Investment Income (-) 
1,246 1,450 1,800 1,925 2,048 2,179 2,354 2,550 2,763 
Other Private Income 28,073 30,423 32,075 34,343 35,868 37,469 39,116 42,661 45,856 
Undistributed Profits (-) 12,370 14,962 15,510 17,453 19,026 20,581 22,085 24,735 27,301 
Personal Income 92,900 101,096 107,666 113,666 119,944 126,779 135,355 145,772 157,573 
Taxes on Personal Income 17,616 18,887 20,441 21,506 22,656 24,032 24,185 25,614 27,780 
Personal Disposable Income 75,284 82,209 87,225 92,160 97,288 102,747 111,170 120,158 129,793 
Personal Consumption 67,079 72,080 77,714 82,046 86,362 90,897 97,622 104,809 112,650 
Personal Savings 8,205 10,129 9,511 10,114 10,926 11,850 13,549 15,349 17,143 
Tax Ratio  
(% Personal Income) 
19.0 18.7 19.0 18.9 18.9 19.0 17.9 17.6 17.6 
Savings Ratio  
(% of Disposable Income) 
10.9 12.3 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.5 12.2 12.8 13.2 
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Table A2.5: Balance of Payments, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Exports – Total 122,301 127,758 135,570 148,716 161,517 175,361 190,136 205,508 221,299
  Merchandise 81,058 83,378 88,020 95,746 102,997 110,526 118,204 125,790 133,111
  Services 41,243 44,381 47,550 52,970 58,520 64,836 71,932 79,718 88,189
Imports – Total 100,446 106,101 112,486 120,967 129,432 138,882 149,568 160,875 172,306
Balance of Trade 21,855 21,658 23,084 27,750 32,086 36,479 40,568 44,633 48,993
  as % of GNP 17.9 16.2 16.1 18.1 19.7 21.1 21.7 22.0 22.3 
International Transfers            
  EC Subsidies 1,788 1,982 2,007 2,004 1,996 1,992 1,999 2,050 2,115
  EC Taxes (-) 316 730 820 893 972 1,060 1,160 1,246 1,343
  Government Payments (-) 1,484 1,721 1,900 2,043 2,191 2,355 2,558 2,769 3,008
  Government Receipts 277 174 130 139 148 157 170 184 200
  Private Transfers 41 504 733 766 795 826 871 924 988
Net International Transfers 306 209 150 -28 -225 -440 -679 -857 -1,049
Factor Income Flows -23,624 -24,323 -26,209 -28,975 -32,270 -35,624 -39,656 -42,833 -46,561
  National Debt Interest (-) 1,554 1,664 1,770 1,660 1,666 1,672 1,677 1,675 1,674
  Profits etc. Outflows (-) 26,348 28,156 30,564 32,835 35,198 37,679 40,910 43,315 45,899
  Other Factor income 4,279 5,497 6,125 5,520 4,594 3,727 2,932 2,156 1,012
Current Account Balance -1,463 -2,456 -2,974 -1,254 -410 416 234 943 1,384
  as % of GNP -1.2 -1.8 -2.1 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 
Capital Transfers 401 360 340 355 369 383 404 428 458
Effective Current Balance -1,062 -2,096 -2,634 -898 -41 799 638 1371 1,842
  as % of GNP -0.9 -1.6 -1.8 -0.6 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.8 
Table A2.6: National Debt, Current prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Government Securities 19,568 19,578 19,544 19,614 19,636 19,653 19,720 19,796 19,876 
Other Borrowing from Central 
Bank 
5,781 5,781 5,781 6,183 6,579 6,999 7,560 8,190 8,875 
Small Savings 4,518 4,518 4,517 4,478 4,431 4,374 4,318 4,253 4,181 
Total Debt Held Domestically 16,799 16,809 16,774 17,207 17,577 17,958 18,530 19,171 19,863 
Total € Debt 29,867 29,877 29,842 30,275 30,645 31,026 31,598 32,239 32,931 
Foreign Debt:          
  Foreign Currency -5 -46 97 217 389 540 473 404 329 
  Government Securities 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 
Total Foreign Debt 13,063 13,022 13,165 13,285 13,457 13,608 13,541 13,472 13,397 
Total National Debt 29,862 29,831 29,939 30,492 31,034 31,565 32,071 32,643 33,261 
General Government Debt 47,261 48,072 47,596 48,150 48,692 49,223 49,728 50,300 50,918 
Other Bank Borrowing -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,390 -1,479 -1,574 -1,700 -1,842 -1,996 
Debt Ratios (% of GNP)          
  Total National Debt 24.4 22.4 20.9 19.9 19.1 18.2 17.2 16.1 15.2 
  General Government Debt 38.6 36.0 33.3 31.5 29.9 28.4 26.6 24.8 23.2 
  Total Domestic Debt 13.7 12.6 11.7 11.3 10.8 10.4 9.9 9.5 9.1 
  Total Foreign Debt 10.7 9.8 9.2 8.7 8.3 7.9 7.2 6.7 6.1 
Total € Debt 24.4 22.4 20.9 19.8 18.8 17.9 16.9 15.9 15.0 
Total Foreign Currency Debt 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Debt Ratios (% of GDP)          
Total National Debt 20.5 18.9 17.7 16.8 15.9 15.1 14.2 13.3 12.5 
General Government Debt 32.4 30.5 28.1 26.5 25.0 23.6 21.9 20.5 19.1 
Total Foreign Debt 9.0 8.3 7.8 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 
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Table A2.7: Public Authorities Accounts, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 22,972 24,336 26,384 27,873 29,606 31,522 32,231 34,301 37,227 
  Company 5,365 5,458 5,953 6,376 6,960 7,501 8,058 8,700 9,461 
  Personal 17,607 18,878 20,431 21,496 22,646 24,021 24,173 25,601 27,766 
Taxes on Expenditure 19,323 21,263 23,160 24,743 26,313 27,946 31,360 34,039 36,935 
  Gross 19,332 21,687 23,674 25,324 26,966 28,680 32,187 34,945 37,935 
  EC Budget Contribution (-) 9 423 513 581 653 734 827 907 1,000 
Net Trading & Investment    
 Income 
1,246 1,450 1,800 1,925 2,048 2,179 2,354 2,550 2,763 
Transfers From Abroad 277 174 130 139 148 157 170 184 200 
Total Current Receipts 43,827 47,232 51,484 54,690 58,126 61,816 66,127 71,087 77,139 
Subsidies 864 905 920 957 1,001 1,047 1,103 1,161 1,224 
National Debt Interest 1,747 1,790 1,828 1,680 1,703 1,724 1,743 1,746 1,751 
Other Transfer Payments 16,941 19,255 19,924 21,163 22,422 23,768 25,312 27,283 29,641 
  Foreign 1,484 1,721 1,900 2,043 2,191 2,355 2,558 2,769 3,008 
  Residents 15,457 17,534 18,024 19,120 20,231 21,413 22,753 24,515 26,633 
Public Consumption 20,761 22,477 24,452 26,047 27,743 29,579 31,787 34,274 37,388 
Total Current Expenditure 40,313 44,427 47,123 49,847 52,870 56,118 59,944 64,465 70,004 
Public Authorities Savings 
(net) 
3,514 2,805 4,361 4,843 5,256 5,699 6,183 6,623 7,135 
  as % of GNP 2.9 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Total Capital Receipts 2,895 2,964 3,045 3,083 3,119 3,164 3,252 3,364 3,502 
  Grants – Housing 98 100 102 104 110 117 134 151 169 
  Grants – Industry 57 59 62 65 69 73 77 81 86 
  Investment 6,133 6,572 7,044 7,410 7,792 8,207 8,673 9,196 9,784 
  Other Capital Expenditure 746 943 857 900 946 997 1,058 1,131 1,216 
Total Capital Expenditure 7,033 7,675 8,065 8,480 8,917 9,395 9,943 10,559 11,256 
Borrowing for Capital 
Purposes 
-4,139 -4,711 -5,019 -5,397 -5,798 -6,231 -6,691 -7,195 -7,754 
Total Borrowing -625 -1,906 -659 -554 -543 -532 -507 -573 -619 
  as % of GNP -0.5 -1.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
Budgetary Definitions          
Exchequer Surplus 112 -2,008 -1,942 -1,838 -1827 -1816 -1,791 -1,857 -1,903 
  as % of GNP 0.1 -1.5 -1.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 
Current Budget Surplus 5,699 5,141 5,157 5,639 6,052 6,495 6,979 7,419 7,931 
  as % of GNP 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 
EU Definitions          
General Government 
Balance 
-2,117 811 -476 -581 -592 -602 -627 -562 -516 
as % of GDP -1.5 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
as % of GNP -1.7 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 
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Table A2.8: Employment and the Labour Force, Thousands, Mid-April 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agriculture 114 110 109 105 102 100 97 94 92 
Industry 504 526 531 530 536 543 557 565 569 
Manufacturing:          
  Traditional 98 98 98 97 96 96 95 93 90 
  Food Processing 47 48 47 47 46 45 44 43 41 
  High Technology 141 133 130 132 135 140 145 147 147 
Manufacturing 286 278 275 276 278 281 284 282 278 
  Utilities 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 
  Building 204 234 242 241 244 248 259 269 278 
Market Services 754 802 826 850 875 902 932 961 990 
  Distribution 260 277 287 291 294 297 302 306 307 
  Transport & 
  Communications 
112 112 112 113 116 119 121 123 123 
Other Market Services 382 413 427 446 465 486 508 533 560 
Non-Market Services 402 415 429 446 463 481 500 518 536 
  Health & Education 307 317 327 340 353 367 382 397 413 
  Public Administration 95 98 103 106 110 114 118 120 123 
Total Employment 1,774 1,853 1,895 1,931 1,977 2,026 2,086 2,138 2,187 
Unemployment 109 105 110 124 126 123 107 101 88 
Labour Force 1,883 1,958 2,005 2,055 2,103 2,149 2,193 2,240 2,274 
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Table A3.1: Expenditure on GNP 
 2004 Volume Price 2005 Cont. to Volume Price 2006 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 67,079 5.2 2.1 72,080 3.2 5.0 2.7 77,714 3.0 
Public Consumption 20,761 3.4 4.7 22,477 0.6 3.6 5.0 24,452 0.6 
Fixed Investment 36,156 7.3 2.9 39,903 1.8 4.3 1.9 42,412 1.1 
  Building 27,090 5.2 3.7 29,562 0.8 2.2 2.1 30,849 0.3 
  Machinery 9,068 10.4 3.4 10,348 1.1 7.2 4.3 11,574 0.8 
Final Domestic Demand 123,997 5.4 2.8 134,460 5.5 4.6 2.8 144,578 4.7 
Stock Building 793   294 0.1   286 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 124,790 5.6 2.3 134,755 5.7 4.7 2.7 144,864 4.8 
Total Exports 122,301 4.6 -0.1 127,758 6.2 4.3 1.7 135,570 5.8 
  Merchandise 81,058 3.8 -0.9 83,378 3.7 4.2 1.3 88,020 4.1 
  Services 41,243 6.4 1.2 44,381 2.5 4.5 2.5 47,550 1.7 
Total Demand 247,091 5.0 1.2 262,513 11.9 4.5 2.3 280,434 10.6 
Total Imports 100,446 5.0 0.6 106,101 5.6 4.1 1.9 112,486 4.5 
Gross Domestic Product 145,939 5.7 2.3 157,746 7.1 4.9 2.2 169,177 6.2 
Net Factor Income -23,624 6.1 -2.9 -24,323 -1.6 5.4 2.3 -26,209 -1.4 
Gross National Product 122,316 5.6 3.3 133,423 5.6 4.8 2.2 142,968 4.8 
        
 2006 Volume Price 2007 Cont. to Volume Price 2008 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 77,714 2.8 1.9 81,435 1.7 2.1 1.9 84,742 1.3 
Public Consumption 24,452 2.9 2.6 25,832 0.5 2.9 2.7 27,297 0.4 
Fixed Investment 42,412 1.8 1.1 43,661 0.5 1.8 0.9 44,882 0.5 
  Building 30,849 0.7 1.2 31,446 0.1 0.5 1.2 31,974 0.1 
  Machinery 11,574 3.2 2.1 12,195 0.3 3.6 1.5 12,820 0.4 
Final Domestic Demand 144,578 2.6 1.8 150,928 2.6 2.2 1.8 156,921 2.2 
Stock Building 286   529 -0.1   653 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 144,864 2.4 2.1 151,456 2.5 2.2 1.8 157,574 2.3 
Total Exports 135,570 5.4 1.4 144,807 7.2 4.6 1.7 154,040 6.2 
  Merchandise 88,020 4.9 0.9 93,183 4.7 4.0 1.4 98,342 3.9 
  Services 47,550 6.5 1.9 51,624 2.5 5.9 1.9 55,697 2.3 
Total Demand 280,434 4.1 1.5 296,264 9.7 3.6 1.5 311,614 8.5 
Total Imports 112,486 3.7 1.9 118,871 4.1 2.9 1.9 124,639 3.2 
Gross Domestic Product 169,177 4.4 1.1 178,620 5.6 4.2 1.1 188,203 5.3 
Net Factor Income -26,209 6.8 1.4 -28,385 -1.8 7.3 1.7 -30,975 -1.9 
Gross National Product 142,968 3.8 1.2 150,235 3.8 3.4 1.2 157,228 3.4 
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Table A3.1 (continued): Expenditure on GNP 
 2008 Volume Price 2009 Cont. to Volume Price 2010 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 84,742 1.1 1.9 87,322 0.7 2.2 2.2 91,170 1.3 
Public Consumption 27,297 2.9 2.4 28,751 0.4 2.9 2.5 30,299 0.4 
Fixed Investment 44,882 1.0 0.9 45,726 0.2 2.8 1.6 47,741 0.7 
  Building 31,974 -0.2 1.1 32,268 0.0 2.2 1.9 33,602 0.3 
  Machinery 12,820 2.5 1.3 13,309 0.3 3.4 1.3 13,946 0.4 
Final Domestic Demand 156,921 1.3 1.7 161,800 1.3 2.4 2.1 169,210 2.4 
Stock Building 653   741 0.1   823 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 157,574 1.4 1.7 162,540 1.4 2.5 2.1 170,033 2.4 
Total Exports 154,040 4.7 1.6 163,855 6.4 4.5 1.8 174,393 6.3 
  Merchandise 98,342 4.1 1.3 103,656 3.9 3.9 1.4 109,236 3.8 
  Services 55,697 6.0 1.9 60,199 2.5 5.9 2.2 65,158 2.5 
Total Demand 311,614 3.3 1.4 326,395 7.8 3.7 1.8 344,426 8.7 
Total Imports 124,639 3.0 1.9 130,747 3.2 3.5 1.9 137,815 3.8 
Gross Domestic Product 188,203 3.6 1.0 196,876 4.6 3.8 1.7 207,839 4.9 
Net Factor Income -30,975 6.8 1.6 -33,621 -1.9 6.9 1.8 -36,613 -2.0 
Gross National Product 157,228 2.7 1.1 163,255 2.7 3.0 1.9 171,226 3.0 
 
 
    
 2010 Volume Price 2011 Cont. to Volume Price 2012 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 91,170 1.8 2.1 94,767 1.0 1.9 2.0 98,418 1.1 
Public Consumption 30,299 2.1 2.1 31,581 0.3 2.1 2.3 32,980 0.3 
Fixed Investment 47,741 2.6 1.5 49,726 0.6 2.6 1.6 51,865 0.6 
  Building 33,602 2.1 1.8 34,937 0.3 2.1 1.9 36,342 0.3 
  Machinery 13,946 3.2 1.3 14,579 0.3 3.3 1.5 15,285 0.4 
Final Domestic Demand 169,210 2.1 2.0 176,074 2.0 2.1 2.0 183,263 2.0 
Stock Building 823   863 0.0   923 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 170,033 2.1 2.0 176,937 2.0 2.1 1.9 184,186 2.0 
Total Exports 174,393 4.4 1.9 185,488 6.3 4.4 1.8 197,161 6.3 
  Merchandise 109,236 3.8 1.5 115,050 3.7 3.7 1.5 121,102 3.7 
  Services 65,158 5.9 2.1 70,438 2.5 5.9 2.0 76,059 2.6 
Total Demand 344,426 3.5 1.7 362,425 8.3 3.5 1.7 381,347 8.3 
Total Imports 137,815 3.7 1.9 145,667 4.1 3.8 1.9 154,030 4.2 
Gross Domestic Product 207,839 3.2 1.6 217,986 4.2 3.2 1.6 228,546 4.2 
Net Factor Income -36,613 3.1 1.9 -38,449 -0.9 3.0 1.8 -40,321 -0.9 
Gross National Product 171,226 3.3 1.5 17,-9537 3.3 3.3 1.5 188,225 3.3 
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Table A3.2: Output 
 2004 Volume    Price 2005 Cont. to Volume Price 2006 Cont. to 
 €m % % €m Growth % % % €m Growth % 
Agriculture 3,687 -0.5 0.5 3,685 0.0 -0.6 1.2 3,707 0.0 
Industry 48,382 5.6 1.4 51,788 2.8 4.0 2.7 55,287 2.0 
  Manufacturing 34,673 5.4 1.1 36,951 2.3 3.9 3.1 39,606 1.7 
  Utilities 1,517 8.0 -1.3 1,618 0.1 6.8 -1.6 1,700 0.1 
  Building 12,192 6.1 2.2 13,220 0.4 3.5 2.2 13,981 0.2 
Market Services 59,007 7.5 4.0 66,005 3.5 5.2 1.6 70,592 2.5 
  Distribution 13,842 6.4 2.4 15,090 0.7 4.8 2.0 16,133 0.6 
  Transport & 
Communications 
7,545 6.5 2.5 8,232 0.4 4.8 2.0 8,800 0.3 
  Other Market Services 37,620 8.3 4.8 42,684 2.3 5.5 1.4 45,659 1.6 
Non-Market Services 17,172 3.3 4.3 18,495 0.4 3.6 3.2 19,765 0.4 
  Health & Education 12,415 3.4 4.5 13,407 0.3 3.0 3.4 14,279 0.3 
  Public Administration 4,757 3.0 3.8 5,088 0.1 5.0 2.7 5,486 0.2 
GDP at Factor Cost 128,953 5.3 2.1 138,640 5.9 4.4 2.4 148,123 4.9 
Taxes on Expenditure 19,639 8.7 3.0 21,993 1.4 7.9 1.1 23,980 1.3 
Subsidies 2,652 7.2 1.5 2,887 0.2 -0.6 2.0 2,927 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 145,939 5.7 2.3 157,746 7.1 4.9 2.2 169,177 6.2 
Net Factor Income -23,624 6.1 -2.9 -24,323 -1.6 5.4 2.3 -26,209 -1.4 
GNP at Market Prices 122,316 5.6 3.3 133,423 5.6 4.8 2.2 142,968 4.8 
 
 
    
 2006 Volume Price 2007 Cont. to Volume Price 2008 Cont. to 
 €m % % €m Growth % % % €m Growth % 
Agriculture 3,707 1.8 1.4 3,829 0.1 2.3 3.0 4,032 0.1 
Industry 55,287 5.4 -1.1 57,632 2.7 5.3 -1.3 59,866 2.7 
  Manufacturing 39,606 4.9 -1.1 41,094 2.0 4.9 -0.9 42,719 2.0 
  Utilities 1,700 5.8 7.1 1,927 0.1 7.2 -4.1 1,981 0.1 
  Building 13,981 8.7 -3.9 14,611 0.5 7.3 -3.3 15,166 0.5 
Market Services 70,592 4.4 1.4 74,709 2.1 4.1 1.7 79,093 1.9 
  Distribution 16,133 3.3 0.3 16,719 0.4 3.1 0.1 17,249 0.4 
  Transport & 
Communications 
8,800 4.0 0.6 9,210 0.3 3.8 0.8 9,635 0.3 
  Other Market Services 45,659 4.9 1.9 48,780 1.4 4.5 2.4 52,210 1.3 
Non-Market Services 19,765 2.8 4.2 21,183 0.3 2.8 4.2 22,684 0.3 
  Health & Education 14,279 2.5 4.6 15,303 0.2 2.5 4.5 16,388 0.2 
  Public Administration 5,486 3.6 3.5 5,880 0.1 3.4 3.5 6,296 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 148,123 4.6 0.8 156,125 5.1 4.4 0.8 164,448 5.0 
Taxes on Expenditure 23,980 2.8 3.1 25,420 0.5 2.2 2.7 26,684 0.4 
Subsidies 2,927 1.3 -1.4 2,925 0.0 1.5 -1.3 2,928 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 169,177 4.4 1.1 178,620 5.6 4.2 1.1 188,203 5.3 
Net Factor Income -26,209 6.8 1.4 -28,385 -1.8 7.3 1.7 -30,975 -1.9 
GNP at Market Prices 142,968 3.8 1.2 150,235 3.8 3.4 1.2 157,228 3.4 
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Table A3.2 (continued): Output 
 2008 Volume Price 2009 Cont. to Volume Price 2010 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth % % €m Growth 
% 
Agriculture 4,032 1.3 3.0 4,210 0.1 1.8 2.5 4,392 0.1 
Industry 59,866 4.4 -1.0 61,873 2.3 4.3 -0.7 64,078 2.2 
  Manufacturing 42,719 4.6 -1.1 44,189 2.0 4.8 -0.8 45,979 2.1 
  Utilities 1,981 5.2 6.5 2,220 0.1 1.7 -21.3 1,777 0.0 
  Building 15,166 3.1 -1.1 15,464 0.2 1.5 4.0 16,321 0.1 
Market Services 79,093 3.7 1.3 83,083 1.8 4.1 1.3 87,657 2.0 
  Distribution 17,249 2.4 0.1 17,672 0.3 3.5 0.1 18,307 0.4 
  Transport & 
Communications 
9,635 3.5 0.8 10,056 0.2 4.1 0.9 10,560 0.3 
  Other Market Services 52,210 4.2 1.7 55,355 1.2 4.4 1.8 58,790 1.3 
Non-Market Services 22,684 2.7 3.7 24,168 0.3 2.7 3.6 25,725 0.3 
  Health & Education 16,388 2.5 3.9 17,460 0.2 2.5 3.8 18,584 0.2 
  Public Administration 6,296 3.3 3.2 6,708 0.1 3.2 3.2 7,140 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 164,448 3.9 0.8 172,105 4.4 4.0 0.9 180,623 4.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 26,684 1.3 2.5 27,700 0.2 2.3 6.5 30,151 0.4 
Subsidies 2,928 0.6 -0.6 2,929 0.0 1.2 -1.0 2,934 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 188,203 3.6 1.0 196,876 4.6 3.8 1.7 207,839 4.9 
Net Factor Income -30,975 6.8 1.6 -3,3621 -1.9 6.9 1.8 -36,613 -2.0 
GNP at Market Prices 157,228 2.7 1.1 163,255 2.7 3.0 1.9 171,226 3.0 
      
      
 2010 Volume Price 2011 Cont. to Volume Price 2012 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Agriculture 4,392 1.0 3.3 4,585 0.0 1.0 3.2 4,778 0.0 
Industry 64,078 3.3 1.1 66,920 1.8 3.7 -1.9 68,081 2.0 
  Manufacturing 45,979 3.8 -1.4 47,068 1.7 3.9 -1.5 48,152 1.7 
  Utilities 1,777 0.6 50.8 2,696 0.0 9.0 -35.0 1,911 0.2 
  Building 16,321 0.6 4.5 17,155 0.0 0.8 4.2 18,018 0.0 
Market Services 87,657 3.9 1.1 92,097 1.9 3.4 3.5 98,605 1.7 
  Distribution 18,307 3.2 0.0 18,904 0.4 3.3 -0.1 19,516 0.4 
  Transport & 
Communications 
10,560 3.9 0.9 11,073 0.3 3.8 1.0 11,605 0.3 
  Other Market Services 58,790 4.2 1.4 62,120 1.3 3.4 5.1 67,484 1.0 
Non-Market Services 25,725 1.7 3.2 26,987 0.2 1.6 3.0 28,249 0.2 
  Health & Education 18,584 1.5 3.4 19,496 0.1 1.5 3.1 20,408 0.1 
  Public Administration 7,140 2.1 2.8 7,491 0.1 2.0 2.6 7,841 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 180,623 3.4 1.4 189,360 3.9 3.3 1.4 198,486 3.9 
Taxes on Expenditure 30,151 2.0 2.8 31,597 0.3 2.0 2.6 33,068 0.3 
Subsidies 2,934 0.6 0.6 2,971 0.0 0.7 0.6 3,009 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 207,839 3.2 1.6 217,986 4.2 3.2 1.6 228,546 4.2 
Net Factor Income -36,613 3.1 1.9 -38,449 -0.9 3.0 1.8 -40,321 -0.9 
GNP at Market Prices 171,226 3.3 1.5 179,537 3.3 3.3 1.5 188,225 3.3 
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Table A3.3: National Income and National Product, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural Incomes 2,998 3,035 3,097 3,204 3,399 3,568 3,741 3,923 4,104 
Non-Agric. Wage Income 58,701 64,562 69,248 73,333 77,644 81,612 86,065 89,979 93,898 
Non-Agric. Profits Net 51,505 53,897 57,806 60,323 62,783 64,856 67,200 70,484 74,077 
Non-Agric. Profits Gross 51,196 54,406 58,256 60,773 63,233 65,306 67,650 70,934 74,527 
Adjustment for Stock 
Appreciation 
-309 509 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Domestic Income 113,204 121,494 130,151 136,860 143,827 150,037 157,006 164,386 172,079 
Depreciation 15,749 17,146 17,972 192,65 20,621 22,069 23,616 24,974 26,407 
GDP (Factor Cost) 128,953 138,640 148,123 156,125 164,448 172,105 180,623 189,360 198,486 
Taxes on Expenditure 19,639 21,993 23,980 25,420 26,684 27,700 30,151 31,597 33,068 
  Domestic 19,323 21,263 23,160 24,540 25,740 26,687 29,064 30,455 31,870 
  EC 316 730 820 880 944 1,013 1,087 1,141 1,198 
Subsidies (-) 2,652 2,887 2,927 2,925 2,928 2,929 2,934 2,971 3,009 
  Domestic 864 905 920 948 981 1,012 1,047 1,084 1,122 
  EC 1,788 1,982 2,007 1,977 1,947 1,917 1,887 1,887 1,887 
          
GDP (Market Prices) 145,939 157,746 169,177 178,620 188,203 196,876 207,839 217,986 228,546 
Net Factor Income -23624 -24,323 -26,209 -28,385 -30,975 -33,621 -36,613 -38,449 -40,321 
Gross National Product 122316 133,423 142,968 150,235 157,228 163,255 171,226 179,537 188,225 
 
Table A3.4: Personal Income and Personal Expenditure, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural Incomes 2,998 3,035 3,097 3,204 3,399 3,568 3,741 3,923 4,104 
Non-Agric. Wage Income 58,701 64,562 69,248 73,333 77,644 81,612 86,065 89,979 93,898 
Transfer Income 15,498 18,038 18,757 19,985 21,286 22,594 23,875 25,234 26,527 
Domestic 15,457 17,534 18,024 19,229 20,510 21,799 23,054 24,385 25,648 
Foreign 41 504 733 756 775 794 821 849 878 
Other Personal Income 15,703 15,460 16,564 16,300 15,853 15,112 14,363 14,515 14,753 
Non-Agricultural Profits 51,196 54,406 582,56 60,773 63,233 65,306 67,650 70,934 74,527 
National Debt Interest 1,747 1,790 1,828 1,664 1,683 1,696 1,706 1,707 1,712 
Net Factor Income -23,624 -24,323 -26,209 -28,385 -30,975 -3,3621 -36,613 -38,449 -40,321 
Government Trading & 
Investment Income (-) 
1,246 1,450 1,800 1,891 1,980 2,055 2,156 2,260 2,370 
Other Private Income 28,073 30,423 32,075 32,160 31,961 31,326 30,586 31,931 33,548 
Undistributed Profits (-) 12,370 14,962 15,510 15,860 16,109 16,214 16,223 17,416 18,795 
Personal Income 92,900 101,096 107,666 112,822 118,182 122,886 128,044 133,651 139,281 
Taxes on Personal Income 17,616 18,887 20,441 21,597 23,352 25,410 26,165 27,614 29,043 
Personal Disposable Income 75,285 82,209 87,225 91,224 94,830 97,476 101,880 106,036 110,238 
Personal Consumption 67,079 72,080 77,714 81,435 84,742 87,322 91,170 94,767 98,418 
Personal Savings 8,205 10,129 9,511 9,790 10,088 10,153 10,710 11,270 11,820 
Tax Ratio  
(% Personal Income) 
19.0 18.7 19.0 19.1 19.8 20.7 20.4 20.7 20.9 
Savings Ratio  
(% of Disposable Income) 
10.9 12.3 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 
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Table A3.5: Balance of Payments, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Exports – Total 122,301 127,758 135,570 144,807 154,040 163,855 174,393 185,488 197,161 
  Merchandise 81,058 83,378 88,020 93,183 98,342 103,656 109,236 115,050 121,102 
  Services 41,243 44,381 47,550 51,624 55,697 60,199 65,158 70,438 76,059 
Imports – Total 100,446 106,101 112,486 118,871 124,639 130,747 137,815 145,667 154,030 
Balance of Trade 21,855 21,658 23,084 25,936 29,401 33,108 36,578 39,821 43,132 
  as % of GNP 17.9 16.2 16.1 17.3 18.7 20.3 21.4 22.2 22.9 
International Transfers            
  EC Subsidies 1,788 1,982 2,007 1977 1,947 1,917 1,887 1,887 1,887 
  EC Taxes (-) 316 730 820 880 944 1,013 1,087 1,141 1,198 
  Government Payments (-) 1,484 1,721 1,900 2,012 2,129 2,246 2,383 2,506 2,637 
  Government Receipts 277 174 130 137 143 148 156 163 171 
  Private Transfers 41 504 733 756 775 794 821 849 878 
Net International Transfers 306 209 150 -23 -208 -400 -606 -749 -899 
Factor Income Flows -23,624 -24,323 -26,209 -28,385 -30,975 -3,3621 -36,613 -38,449 -40,321 
  National Debt Interest (-) 1,554 1,664 1,770 1,660 1,670 1,676 1,683 1,686 1,691 
  Profits etc. Outflows (-) 26,348 28,156 30,564 32,246 33,976 35,541 37,520 38,480 39,430 
  Other Factor income 4,279 5,497 6,125 5,520 4,670 3,597 2,590 1,717 800 
Current Account Balance -1,463 -2,456 -2,974 -2,472 -1,781 -913 -642 623 1,912 
  as % of GNP -1.2 -1.8 -2.1 -1.6 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 1.0 
Capital Transfers 401 360 340 351 360 368 381 394 407 
Effective Current Balance -1,062 -2,096 -2,634 -2,121 -1,422 -545 -261 1,017 2,320 
  as % of GNP -0.9 -1.6 -1.8 -1.4 -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 1.2 
Table A3.6: National Debt, Current prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Government Securities 19,568 19,578 19,544 19,548 19,506 19,437 19,399 19,354 19,306 
Other Borrowing from Central 
Bank 
5,781 5,781 5,781 6,075 6,358 6,601 6,924 7,260 7,611 
Small Savings 4,518 4,518 4,517 4,492 4,459 4,417 4,373 4,314 4,242 
Total Debt Held Domestically 16,799 16,809 16,774 17,046 17,255 17,388 17,627 17,860 18,091 
Total € Debt 29,867 29,877 29,842 30,114 30,323 30,456 30,695 30,928 31,159 
Foreign Debt:          
  Foreign Currency -5 -46 97 350 641 960 1,103 1,250 1,372 
  Government Securities 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 13,068 
Total Foreign Debt 13,063 13,022 13,165 13,418 13,709 14,028 14,171 14,318 14,440 
Total National Debt 29,862 29,831 29,939 30,464 30,964 31,416 31,798 32,178 32,531 
General Government Debt 47,261 48,072 47,596 48,122 48,621 49,073 49,455 49,835 50,188 
Other Bank Borrowing -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,366 -1,430 -1,484 -1,557 -1,633 -1,712 
Debt Ratios (% of GNP)          
  Total National Debt 24.4 22.4 20.9 20.3 19.7 19.2 18.6 17.9 17.3 
  General Government Debt 38.6 36.0 33.3 32.0 30.9 30.1 28.9 27.8 26.7 
  Total Domestic Debt 13.7 12.6 11.7 11.3 11.0 10.7 10.3 9.9 9.6 
  Total Foreign Debt 10.7 9.8 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.7 
Total € Debt 24.4 22.4 20.9 20.0 19.3 18.7 17.9 17.2 16.6 
Total Foreign Currency Debt 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Debt Ratios (% of GDP)          
Total National Debt 20.5 18.9 17.7 17.1 16.5 16.0 15.3 14.8 14.2 
General Government Debt 32.4 30.5 28.1 26.9 25.8 24.9 23.8 22.9 22.0 
Total Foreign Debt 9.0 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.3 
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Table A3.7: Public Authorities Accounts, Current Prices, € million 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 22,972 24,336 26,384 27,964 29,995 32,323 33,305 35,012 36,802 
  Company 5,365 5,458 5,953 6,376 6,653 6,924 7,152 7,410 7,771 
  Personal 17,607 18,878 20,431 21,588 23,342 25,399 26,154 27,603 29,031 
Taxes on Expenditure 19,323 21,263 23,160 24,540 25,740 26,687 29,064 30,455 31,870 
  Gross 19,332 21,687 23,674 25,114 26,377 27,393 29,844 31,290 32,762 
  EC Budget Contribution (-) 9 423 513 573 638 706 780 835 892 
Net Trading & Investment    
 Income 
1,246 1,450 1,800 1,891 1,980 2,055 2,156 2,260 2,370 
Transfers From Abroad 277 174 130 137 143 148 156 163 171 
Total Current Receipts 43,827 47,232 51,484 54,542 57,867 61,224 64,692 67,903 71,225 
Subsidies 864 905 920 948 981 1,012 1,047 1,084 1,122 
National Debt Interest 1,747 1,790 1,828 1,664 1,683 1,696 1,706 1,707 1,712 
Other Transfer Payments 16,941 19,255 19,924 21,241 22,639 24,046 25,436 26,891 28,285 
  Foreign 1,484 1,721 1,900 2,012 2,129 2,246 2,383 2,506 2,637 
  Residents 15,457 17,534 18,024 19,229 20,510 21,799 23,054 24,385 25,648 
Public Consumption 20,761 22,477 24,452 25,832 27,297 28,751 30,299 31,581 32,980 
Total Current Expenditure 40,313 44,427 47,123 49,684 52,600 55,504 58,489 61,263 64,099 
Public Authorities Savings 
(net) 
3,514 2,805 4,361 4,858 5,267 5,721 6,203 6,640 7,126 
  as % of GNP 2.87 2.10 3.05 3.23 3.35 3.50 3.62 3.70 3.79 
Total Capital Receipts 2,895 2,964 3,045 3,079 3,113 3,143 3,196 3,247 3,298 
  Grants – Housing 98 100 102 102 101 99 102 105 108 
  Grants – Industry 57 59 62 65 69 73 76 80 83 
  Investment 6,133 6,572 7,044 7,396 7,766 8,154 8,562 8,990 9,440 
  Other Capital Expenditure 746 943 857 899 944 992 1,041 1,093 1,148 
Total Capital Expenditure 7,033 7,675 8,065 8,463 8,880 9,317 9,781 10,268 10,779 
Borrowing for Capital 
Purposes 
-4,139 -4,711 -5,019 -5,384 -5,768 -6,174 -6,586 -7,021 -7,481 
Total Borrowing -625 -1,906 -659 -526 -501 -453 -383 -381 -355 
  as % of GNP -0.51 -1.43 -0.46 -0.35 -0.32 -0.28 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 
Budgetary Definitions          
Exchequer Surplus 112 -2,008 -1,942 -1,810 -1,784 -1,737 -1,667 -1,665 -1,639 
  as % of GNP 0.1 -1.5 -1.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 
Current Budget Surplus 5,699 5,141 5,157 5,654 6,063 6,517 6,999 7,436 7,922 
  as % of GNP 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 
EU Definitions          
General Government 
Balance 
-2,117 811 -476 -608 -634 -681 -752 -753 -780 
as % of GDP -1.5 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
as % of GNP -1.7 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
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Table A3.8: Employment and the Labour Force, Thousands, Mid-April 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agriculture 114 110 109 105 102 100 97 94 92 
Industry 504 526 531 527 527 526 531 531 531 
Manufacturing:          
  Traditional 98 98 98 97 96 95 94 92 90 
  Food Processing 47 48 47 46 46 45 45 44 43 
  High Technology 141 133 130 131 133 134 136 134 133 
Manufacturing 286 278 275 275 275 275 275 271 266 
  Utilities 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 
  Building 204 234 242 239 239 238 242 247 251 
Market Services 754 802 826 846 864 878 895 914 936 
  Distribution 260 277 287 288 288 287 288 290 292 
  Transport & 
  Communications 
112 112 112 112 113 114 116 118 120 
Other Market Services 382 413 427 446 462 477 491 507 524 
Non-Market Services 402 415 429 440 451 462 474 481 488 
  Health & Education 307 317 327 335 343 352 361 366 371 
  Public Administration 95 98 103 105 108 111 113 115 117 
Total Employment 1,774 1,853 1,895 1,919 1,944 1,966 1,996 2,021 2,047 
Unemployment 109 105 110 135 154 174 181 193 192 
Labour Force 1,883 1,958 2,005 2,054 2,099 2,139 2,177 2,214 2,238 
 
 
